Showing posts with label Disclosure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Disclosure. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 2, 2014

Sletten (2011, RAS)

The effect of stock price on discretionary disclosure

文章研究的是,在一个exogenous引起的股价下跌后,公司是否会发布一个消息。这消息,在股价下跌之前,肯定是坏消息无疑;但是股价下跌后,比起跌幅,这个消息反而不算太坏,甚至可以算好消息了。(原话是:previously considered bad (based on previous stock price) and withheld from investors, is now considered good (relative to revised stock price) and is thus disclosed.)

Sletten确实发现了, 股价下跌之后,公司发布好消息。

有些关于disclosure的common sense,Sletten甚至都不再引用作者了。

(1) size, analyst following, return on assets, and litigation risk are higher for firms issuing forecasts.各种表现好的时候,disclosure的可能性更大。

(2) managers are more likely to issue forecasts when investors' expectations are optimistic。未来预期如果好,disclosure的可能性更大。

(3) Forecasting firms come from more concentrated industries, possibly because of propriety costs. 集中度更高的行业,更多disclosure.(我觉得propriety costs好像不是很好的解释,在这里。)

(4) they are more likely to issue forecasts in the previous quarter and in the period between last quarter's earnings announcement and the peer firm's restatement announcement, which is consistent with some of the firms being "frequent guiders", as suggested by Bhojraj et al. (2011).

(5) firms with more days remaining before the end of the announcement quarter are also more likely issue forecasts, as are firms tat restate their own financial statements within the following 90 days.

Bova, Dou, Hope (2014, CAR)

Employee Ownership and Firm Disclosure

两个发现:

(1) employee如果有强大bargaining power, 通常公司会less disclosure.(e.g. unions工会)

(2) 但是employee ownership如果增加,这种Information asymmetry就会降低。因为这时候他们的利益越来越像股东,而不是索取超额的工资。同时,股东也为此获益了,disclosure增加了。

Voluntary Disclosure Proxies

(1) management guidance

  • # of management forecasts issued
  • the quality of management forecasts (Francis, Nanda, and Olsson, 2008) (e.g. point, range, open-ended?)

(2) conference calls - # of conference calls

(3) annual report readability - Fog index

(4) aggregate disclosure measure

Monday, September 1, 2014

Marquardt (1998, CAR)

Voluntary Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, and Insider Selling through Secondary Equity Offerings

这篇文章研究的是SEO前的information asymmetry以及management forecasts.

SEO前的9个月,disclosure frequency和insider trading成正比。

也发现了management participation和两个information asymmetry的proxies负相关。

2 proxies:

(1) analyst forecast accuracy

(2) the timing of the equity offering registration

Korajczyk et al. (1991) argue that information asymmetry is at its lowest level at the time of an earnings release, when relevant information has been made public to all market participants. They use the number of days elapsed since the last earnings announcement as a measure of the degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors.

Sefafeim (2011, JAR)

Consequences and Institutional Determinants of Unregulated Corporate Financial Statements: Evidence from Embedded Value Reporting

讲一种Embedded Value Reporting,主要用于保险行业,不是IFRS,也不是GAAP。是一种forward-looking measure that captures the expected net value of the underlying contracts signed by the insurer.

文章发现这种disclosure能够降低information asymmetry.该幅度还与EV的以下特性相关:点出methodological deficiencies,还有提供横向的可比性(comparability).

在以下国家内EV运用的更广泛:
(1) hostile takeovers恶意收购多的
(2) 经理人不规避volatile income的
(3) 法律法规很少进入product market
(4) 以及analysts认为EV确实增加了disclosure的价值

Roychowdhury and Sletten (2012, TAR)

Voluntary Disclosure Incentives and Earnings Informativeness

(1) Earnings informativeness relative to other sources is higher in bad-news quarters than in good-news quarters.

(2) 如果公司不主动披露信息,Information asymmetry更厉害,以及insider trading里面managers are net sellers,那么earnings differential informativeness in bad-news quarters is more pronounced.

H1: Earnings informativeness is higher when the overall news reaching the market during a quarter is negative than when it is positive.

H2: Earnings differential informativeness during bad-news quarters relative to good-news quarters is higher among firms with greater information asymmetry.

H3: Earnings differential informativeness during bad-news quarters relative to good-news quarters is higher in quarters with net insider sales if firm stock.

Tang (2011, JAE)

Isolating the effect of disclosure on information risk

Cost of capital reflect both information risk and fundamental risk.

文章认为A股B股的fundamental risk是一样的,但是information risk是不同的。因为本土和境外投资人有不同的投资机会,和risk-free interest rate。

备注里其实说,80%的B股投资人都是海外华人,他们是能看懂中国新闻和报表的,那么仍然有20%没有access,了解公司内幕。

H1: Ceteris paribus, firms with a greater disparity in public dislosure available to domestic and foreign investors have a higher level of price differences between A and B shares.

A,B股的disparity在沪市的差异比深圳还要大,解释之一,是B股投资人大多住在香港,离深圳很近。

H2:,Disparity in public disclosure available to domestic and foreign investors has a more pronounced effect on the level of price differences between A and B shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange than the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.

有人问,这种disparity为什么不能被arbitrage away?这里说道杭州有21%的dispute通过法院解决,但在大连,这个比例只有0.1%.

H3: Disparity in public dislosure available to domestic and foreign investors has a more pronounced effect on the level of price differences between A and B shares in regions with weak protection than in regions with strong protection of property rights.

