Tuesday, September 2, 2014

Sletten (2011, RAS)

The effect of stock price on discretionary disclosure

文章研究的是,在一个exogenous引起的股价下跌后,公司是否会发布一个消息。这消息,在股价下跌之前,肯定是坏消息无疑;但是股价下跌后,比起跌幅,这个消息反而不算太坏,甚至可以算好消息了。(原话是:previously considered bad (based on previous stock price) and withheld from investors, is now considered good (relative to revised stock price) and is thus disclosed.)

Sletten确实发现了, 股价下跌之后,公司发布好消息。

有些关于disclosure的common sense,Sletten甚至都不再引用作者了。

(1) size, analyst following, return on assets, and litigation risk are higher for firms issuing forecasts.各种表现好的时候,disclosure的可能性更大。

(2) managers are more likely to issue forecasts when investors' expectations are optimistic。未来预期如果好,disclosure的可能性更大。

(3) Forecasting firms come from more concentrated industries, possibly because of propriety costs. 集中度更高的行业,更多disclosure.(我觉得propriety costs好像不是很好的解释,在这里。)

(4) they are more likely to issue forecasts in the previous quarter and in the period between last quarter's earnings announcement and the peer firm's restatement announcement, which is consistent with some of the firms being "frequent guiders", as suggested by Bhojraj et al. (2011).

(5) firms with more days remaining before the end of the announcement quarter are also more likely issue forecasts, as are firms tat restate their own financial statements within the following 90 days.

Bova, Dou, Hope (2014, CAR)

Employee Ownership and Firm Disclosure

两个发现:

(1) employee如果有强大bargaining power, 通常公司会less disclosure.(e.g. unions工会)

(2) 但是employee ownership如果增加,这种Information asymmetry就会降低。因为这时候他们的利益越来越像股东,而不是索取超额的工资。同时,股东也为此获益了,disclosure增加了。

Voluntary Disclosure Proxies

(1) management guidance

  • # of management forecasts issued
  • the quality of management forecasts (Francis, Nanda, and Olsson, 2008) (e.g. point, range, open-ended?)

(2) conference calls - # of conference calls

(3) annual report readability - Fog index

(4) aggregate disclosure measure

PPT One Page

Why do firms voluntarily disclose?

(1) Firms may decrease disclosures after spin offs.
  • Spinoffs decrease information asymmetry (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999), while private information is less valuable in a low information asymmetry environment (Frankel and Li, 2004).
(2) Firms may increase disclosures after spin offs.
  • Focus-increasing spinoffs have positive announcement returns (average 3.3%), long-run abnormal returns, and improvements in operating performance (Desai and Jain, 1999). Firms may increase disclosure when they perform well (Healy and Palepu, 2001).
(3) Firms may not change disclosures after spin offs.
  • Disclosure policies are usually sticky (Skinner, 2003).
(4) Other factors may dominate.
  • Managers’ disclosure style may dominate other factors (Bamber et al., 2010).
  • Industry membership may exert an influence on voluntary disclosure (Meek, 1995).
M's comments: The research question does not even include the word "spin offs". Why do you put them in arguments?

Write again!

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笔记:

关于friction和incentives

Gigler (1994. JAR)

Previous disclosure models assume that firms have incentives to disclose all private information in the absence of proprietary costs. In those models proprietary costs are the friction that prevents full disclosure. In contrast, my model assumes a manager wants to overstate profitability to the capital market in the absence of verification. But, since voluntary disclosures are unaudited and firms can lie, credibility becomes an issue.

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Incentives of Voluntary Disclosure


Information asymmetry reduction
(1) Capital markets transactions hypothesis

Theory: Healy and Palepu (1993, 1995) hypothesize that investors’ perceptions of a firm are important to corporate managers expecting to issue public debt or equity or to acquire another company in a stock transaction.

Empirical papers: Lang and Lundholm (1993) document that analysts’ ratings of disclosures are higher for firms issuing securities in the current or future periods. Healy et al. (1999) find that firms with increased analyst ratings of disclosures have an abnormally high frequency of subsequent public debt offers. Ruland etal.(1990) and Marquardt andWiedman (1998) document  that the number of management earnings forecasts increases significantly around equity offerings. 

Mixed evidence on the other side.

(2) Stock-based Compensation and corporate control contest

(It's hard to say when managers intentionally release some particular good or bad news, though real, whether such disclosure is related to an increase or decrease of stock price through the increase or decrease of information asymmetry.) (Disclosure对股价有影响,是很明显的,但很难说是通过information asymmetry的改变,而导致最终对股价的影响吧?使得股价背离真实价格,无论高估或低估,都是增加information asymmetry的表现吧?)

