Showing posts with label Monitoring. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Monitoring. Show all posts

Monday, July 14, 2014

Roosenboom, Schlingemann, and Vasconcelos (2014, FRS)

Does Stock Liquidity Affect Incentives to Monitor? Evidence from Corporate Takeovers

Does stock liquidity enhance or weaken institutional monitoring?股票流动性增加还是抑制了机构投资人的Monitoring动力?

一个比较严格的Monitoring监督环境,会有更好的takeover决策,所以CAR在announcement dates应该会更高。

Enhance论据一:

  • Institutions can acquire shares in the open market to recoup the costs of monitoring。他们可以买进股票,来弥补cost。
  • 买入价(没有包含,如果他们介入,会取得的增值。因此买入价还是偏低的)鼓励机构去买,多少克服了free riding的顾虑。
  • Liquidity越大,profits越大。因为高流动性的情况下,informed trades容易被隐藏。所以large institution提高了流动性。
Enhance论据二:
  • 因为高流动性,所以机构撤出(exit)更easy
  • Liquidity is more beneficial when there are multiple blockholders as it shifts the importance of monitoring from intervention ("voice") to threat of exit.流动性更有益,当该公司有不少大股东,因为流动性把monitoring的重要性从"介入,发声",转向了退出的威胁。
研究acquisition,liquidity的好处:
  • 第一,reverse causality不太可能(个人理解,之前你不知道是monitoring影响liquidity,还是反过来,在这里,先来后到很明显)。regress announcement returns of acquisitions on past liquidity
  • 第二,announcement dates are  easily identified(这个为什么是advantage?)
  • 第三,takeover是个重要的场景设定,因为agency conflict和institutional monitoring在这情形下很重要,不然的话,经理们的self-interested会对公司价值造成重大后果。
  • 最后,我们还可以研究liquidity对于ex-post的影响,比如the prob. of deal completion and CEO turnover, and on takeover premiums
发现:liquidity and voice(monitoring)负相关。

然后,他们考虑是否organizational form of the target和the form of payment影响liquidity和returns之间的关系。+ return for private targets, - for public targets, 尤其用equity来收购时。

liquidity and returns relationship:

  • (-), significantly large, for takeovers involving private targets
  • insignificant for public
  • weakly positive for takeovers of public targets where equity is included
另外,
  • within private targets sample, the form of payment不影响结果
那么究竟为什么,liquidity在对于private和public公司有区别?
  • the disciplining effect of the threat of exit is more relevant for acquisitions of public targets
  • 研究结果还显示,如果liquidity增加的话,就会加大收购private target的可能性(从而不收购public target了)
liquidity阻碍了Monitoring through voice. voice more likely(比如只有一个blockholder)情况下,liquidity和announcement return负相关。当threat of exit比较大(比如好几个blockholders),(-) relationship b/w liquidity and voice is mitigated by the (+) effect of liquidity on the effectiveness of the threat of exit. (Q: 这里有没有typo???(-) b/w liq and voice,还是应该liq and return???) Agency costs存在时,liquidity和returns之间也负的更厉害。

如果liquidity对monitoring ex-ante有影响,那么对于ex-post也应该有影响。

他们发现,如果流动性很差,机构投资人有更可能迫使经理drop value-destroying deals (i.e., deals with negative abnormal announcement returns)。

他们还发现负相关b/w liquidity and takeover premiums

解释:高流动性的股票可以很容易卖掉,所以机构投资人就不花太多功夫去监控了。反正,如果公司经营的不好,我可以卖嘛。