早汇报三件事,关于律所的报告。
1. No shareholder meetings needed
2. Filings include:
Form 10 for parents
S-1 or 8-A for IPO subsidiaries
3. Debt offering - Cash transactions
Example:
Abbott $50 billion spin off
$14 billion debt offering
力力的问题,
10-K怎么显示俩公司的负债情况?
老克的问题,
generally speaking, stock dividend, splits-off, spin-offs, carve-outs在美国都是谁起头的?MGMT or shareholders? 查Delaware州法律即可。
Wednesday, January 14, 2015
Tuesday, January 13, 2015
20150113 Lunch Room Presentation
1. What are the rules for spinoff shareholder meetings?
Do they need a meeting? Kris said in Sweden 必须有那么一个会议。
美国的规定不一样,那么多少$以上,或者占公司比重多少的spinoff,需要那样的会议?
2. Management forecasts始于何时?time series中怎样变化?
3. Analysts forecasts始于何时?time series中怎样变化?
To-do-list
2015.1.13
1. Control Group
2. Expand time to 1998 (IBES)
3. SDC Plantinum, user initial?
4. BUPC email list
5. Bed Frame (Walmart)
6. Credit Card - Holland America?
7. Credit Card Receipt - $500?
8. Register 1 credit in Srping
9. Campus Pre-School Material
10. Rocky 10:30AM Appointment
11. SIC in CRSP?
12. Lunch room presentation Qs
老克的建议
(1) 不要用Information asymmetry这样的字眼,我们不知道管理层到底是不是知道。用Value!!!因为市场低估了Value。
(2) 找control group过程中
条件: a. 两位SIC相同
b. 10%以内的total assets
c. 最接近的MB ratio
如果条件二不满足,把第一条限制去掉。
=====================================
想起小马跟我讲的。debt的原因。
律所的这篇文章,讲起spin off其实也经常牵涉"钱"的问题。比如子公司被spun off前,借了笔钱,然后把现金都给了母公司,在spun off以后,把债务带走。
http://www.wlrk.com/files/2014/SpinOffGuide.pdf
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
Spin-Off Guide
spin off的CAR是最高的,比carve-out和卖部门的CAR都高。如果和钱有关,与debt有关的spin off应该CAR较低。
和力力谈谈这个alternative explanation.
https://books.google.com/books?id=t2qrbAo0fs4C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
Do they need a meeting? Kris said in Sweden 必须有那么一个会议。
美国的规定不一样,那么多少$以上,或者占公司比重多少的spinoff,需要那样的会议?
2. Management forecasts始于何时?time series中怎样变化?
3. Analysts forecasts始于何时?time series中怎样变化?
To-do-list
2015.1.13
1. Control Group
2. Expand time to 1998 (IBES)
3. SDC Plantinum, user initial?
4. BUPC email list
5. Bed Frame (Walmart)
6. Credit Card - Holland America?
7. Credit Card Receipt - $500?
8. Register 1 credit in Srping
9. Campus Pre-School Material
10. Rocky 10:30AM Appointment
11. SIC in CRSP?
12. Lunch room presentation Qs
老克的建议
(1) 不要用Information asymmetry这样的字眼,我们不知道管理层到底是不是知道。用Value!!!因为市场低估了Value。
(2) 找control group过程中
条件: a. 两位SIC相同
b. 10%以内的total assets
c. 最接近的MB ratio
如果条件二不满足,把第一条限制去掉。
=====================================
想起小马跟我讲的。debt的原因。
律所的这篇文章,讲起spin off其实也经常牵涉"钱"的问题。比如子公司被spun off前,借了笔钱,然后把现金都给了母公司,在spun off以后,把债务带走。
http://www.wlrk.com/files/2014/SpinOffGuide.pdf
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
Spin-Off Guide
spin off的CAR是最高的,比carve-out和卖部门的CAR都高。如果和钱有关,与debt有关的spin off应该CAR较低。
和力力谈谈这个alternative explanation.