Managers sell more shares after good-news than after bad-news releases, and buy more after bad-news than after good-news releases (Noe, 1999). Further, in periods when insiders buy more shares, there are more bad-news forecasts (which lower the purchase price) (Cheng and Lo, 2006).

Aboody and Kasznik (2000) show that firms delay disclosure of good news and accelerate the release of bad news prior to stock option award periods, consistent with manager s making disclosure decisions to increase stock-based compensation. Miller and Piotroski (2000) find that managers of firms in turnaround situations are more likely to provide earnings forecasts if they have higher stock option compensation at risk.

Nagar et al. (2003) find that both management earnings forecast frequency and the quality of firms’ disclosures, as measured by analysts’ subjective ratings of firms’ disclosure practices, are higher when the CEO’s compensation and wealth are more sensitive to stock price changes.

They argue that equity-based incentives encourage not only good-news but also bad-news disclosures.

(3) Litigation costs

Skinner (1994, 1997) finds that firms with bad earnings news are more than twice as likely to pre-disclose the poor earnings performance than are firms with good news. In addition, firms with negative earnings news are more likely to be subject to litigation.

Field etal.(2005) find no evidence that disclosure triggers litigation. Their findings suggest, however, that disclosure deters certain types of litigation.



Managers talent signaling
Healy and Palepu (2001); Trueman (1986)

Trueman (1986) argues that talented managers have an incentive to make voluntary earnings forecasts to reveal their type. A firm’s market value is a function of investors’ perceptions of its managers’ ability to anticipate and respond to future changes in the firm’s economic environment. The earlier that investors infer that the manager has received information, the more favorable will be their assessment of the manager’s ability to anticipate future changes and the higher will be the firm’s market value. To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence to either support or refute this hypothesis.

Information asymmetry addition
(1) Capital markets transactions hypothesis

Lang and Lundholm (1997) analyze disclosures specifically for firms that make equity offerings and find that there is a significant increase in disclosure beginning six months before the offering, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms have the most discretion.


Modeling papers: Barry and Brown (1985, 1986) ; Diamond and Verrecchia (1991); Easley and O’Hara (2004); Glosten and Milgrom (1985); Healy and Palepu (1993, 1995); Kim and Verrecchia (1994); Merton (1987)

Empirical papers: Amihud and Mendelson (1986); Welker (1995); Botosan and Harris (2000); Lang and Lundholm (1993); Healy et al. (1999); Leuz and Verrecchia (2000)

(2) Stock-based Compensation and corporate control contest

更像是这一头的

Oligopoly, disclosure, and earnings management

M Bagnoli, SG Watts - The Accounting Review, 2010
Cournot competitors bias their reports to create the impression that their costs are lower than they actually are. 

On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management

R Kasznik - Journal of accounting research, 1999
managers manage reported earnings toward their forecasts

Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison

C Leuz, D Nanda, PD Wysocki - Journal of financial economics, 2003
earnings management is more pervasive in countries characterized by less developed stock markets, more concentrated ownership and lower disclosure levels. The latter correlation suggests that firms engaging in earnings management also provide fewer disclosures. This finding questions the use of disclosure indices as exogenous variables in prior research

Incentives of Non-Disclosure

(3) Litigation costs

Francis et al. (1994) find that 62% of the firms in their litigation
sample were sued over earnings forecasts or pre-emptive earnings disclosures.
In contrast, 87% of their sample of no-litigation firms with comparable stock
price declines pre-announced an earnings decline. They concluded that predisclosure
does not appear to be a deterrent to litigation.

Baginski etal.(2002) find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts, both bad and good news, in the less litigious Canadian financial reporting environment.

Incentives of Disclosure Decrease (through information asymmetry addition)

(3) Litigation costs

Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) find that firms reduce disclosures subsequent to class-action lawsuits. Their findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the litigation process decreases managers’ incentives to disclose, despite the increased protections afforded by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. However, Lowry (2009) points out that the
evidence in Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) is based on a sample of firms that were actually sued; as such, the results cannot be generalized to the larger population of firms who were not sued.

反驳文章的意思是,其他那些没被sue的公司,也许正是因为提高了disclosure,所以无需被告呢。

Monday, September 1, 2014

Marquardt (1998, CAR)

Voluntary Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, and Insider Selling through Secondary Equity Offerings

这篇文章研究的是SEO前的information asymmetry以及management forecasts.

