笔记:
关于friction和incentives
Gigler (1994. JAR)
Previous disclosure models assume that firms have incentives to disclose all private information in the absence of proprietary costs. In those models proprietary costs are the friction that prevents full disclosure. In contrast, my model assumes a manager wants to overstate profitability to the capital market in the absence of verification. But, since voluntary disclosures are unaudited and firms can lie, credibility becomes an issue.
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Incentives of Voluntary Disclosure
Information asymmetry reduction
(1) Capital markets transactions hypothesis
Theory: Healy and Palepu (1993, 1995) hypothesize that investors’ perceptions of a firm are important to corporate managers expecting to issue public debt or equity or to acquire another company in a stock transaction.
Empirical papers: Lang and Lundholm (1993) document that analysts’ ratings of disclosures are higher for firms issuing securities in the current or future periods. Healy et al. (1999) find that firms with increased analyst ratings of disclosures have an abnormally high frequency of subsequent public debt offers. Ruland etal.(1990) and Marquardt andWiedman (1998) document that the number of management earnings forecasts increases significantly around equity offerings.
Mixed evidence on the other side.
(2) Stock-based Compensation and corporate control contest
(It's hard to say when managers intentionally release some particular good or bad news, though real, whether such disclosure is related to an increase or decrease of stock price through the increase or decrease of information asymmetry.) (Disclosure对股价有影响,是很明显的,但很难说是通过information asymmetry的改变,而导致最终对股价的影响吧?使得股价背离真实价格,无论高估或低估,都是增加information asymmetry的表现吧?)
Managers sell more shares after good-news than after bad-news releases, and buy more after bad-news than after good-news releases (Noe, 1999). Further, in periods when insiders buy more shares, there are more bad-news forecasts (which lower the purchase price) (Cheng and Lo, 2006).
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) show that firms delay disclosure of good news and accelerate the release of bad news prior to stock option award periods, consistent with manager s making disclosure decisions to increase stock-based compensation. Miller and Piotroski (2000) find that managers of firms in turnaround situations are more likely to provide earnings forecasts if they have higher stock option compensation at risk.
Nagar et al. (2003) find that both management earnings forecast frequency and the quality of firms’ disclosures, as measured by analysts’ subjective ratings of firms’ disclosure practices, are higher when the CEO’s compensation and wealth are more sensitive to stock price changes.
They argue that equity-based incentives encourage not only good-news but also bad-news disclosures.
(3) Litigation costs
Skinner (1994, 1997) finds that firms with bad earnings news are more than twice as likely to pre-disclose the poor earnings performance than are firms with good news. In addition, firms with negative earnings news are more likely to be subject to litigation.
Field etal.(2005) find no evidence that disclosure triggers litigation. Their findings suggest, however, that disclosure deters certain types of litigation.
Managers talent signaling
Healy and Palepu (2001); Trueman (1986)
Trueman (1986) argues that talented managers have an incentive to make voluntary earnings forecasts to reveal their type. A firm’s market value is a function of investors’ perceptions of its managers’ ability to anticipate and respond to future changes in the firm’s economic environment. The earlier that investors infer that the manager has received information, the more favorable will be their assessment of the manager’s ability to anticipate future changes and the higher will be the firm’s market value. To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence to either support or refute this hypothesis.
Information asymmetry addition
(1) Capital markets transactions hypothesis
Lang and Lundholm (1997) analyze disclosures specifically for firms that make equity offerings and find that there is a significant increase in disclosure beginning six months before the offering, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms have the most discretion.
Modeling papers: Barry and Brown (1985, 1986) ; Diamond and Verrecchia (1991); Easley and O’Hara (2004); Glosten and Milgrom (1985); Healy and Palepu (1993, 1995); Kim and Verrecchia (1994); Merton (1987)
Empirical papers: Amihud and Mendelson (1986); Welker (1995); Botosan and Harris (2000); Lang and Lundholm (1993); Healy et al. (1999); Leuz and Verrecchia (2000)
(2) Stock-based Compensation and corporate control contest
更像是这一头的
M Bagnoli, SG Watts - The Accounting Review, 2010
Cournot competitors bias their reports to create the impression that their costs are lower than they actually are.
R Kasznik - Journal of accounting research, 1999
managers manage reported earnings toward their forecasts
C Leuz, D Nanda, PD Wysocki - Journal of financial economics, 2003
earnings management is more pervasive in countries characterized by less developed stock markets, more concentrated ownership and lower disclosure levels. The latter correlation suggests that firms engaging in earnings management also provide fewer disclosures. This finding questions the use of disclosure indices as exogenous variables in prior research
Incentives of Non-Disclosure
(3) Litigation costs
Francis et al. (1994) find that 62% of the firms in their litigation
sample were sued over earnings forecasts or pre-emptive earnings disclosures.
In contrast, 87% of their sample of no-litigation firms with comparable stock
price declines pre-announced an earnings decline. They concluded that predisclosure
does not appear to be a deterrent to litigation.
Baginski etal.(2002) find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts, both bad and good news, in the less litigious Canadian financial reporting environment.
Incentives of Disclosure Decrease (through information asymmetry addition)
(3) Litigation costs
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) find that firms reduce disclosures subsequent to class-action lawsuits. Their findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the litigation process decreases managers’ incentives to disclose, despite the increased protections afforded by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. However, Lowry (2009) points out that the
evidence in Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) is based on a sample of firms that were actually sued; as such, the results cannot be generalized to the larger population of firms who were not sued.
反驳文章的意思是,其他那些没被sue的公司,也许正是因为提高了disclosure,所以无需被告呢。