https://books.google.com/books?id=t2qrbAo0fs4C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
Monday, January 12, 2015
* 20 parent firms do not have AT in the current year;
* 20 parent firms do not have AT in the current year;
* Airborne Inc-Air Operations, AIRBORNE INC acquired by DHL;
* US Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc, Parent New GVKEY 4723(1963-2013), Old gvkey 4682;
* Tronox Inc, KERR-MCGEE CORP, parent acquired by Anadarko;
* Fidelity National Title Group, merge after spinoff;
http://www.investor.fnf.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=201868
* CPEX Pharmaceuticals Inc, Bentley Pharmaceuticals & Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Merger;
* Airborne Inc-Air Operations, AIRBORNE INC acquired by DHL;
* US Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc, Parent New GVKEY 4723(1963-2013), Old gvkey 4682;
* Tronox Inc, KERR-MCGEE CORP, parent acquired by Anadarko;
http://www.anadarko.com/Investor/Pages/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?release-id=894918
https://www.quanex.com/News-Room/News-Releases/Investors/Quanex-Corporation-Announces-Plan-to-Separate-Its.aspx
* Suncoke Energy Inc, Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. Acquisition of Sunoco, Inc.;
file:///C:/Users/qzhang25/Downloads/ETP%20to%20Acquie%20SUN%20Investor%20Presentation%20(1).pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunoco
* Adelphia Business Solutions, ADELPHIA COMMUN -CL A, two missing years of AT in Compustat;
* Comverse Inc, parent COMVERSE TECHNOLOGY INC merger with VRNT;
http://www.spinoffresearch.com/Stock-Spin-Off-Research-Report-blog/bid/161470/CMVT-Spin-Off-Comverse-Technology-Comverse-Inc-When-Issued-Trading
* Fidelity National Title Group, merge after spinoff;
http://www.investor.fnf.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=201868
* CPEX Pharmaceuticals Inc, Bentley Pharmaceuticals & Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Merger;
http://www.drugs.com/news/bentley-pharmaceuticals-amp-teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-merger-consideration-established-14-8367.html
* SurgiCount Medical Inc, Compustat doesn't record any AT in any year;
* BioVeris Corp, ROCHE TO ACQUIRE IGEN, parent;
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/916304/000095015703000463/form8-k.txt
* Cohesant Inc, merger & spinoff;
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20080227006151/en/Cohesant-Technologies-Completes-Sale-Glascraft-Graco-Completes#.VLQreSvF8UN
* Straight Path Communications, IDT CORP 62396, full info in AT, cannot UNDERSTAND!!!;
* Marlborough Software, merge & spinoff;
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/818813/000119312511307245/d255179dex991.htm
* 8 parent firms do not have AT in the next year;
SAS Pro\Spinoff
New20150112.SAS
* 8 parent firms do not have AT in the next year;
* Cadbury Schweppes Americas, Cadbury, Demerger of Cadbury Schweppes plc, cease trading on NYSE in 2008;
* Flamemaster Aerospace Corp, FLAMEMASTER CORP, reorganize;
* Monsanto Co, PHARMACIA CORP, stopped trading in 2002;
* Post Foods LLC, RALCORP HOLDINGS INC, ConAgra Foods agreed to acquire Ralcorp on November 26, 2012;
* PPD Inc-Furiex Pharm Inc, delist from NASDAQ;
New20150112.SAS
* 8 parent firms do not have AT in the next year;
* Cadbury Schweppes Americas, Cadbury, Demerger of Cadbury Schweppes plc, cease trading on NYSE in 2008;
* Flamemaster Aerospace Corp, FLAMEMASTER CORP, reorganize;
* Monsanto Co, PHARMACIA CORP, stopped trading in 2002;
* Post Foods LLC, RALCORP HOLDINGS INC, ConAgra Foods agreed to acquire Ralcorp on November 26, 2012;
* PPD Inc-Furiex Pharm Inc, delist from NASDAQ;
http://www.getfilings.com/sec-filings/111205/PHARMACEUTICAL-PRODUCT-DEVELOPMENT-INC_8-K/
* Strategos Inc, INNOVARO INC, delist from NYSE;
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20121205006638/en/Innovaro-Receives-Delisting-Notification-NYSE-MKT#.VLQZbyvF8UM
* Abraxis Pharmaceutical, APP PHARMACEUTICALS INC, remove from NASDAQ;
http://services.corporate-ir.net/SEC.Enhanced/SecCapsule.aspx?c=130431&fid=5307510
Unique ID in Compustat
Topic: Unique Identifier
Q: How to find unique obs in Compustat?
