Does stock liquidity enhance or weaken institutional monitoring?股票流动性增加还是抑制了机构投资人的Monitoring动力?
一个比较严格的Monitoring监督环境,会有更好的takeover决策,所以CAR在announcement dates应该会更高。
Enhance论据一:
- Institutions can acquire shares in the open market to recoup the costs of monitoring。他们可以买进股票,来弥补cost。
- 买入价(没有包含,如果他们介入,会取得的增值。因此买入价还是偏低的)鼓励机构去买,多少克服了free riding的顾虑。
- Liquidity越大,profits越大。因为高流动性的情况下,informed trades容易被隐藏。所以large institution提高了流动性。
Enhance论据二:
- 因为高流动性,所以机构撤出(exit)更easy
- Liquidity is more beneficial when there are multiple blockholders as it shifts the importance of monitoring from intervention ("voice") to threat of exit.流动性更有益,当该公司有不少大股东,因为流动性把monitoring的重要性从"介入,发声",转向了退出的威胁。
研究acquisition,liquidity的好处:
- 第一,reverse causality不太可能(个人理解,之前你不知道是monitoring影响liquidity,还是反过来,在这里,先来后到很明显)。regress announcement returns of acquisitions on past liquidity
- 第二,announcement dates are easily identified(这个为什么是advantage?)
- 第三,takeover是个重要的场景设定,因为agency conflict和institutional monitoring在这情形下很重要,不然的话,经理们的self-interested会对公司价值造成重大后果。
- 最后,我们还可以研究liquidity对于ex-post的影响,比如the prob. of deal completion and CEO turnover, and on takeover premiums
发现:liquidity and voice(monitoring)负相关。
然后,他们考虑是否organizational form of the target和the form of payment影响liquidity和returns之间的关系。+ return for private targets, - for public targets, 尤其用equity来收购时。
liquidity and returns relationship:
liquidity and returns relationship:
- (-), significantly large, for takeovers involving private targets
- insignificant for public
- weakly positive for takeovers of public targets where equity is included
另外,
- within private targets sample, the form of payment不影响结果
那么究竟为什么,liquidity在对于private和public公司有区别?
- the disciplining effect of the threat of exit is more relevant for acquisitions of public targets
- 研究结果还显示,如果liquidity增加的话,就会加大收购private target的可能性(从而不收购public target了)
liquidity阻碍了Monitoring through voice. voice more likely(比如只有一个blockholder)情况下,liquidity和announcement return负相关。当threat of exit比较大(比如好几个blockholders),(-) relationship b/w liquidity and voice is mitigated by the (+) effect of liquidity on the effectiveness of the threat of exit. (Q: 这里有没有typo???(-) b/w liq and voice,还是应该liq and return???) Agency costs存在时,liquidity和returns之间也负的更厉害。
如果liquidity对monitoring ex-ante有影响,那么对于ex-post也应该有影响。
他们发现,如果流动性很差,机构投资人有更可能迫使经理drop value-destroying deals (i.e., deals with negative abnormal announcement returns)。
他们还发现负相关b/w liquidity and takeover premiums
解释:高流动性的股票可以很容易卖掉,所以机构投资人就不花太多功夫去监控了。反正,如果公司经营的不好,我可以卖嘛。
如果liquidity对monitoring ex-ante有影响,那么对于ex-post也应该有影响。
他们发现,如果流动性很差,机构投资人有更可能迫使经理drop value-destroying deals (i.e., deals with negative abnormal announcement returns)。
他们还发现负相关b/w liquidity and takeover premiums
解释:高流动性的股票可以很容易卖掉,所以机构投资人就不花太多功夫去监控了。反正,如果公司经营的不好,我可以卖嘛。
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