SEO前的9个月,disclosure frequency和insider trading成正比。

也发现了management participation和两个information asymmetry的proxies负相关。

2 proxies:

(1) analyst forecast accuracy

(2) the timing of the equity offering registration

Korajczyk et al. (1991) argue that information asymmetry is at its lowest level at the time of an earnings release, when relevant information has been made public to all market participants. They use the number of days elapsed since the last earnings announcement as a measure of the degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors.

随想

主要

1. Analyst coverage的增加,或者准确率提高导致的information asymmetry reduction,是不是也算另外一种,不是由disclosure increase引起的information asymmetry reduction。公司怎么回应呢?也会降低disclosure吗?好像不合理。

2. Why will firms increase disclosure after spin offs?

(1) Spin off 通常是增加公司价值的,(analyst 会上调预期),Healy and Palepu (2001, JAE)说firms with the highest disclosure ratings tend to also show the highest contemporaneous earnings performance (see Lang and Lundholm, 1993). This may be caused by a self-selection bias -- firms may increase disclosure when they are performing well.

是Endogeneity的问题!

(2) CEO style

What's my style? The influence of top managers on voluntary corporate financial disclosure

LS Bamber, J Jiang, IY Wang - The Accounting Review, 2010

(3) Industry form

反方:

The impact of corporate characteristics on social responsibility disclosure: a typology and frequency-based analysis

SS Cowen, LB Ferreri, LD Parker - Accounting, Organizations and society, 1987

"However, most disclosure types (fair business practice, human resources, products, other disclosures) do not appear to be significantly affected by industry category."

Abstract - "Corporate size and industry category are found to correlate with certain types of disclosures while the existence of a corporate social responsibility committee appears to correlate with one particular type of disclosure."

正方:


Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by US, UK and continental European multinational corporations

GK Meek, CB Roberts, SJ Gray - Journal of international business studies, 1995
"Therefore, industry membership may exert an influence on voluntary disclosure."

3. Why will firms decrease disclosure after spin offs?

(1) incentives are weakened.

4. Information asymmetry and information value

Frankel and Li (2004, JAE)

"(2) the frequency of insider trades. Measuring the frequency of insider trading is important for another reason. If insiders incur a fixed cost when executing a trade, then they will not trade unless the expected profits of the trade exceed this cost. If this cost is cross-sectionally constant, then we should see fewer trades when insiders’private information is less valuable (e.g. situations of low information asymmetry).8 Thus trading frequency can serve as an important measure of information asymmetry." 

5. factor analysis

可不可以用factor analysis来测量一下现今的latent variable,到底哪些measurement比较靠谱?能想到的除了有information asymmetry,还有accrual quality, earnings quality等等。

6. spin off和information asymmetry

Huson and MacKinnon (2003, JCF)

Why spin off increases information asymmetry?

(1) 对于informed investor,现在的信息价值少了,所以他们的交易也少了,因此information asymmetry 反而降低。

(2) 反而增加了informed investors和uninformed investors的disparity,因为informed investors可以结合better public information和自己的private information来得到更好的信息。

Sefafeim (2011, JAR)

Consequences and Institutional Determinants of Unregulated Corporate Financial Statements: Evidence from Embedded Value Reporting

讲一种Embedded Value Reporting,主要用于保险行业,不是IFRS,也不是GAAP。是一种forward-looking measure that captures the expected net value of the underlying contracts signed by the insurer.

文章发现这种disclosure能够降低information asymmetry.该幅度还与EV的以下特性相关:点出methodological deficiencies,还有提供横向的可比性(comparability).

在以下国家内EV运用的更广泛:
(1) hostile takeovers恶意收购多的
(2) 经理人不规避volatile income的
(3) 法律法规很少进入product market
(4) 以及analysts认为EV确实增加了disclosure的价值

Roychowdhury and Sletten (2012, TAR)

Voluntary Disclosure Incentives and Earnings Informativeness

(1) Earnings informativeness relative to other sources is higher in bad-news quarters than in good-news quarters.

(2) 如果公司不主动披露信息,Information asymmetry更厉害,以及insider trading里面managers are net sellers,那么earnings differential informativeness in bad-news quarters is more pronounced.

H1: Earnings informativeness is higher when the overall news reaching the market during a quarter is negative than when it is positive.

H2: Earnings differential informativeness during bad-news quarters relative to good-news quarters is higher among firms with greater information asymmetry.

H3: Earnings differential informativeness during bad-news quarters relative to good-news quarters is higher in quarters with net insider sales if firm stock.