A: DATAFMT = STD INDFMT = INDL CONSOL = C POPSRC = D
web:
https://cobweb.business.nd.edu/Portals/0/MendozaIT/Research/Shared%20Documents/CCM/Data%20Guides/CRSP-Compustat%20Merged%20Database%20Guide.pdf
page 11
问了力力,他说,看似是对的。就是keyset=0的那一行。找一个WRDS的sample program来看看。
我找了以下的。应该是对的。
http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/support/Data/_003Sample%20Programs/Compustat/compna_funda1.cfm
Q: How to find unique obs in Compustat?
A: DATAFMT = STD INDFMT = INDL CONSOL = C POPSRC = D
web:
https://cobweb.business.nd.edu/Portals/0/MendozaIT/Research/Shared%20Documents/CCM/Data%20Guides/CRSP-Compustat%20Merged%20Database%20Guide.pdf
page 11
问了力力,他说,看似是对的。就是keyset=0的那一行。找一个WRDS的sample program来看看。
我找了以下的。应该是对的。
http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/support/Data/_003Sample%20Programs/Compustat/compna_funda1.cfm
Tuesday, December 2, 2014
Progress
1. 和小马谈了谈,他问,可不可能是因为creditor要求的呢?因为公司变小了,Collateral这些都不好说了,所以需要MF。建议和Tony聊聊。
2. 力力说,MF如果不是为了降低information asymmetry,那么CEO的fixed effects呢?
2014/12/16
今天Present对于IBES的了解。
1. 所有发现的问题,在SAS里做备注,提供简单的数字描述,以及解决方案。从今往后,即使重新下载数据,同样的问题,可以直接用编程解决。
e.g. IBES的Cusip问题。写粗来!!!
2. Activation date在Announcement Date之前,之后,是什么情况?有多少是pre-announcement date? 比较一下!!!
3. 以上问题如果离谱,怎么解决???!!!comments & 解决方案,要在SAS备注!!!
4. Key在数据库里的独特意义,是Unique identifier!IBES的key,pdf有详述。那么Compustat或CRSP的key在哪儿?
5. 在datetime16.的格式中,要获得正常年月日,可以用datepart()function
再用year(datepart())就能得到年份了。
6. 发MF的公司有什么样的特性?发不同measure,比如EPS,Earnings,或者CPX的公司,各自什么特性?(找paper)
7. p/s and earnings,公司一般同时宣布,还是有些公司亲睐ps,有些公司亲睐earnings?
8. annual / quarterly compustat的difference???
2. 力力说,MF如果不是为了降低information asymmetry,那么CEO的fixed effects呢?
2014/12/16
今天Present对于IBES的了解。
1. 所有发现的问题,在SAS里做备注,提供简单的数字描述,以及解决方案。从今往后,即使重新下载数据,同样的问题,可以直接用编程解决。
e.g. IBES的Cusip问题。写粗来!!!
2. Activation date在Announcement Date之前,之后,是什么情况?有多少是pre-announcement date? 比较一下!!!
3. 以上问题如果离谱,怎么解决???!!!comments & 解决方案,要在SAS备注!!!
4. Key在数据库里的独特意义,是Unique identifier!IBES的key,pdf有详述。那么Compustat或CRSP的key在哪儿?
5. 在datetime16.的格式中,要获得正常年月日,可以用datepart()function
再用year(datepart())就能得到年份了。
6. 发MF的公司有什么样的特性?发不同measure,比如EPS,Earnings,或者CPX的公司,各自什么特性?(找paper)
7. p/s and earnings,公司一般同时宣布,还是有些公司亲睐ps,有些公司亲睐earnings?
8. annual / quarterly compustat的difference???
Friday, October 24, 2014
Ch 17 Executive Compensation and Incentives
Jensen and Murphy (1990)对于管理层激励的研究,影响深远。
P499
1. Introduction
管理层工资高于一线员工300倍,是因为寻租(rent extraction).
2. Trends and Components in executive compensation 趋势和构成
2.1 Short-term components
salary, bonus, and other annual compensation
quite small fraction of total incentives
测量公司绩效的常见工具:
ROE, ROA, ROI,EVA
还有比如plant quality ("zero-defects"),市场份额,等等。
2.2 Long-term components
new grants of restricted stock, new grants of stock options, long-term incentive plan payouts, and all other components
其他包括:
× gross-ups for tax liabilities (公司给的额外的税的优惠。比如给个价值$3000的搬家费,说的是税前)
Tax gross-ups are often used as a way to compensate employees in advance for tax liabilities. For example, if an employee is promised $3,000 for moving expenses with a gross-up of one-third of that amount added, the payment is $4,000. The extra $1,000 covers most of the tax liability that needs to be paid on the $3,000 payment; once that $1,000 is deducted from the $4,000 payment, the employee has $3,000 in actual funds for moving expenses. In that case, the recipient is compensated in advance for future taxes — the gross-up is a benefit.
