A product markets perspective
Jain et al. (2011) 研究vertical divestitures via two-stage process. 第一步,研究公司是否会divest.在第一步的基础上,第二步再做决策,是carve-out还是spinoff.
2.1 Factors influencing the vertical divestiture decision
2.1.1 Industry demand shocks and the decision to divest
Theory: Maksimovic and Phillips (2001, 2002), neo-classical model. Demand shocks alter the value of assets. (Jain et al.没说全,MP没说positive demand shock就一定会使more productive 公司加大产量,这还取决于capacity price以及conglomerate其他部门的效率。)
Empirical: industry demand shocks reduce the benefits of integration relative to separation and provide the impetus for vertically integrated firms to divest either their upstream or downstream business to preserve the most efficient organizational form (e.g., Stigler, 1951; Chen, 2005; Sappinton, 2006) 但是,实证发现positive demand shock会引起spin off,(而非扩大生产).
Jain et al. (2011) 顺着实证,预测demand shock在parent或者sub都会引起divest,他们用的proxy是MP里面的detrended value of the natural log of parent (sub) industry real sales.
2.1.2 Relative productivity of parent and the decision to divest
Theory: MP (2001, 200) model that less productive应该卖掉capacity.
2.1.3 Contracting considerations and the decision to divest
Literature: The vertical integration provides a solution to the holdup problem and allows firms to undertake relationship specific investments. (Coase, 1937; ,,,)
Q1: 这话什么意思???
所以divest在这里是一个权衡,一方面是divest带来的收益,另一方面是separate以后contractual inefficiencies. Jain et al. (2011) 预计,这种契约关系越紧密,separate cost也高,所以divest可能性越小。
2.1.4 Financing considerations and the decision to divest
Firms divest assets when doing so provides them with the cheapest source of funds (John and Ofek, 1995; Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995).所以如果一个公司capital-constrained,它就有可能divest.
Q2: 文章自己也说了,spinoff不带来现金流,所以capital constrained肯定不是spinoff的动机之一啊?!
2.2 Factors influencing the choice of method of divestitures conditional on vertical divestitures (spinoffs versus carve-outs)
2.2.1 Product market and holdup considerations and the method of vertical divestitures
也不太清楚哪些是Theory or empirical
- partial equity ownership in vertically related businesses is a potential solution to the underinvestment problem in relationship-specific assets (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Dasgupta and Tao, 2000; Harbaugh, 2001)
- Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) conclude that equity ownership by customers in suppliers is beneficial when firms are concerned with expropriation and holdup problems arising from relationship-specific investments.
- 所以, holdup 如果是个问题, carve-out比spinoff有优势。
- Proxy of expropriation and holdup problems:
- Explicit product market relations (Allen and Phillips, 2002): buyer-supplier agreements, technology sharing and R&D agreements, marketing and distribution agreements, and specialty services agreements
- The need for investments in relationship-specific assets is greater in R&D intensive environment (e.g., Allen and Phillips, 2002; Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas, 2006)
- R&D越高,越可能carve-out
2.2.2 Financing considerations and method of vertical divestitures
一方面,Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) 发现the incidence of equity stakes is more likely between customers and suppliers 当suppliers面临的financing constraints很高。
另一方面,若论筹钱(raise capital),公司会更倾向于carve-outs,而不是spinoffs.(e.g., Allen and McConnell, 1998; Powers, 2011)
Proxy 1: 如果Post-divestiture时期,parent和sub还有financing agreement,dummy=1
Proxy 2: 母公司的external capital need.
2.2.3 Economies of scale benefits and method of vertical divestitures
Theory:
- Stigler (1951) 公司纵向并购vertical integration,如果他们处于的行业很小。
- Vertical divestitures result in efficiency gains (e.g., Chen, 2005; Sappington, 2006)
Jain et al. (2011) 推测,industry shock越大,公司从separation得到的效益就越大,所以spinoff比carve-outs更有优势。
2.2.4 Foreclosure and method of vertical divestitures
The foreclosure hypothesis suggests that vertical integration provides an opportunity for integrated firms to raise the cost of their unintegrated rivals by denying or limiting access to inputs or distribution outlets to their rivals (e.g., Salinger, 1988; Jart and Tirole, 1990; ,,,) 纵向合并的公司可以提高那些single-segment的成本,比如不让他们轻易买到inputs,或者阻碍他们铺货outlets。
如果foreclosure benefit很大,公司会更愿意carve-outs, 而不是spinoffs.
Q3: 搞不懂foreclosure benefit很大的话,为什么要divest?
2.2.5 Collusion and method of vertical divestitures
Collusion hypothesis: the sub of the integrated vertical firm serves as a mechanism that facilitates the flow of information between the integrated firm and its unintegrated rivals. (e.g., Chen, 2001; Nocke and White, 2007)
Q4: 子公司作为一种机制,用来沟通信息,于合并的公司和没有上下合并的竞争对手之间。不明白?!
如果母公司想从这样的collusion获益,carve-outs比spinoffs更有优势。
2.2.6 Control factors influencing the method of vertical divestitures
- financing constraints
- market conditions favoring equity issuances
- size of subsidiary relative to parent
- Allen, Lummer, McConnell, and Reed, 1995; Hite and Owers, 1983; Powers, 2001