Tuesday, September 2, 2014

Bova, Dou, Hope (2014, CAR)

Employee Ownership and Firm Disclosure

两个发现:

(1) employee如果有强大bargaining power, 通常公司会less disclosure.(e.g. unions工会)

(2) 但是employee ownership如果增加,这种Information asymmetry就会降低。因为这时候他们的利益越来越像股东,而不是索取超额的工资。同时,股东也为此获益了,disclosure增加了。

Voluntary Disclosure Proxies

(1) management guidance

  • # of management forecasts issued
  • the quality of management forecasts (Francis, Nanda, and Olsson, 2008) (e.g. point, range, open-ended?)

(2) conference calls - # of conference calls

(3) annual report readability - Fog index

(4) aggregate disclosure measure

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