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/tax-grossup-definition-30980.html
× perquisites 额外补贴,临时津贴
× preferential discounts on stock purchases
× contributions to benefit plans
× severance payments 分手费
以上这些"其他项目",通常被认为,不那么重要。relatively unimportant.
Yermack (2006) CEO买了corporate jet是寻租的表现。
Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2007) 捐款也是寻租的表征。
有些公司,比如GE的Jack Welch的退休金相当显著。
Benchuk and Fried (2004)管retirement benefits叫做"stealth" compensation.
2.2.1 Restricted stock
通常5年
第一,CEO通常因为restricted stock,所以想长期服务于公司。
第二,在vesting period内,CEO不能卖股票,所以公司业绩与他的股票价值挂钩。
1990s 后,restricted stocks的使用减少。2000 stock market decline后,使用又增加。
2.2.2 Stock options
典型的option年限是10年。但是大都被提早行权。
一般条款说,每年25%被允许行权(还有25%一旦授予,就可以行权。)所以,通常需要3年时间,可以充分解套。之后有7年时间,可以hold直到maturity(过期)。
nonqualified options,大多数公司都在用这种options,因为CEO会支付option给的价格,与行权价格差之间的税。对于公司来说,这种方式省钱。
以前会计是不计入options在报表上的,所以Murphy (2002)谈到,公司都觉得这是一种低成本的奖励机制,因为deferred costs都不在报表内啊!
两种估算方式:
第一,把股票增幅设定在5%-10%
第二,用Black Scholes
Yermack (1997),管理层在好消息发放前,拿到options。在坏消息发放前,行权。(这个有悖于常理哇???!!!)
Lie (2005), Heron and Lie (2007) ,公司发放option的时间都很可疑,都是股价最低的时候。
2.2.3 Long-term incentive plans
IBM几大高管的长期incentive plans也挺多。
2.3 Aggregate measure of compensation
Total annual compensation of the executives
+ Annual change in wealth for the executive based on changes in firm value
= Aggregate measure of compensation for incentive purposes
Annual change in wealth for the executive based on changes in firm value包括这一年里股票,以及option的价值变化。
2.4.1 Total annual compensation
1999年Top 20的CEO工资,离散度也很大。
排名第一,Global Crossing, Ltd. 的Robert赚走了193 million。
排名20, Yahoo的Timothy,赚了44.6 million.
就工资,将近而言,CEO和普通工人的差距,在45倍左右,还没有business week讲的那么夸张。
2.4.2 Holdings of stock and options
mean和median差距很大,因为outliers的存在。
3. What determines incentives (什么决定了incentives,主要从agency的角度)
3.1 Pay-performance sensitivities (PPS)
Murphy (1999)有两种计算办法
第一,regress annual compensation on firm performance (dollar change in firm market value or percentage change)
历史数据有$3.25 (Jensen and Murphy, 1990)
$5.29 (Hall and Liebman, 1998)
for every $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth
Aggarwal and Samwick说,这种办法没有把risk考虑进去。所以用了如下方法。
第二,an executive's holdings of stock as a fraction of the total equity outstanding
管理层在总股本中占有的股票数量
share option另有一种算法(P508),option delta什么的。
平均explicit PPS是3.99%。
股价的增高也会增加PPS,因为option的价值更高了呀!
3.2 How should incentives be set?
谈到了Agency problem, Jensen and Mecking (1976)
Jensen (1986)调查了overinvestment.说在石油不景气的那些年,公司最佳的办法应该是把现金分给股东,而不是继续投资。
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999)发现股价的variance可以解释variation in incentives across CEOs. 两者负相关。
3.3 Executive discretion
Prendergast (2002) 说contracting environment对incentives有影响。
第一,不确定性越大,incentives越大。(但是以往的paper都不支持这种说法)
第二,不确定性越大,分权越多。(Nagar, 2002观察到banking中确实有类似的现象。)
3.4 Firm size
high compensation in dollar values and lower ownership in the firms
3.5 Accounting returns
是不是accounting-based outcome比market-return based outcome更能代表CEO的action呢?因为CEO不可控力之外的东西(比如股灾),不应该让CEO来受到惩罚。(P515)
3.6 Ability
Milbourn (2003)讲到,CEO ability是incentives的一个重要决定因素。
能力高的,不易被炒,股价更Informative,所以PPS也高。
反之,能力低的,容易被炒,股价不informative,所以PPS低。
Frydman (2005)发现,随着时间发展,general skills比specific skills对于CEO在Labor market中更重要。
Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2007) 发现,CAR(top管理层离职当天的return),和在他任期内公司的return负相关。
3.7 Incentives within firms
Oyer(2004) broad-based incentive pay can be optimal if an employee's future outside opportunities are positively correlated with firm performance.
Q: broad-based incentive pay什么意思?
Inderst and Mueller (2006)说broad-based incentive pay可以保护CEO,万一公司调整策略什么的,所以不需要他了。
Idea: 实施spin off的CEO中,是不是golden parachute或者broad-based incentive pay都比较高呢?
Oyer and Schaefer (2004)提到了公司给broad-based stock option plan的三个原因,
第一,incentive provision
第二,吸引外头的人才
第三,留住现有的人才
小公司用这招比较多。
Cichello, Fee, Hadlock, and Sonti (2006)研究的是部门级经理。部门绩效好,turnover就少,跟公司整体绩效,或者公司其他部门绩效没什么大关系。turnover只和同行业的其他类似部门绩效,相关。
又有一篇老文章,Lazear and Rosen 1981,讲的是tournament incentives.
4. the general absence of the use of relative performance evaluation when compensating and providing incentives to top managers(评估时,缺了什么?)
5. what managerial actions incentives should or do influence the associated impact on firm value (哪些行为反过来影响股价)
6. alternatives to the agency view (skimming or rent extraction view),skimming在这里什么意思?
P499
1. Introduction
管理层工资高于一线员工300倍,是因为寻租(rent extraction).
2. Trends and Components in executive compensation 趋势和构成
2.1 Short-term components
salary, bonus, and other annual compensation
quite small fraction of total incentives
测量公司绩效的常见工具:
ROE, ROA, ROI,EVA
还有比如plant quality ("zero-defects"),市场份额,等等。
2.2 Long-term components
new grants of restricted stock, new grants of stock options, long-term incentive plan payouts, and all other components
其他包括:
× gross-ups for tax liabilities (公司给的额外的税的优惠。比如给个价值$3000的搬家费,说的是税前)
Tax gross-ups are often used as a way to compensate employees in advance for tax liabilities. For example, if an employee is promised $3,000 for moving expenses with a gross-up of one-third of that amount added, the payment is $4,000. The extra $1,000 covers most of the tax liability that needs to be paid on the $3,000 payment; once that $1,000 is deducted from the $4,000 payment, the employee has $3,000 in actual funds for moving expenses. In that case, the recipient is compensated in advance for future taxes — the gross-up is a benefit.
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/tax-grossup-definition-30980.html
× perquisites 额外补贴,临时津贴
× preferential discounts on stock purchases
× contributions to benefit plans
× severance payments 分手费
以上这些"其他项目",通常被认为,不那么重要。relatively unimportant.
Yermack (2006) CEO买了corporate jet是寻租的表现。
Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2007) 捐款也是寻租的表征。
有些公司,比如GE的Jack Welch的退休金相当显著。
Benchuk and Fried (2004)管retirement benefits叫做"stealth" compensation.
2.2.1 Restricted stock
通常5年
第一,CEO通常因为restricted stock,所以想长期服务于公司。
第二,在vesting period内,CEO不能卖股票,所以公司业绩与他的股票价值挂钩。
1990s 后,restricted stocks的使用减少。2000 stock market decline后,使用又增加。
2.2.2 Stock options
典型的option年限是10年。但是大都被提早行权。
一般条款说,每年25%被允许行权(还有25%一旦授予,就可以行权。)所以,通常需要3年时间,可以充分解套。之后有7年时间,可以hold直到maturity(过期)。
nonqualified options,大多数公司都在用这种options,因为CEO会支付option给的价格,与行权价格差之间的税。对于公司来说,这种方式省钱。
以前会计是不计入options在报表上的,所以Murphy (2002)谈到,公司都觉得这是一种低成本的奖励机制,因为deferred costs都不在报表内啊!
两种估算方式:
第一,把股票增幅设定在5%-10%
第二,用Black Scholes
Yermack (1997),管理层在好消息发放前,拿到options。在坏消息发放前,行权。(这个有悖于常理哇???!!!)
Lie (2005), Heron and Lie (2007) ,公司发放option的时间都很可疑,都是股价最低的时候。
2.2.3 Long-term incentive plans
IBM几大高管的长期incentive plans也挺多。
2.3 Aggregate measure of compensation
Total annual compensation of the executives
+ Annual change in wealth for the executive based on changes in firm value
= Aggregate measure of compensation for incentive purposes
Annual change in wealth for the executive based on changes in firm value包括这一年里股票,以及option的价值变化。
2.4.1 Total annual compensation
1999年Top 20的CEO工资,离散度也很大。
排名第一,Global Crossing, Ltd. 的Robert赚走了193 million。
排名20, Yahoo的Timothy,赚了44.6 million.
就工资,将近而言,CEO和普通工人的差距,在45倍左右,还没有business week讲的那么夸张。
2.4.2 Holdings of stock and options
mean和median差距很大,因为outliers的存在。
3. What determines incentives (什么决定了incentives,主要从agency的角度)
3.1 Pay-performance sensitivities (PPS)
Murphy (1999)有两种计算办法
第一,regress annual compensation on firm performance (dollar change in firm market value or percentage change)
历史数据有$3.25 (Jensen and Murphy, 1990)
$5.29 (Hall and Liebman, 1998)
for every $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth
Aggarwal and Samwick说,这种办法没有把risk考虑进去。所以用了如下方法。
第二,an executive's holdings of stock as a fraction of the total equity outstanding
管理层在总股本中占有的股票数量
share option另有一种算法(P508),option delta什么的。
平均explicit PPS是3.99%。
股价的增高也会增加PPS,因为option的价值更高了呀!
3.2 How should incentives be set?
谈到了Agency problem, Jensen and Mecking (1976)
Jensen (1986)调查了overinvestment.说在石油不景气的那些年,公司最佳的办法应该是把现金分给股东,而不是继续投资。
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999)发现股价的variance可以解释variation in incentives across CEOs. 两者负相关。
3.3 Executive discretion
Prendergast (2002) 说contracting environment对incentives有影响。
第一,不确定性越大,incentives越大。(但是以往的paper都不支持这种说法)
第二,不确定性越大,分权越多。(Nagar, 2002观察到banking中确实有类似的现象。)
3.4 Firm size
high compensation in dollar values and lower ownership in the firms
3.5 Accounting returns
是不是accounting-based outcome比market-return based outcome更能代表CEO的action呢?因为CEO不可控力之外的东西(比如股灾),不应该让CEO来受到惩罚。(P515)
3.6 Ability
Milbourn (2003)讲到,CEO ability是incentives的一个重要决定因素。
能力高的,不易被炒,股价更Informative,所以PPS也高。
反之,能力低的,容易被炒,股价不informative,所以PPS低。
Frydman (2005)发现,随着时间发展,general skills比specific skills对于CEO在Labor market中更重要。
Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2007) 发现,CAR(top管理层离职当天的return),和在他任期内公司的return负相关。
3.7 Incentives within firms
Oyer(2004) broad-based incentive pay can be optimal if an employee's future outside opportunities are positively correlated with firm performance.
Q: broad-based incentive pay什么意思?
Inderst and Mueller (2006)说broad-based incentive pay可以保护CEO,万一公司调整策略什么的,所以不需要他了。
Oyer and Schaefer (2004)提到了公司给broad-based stock option plan的三个原因,
第一,incentive provision
第二,吸引外头的人才
第三,留住现有的人才
小公司用这招比较多。
Cichello, Fee, Hadlock, and Sonti (2006)研究的是部门级经理。部门绩效好,turnover就少,跟公司整体绩效,或者公司其他部门绩效没什么大关系。turnover只和同行业的其他类似部门绩效,相关。
又有一篇老文章,Lazear and Rosen 1981,讲的是tournament incentives.
4. the general absence of the use of relative performance evaluation when compensating and providing incentives to top managers(评估时,缺了什么?)
5. what managerial actions incentives should or do influence the associated impact on firm value (哪些行为反过来影响股价)
6. alternatives to the agency view (skimming or rent extraction view),skimming在这里什么意思?
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