Measure of disparity in public disclosure,比较公司新闻在中外媒体上的数量差别。

Badertscher, Shroff, White (2013, JFE)

Externalities of public firm prescence:
Evidence from private firms' investment decisions

什么叫如果某行业的uncertainty比较低,then private firms are more responsive to their investment opportunities?

公司要做个trade off,(1)等等,再看看。也许项目的回报更清晰,但也许会错过投资机会;(2)不管三七二十一,拿了项目再说,但回报还看不太清楚。

El Ghoul et al. (2013, CAR)

Does Information Asymmetry Matter to Equity Pricing?
Evidence form Firms' Geographic Location

最早的CAPM model中,投资者的回报基于holding systematic risks。Information asymmetry不应该被计价。但是这个model太静态,怎么解释,在有了新消息来临后,价格的变动呢?(Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O' Hara, 2002)。更何况,还有Public和private消息之分?

所以Information asymmetry是不是该记入cost of capital,还没有定论。

文章发现:公司地处6大金融城市附近100公里,他们的融资成本要低7个basis points.

我总是觉得用Location来作为information asymmetry的proxy,怪怪的。

Blankespoor, Miller, and White (2014, TAR)

The Role of Dissemination in Market Liquidity: 
Evidence from Firms' Use of Twitter

Twitter的使用降低了Information Asymmetry. (lower abnormal bid-ask spreads and greater abnormal depths.Q: 后面这个什么意思?)

page 86

Role of DAIT Dissemination Based on Firm Visibility

Information acquisition costs (这个一种cost。从另一种角度,adverse selection也是一种cost。) Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)等等。

Bushess et al. (2010) 讲的是information intermediaries, such as the press, 也有助于降低information acquisition costs.

Miller (2006)说business press有bias,并且toward coverage of high visibility firms.

page 88

Information Asymmetry Measures

Leuz and Verrecchia (1999, 2000) - bid-ask spread

Lee et al. 1993; Kavajecz, 1999 - depth

Q: 用了两个liquidity相关的Measure来测量information asymmetry,这对吗?

Page 99

Impact of Dissemination Based on Firm Visibility

文章说DAIT是降低了information asymmetry,但其实对于high visibility firms的帮助不大,因为他们传统的信息渠道已经很多了。

Wednesday, August 27, 2014

Rogers and Stocken (2005, TAR)

Credibility of Management Forecasts

The Accounting Review

Lev and Penman (1990) 说,management forecasts是credible因为ex post,市场可以验证他们说的话。

但本文第一句就说Managers have incentives to bias their earnings forecasts. (此话从何而来?好莫名其妙。)

本文最主要的发现:
The willingness of managers to misrepresent their information in response to their incentives varies with the market's ability to detect their misrepresentation.

MF是否misrepresent,和市场有没有能力发现他们的Misrepresentation有关。

Litigation Environment
H1a:
有可能面临Litigation risk的公司,更可能发布less optimistic or more pessimistic forecasts.当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,这个问题更严重。

Insider Transactions
H1b:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,公司更可能发布more optimistic before disposing of stock and more pessimistic forecasts before acquiring stock.

Financial Distress
H1c:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,financial distress的公司更可能发布more optimistic forecast。

Competitive Enviroment
H1d:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,concentrated market里的公司更可能发布more pessimistic forecasts。(因为不希望有entrants嘛)

Management Incentives and Market Price Response

H2:
Investors respond less positively (or more negatively) to forecasts with higher predicted optimism and more positively (or less negatively) to forecasts with higher predicted pessimism.



Arya, Frimor, Mittendorf (2010, MS)

Discretionary Disclosure of Proprietary Information in a Multisegment Firm

Management Science

Grossman and Hart (1980)他们提出的unraveling results (几个condition,用于full disclosure),本问认为只适用于公司层面,不适用于segment level.

本文假设Ex Ante,公司withhold information.

实际例子:比如Apple拒绝提供Ipod部门的销售情况

Literature Review

Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford (2005)
后者研究了SFAS No. 131 (一个法令,要求企业进一步增加segment level的disclosure)

Berger and Hann (2007) 认为是agency problem,而不是proprietary costs,更能解释partial disclosure.

还有很多modeling papers.

本文的均衡也是partial disclosure.

3. Results

3.1 Single Market Benchmark

假设Incumbent的initial cost is more informative of its own future cost than its rival's

还假设了Bertrand competition

(i) Incumbent, Ex Ante, prefer withhold info.
(ii) Ex Post, fully reveal info.

3.2 Disclosure in Multiple Segments

segment aggregation是均衡

Corollary 1

aggregation的条件:
(i) 两部门的信息差异,smaller than 
(a) the degree of uncertainty
(b) the competitive intensity

Corollary 2
In the case of no cross-firm correlation, mandatory segment disclosure regulations reduce total welfare.

强制信息披露降低social welfare


Monday, August 25, 2014

Beyer, Cohen, Lys, Walther (2010, JAE)

The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature

I. Introduction

Accounting info的作用

关键词:
(1)Evaluate (the ex ante or valuation role of accounting information) 估价
著名例子:Lemon market (Akerlof, 1970)

(2)Monitor (the ex-post or stewardship role of accounting info.) 监督
因为所有权和管理分离

同样,两种information asymmetry

(1) b/w capital providers and entrepreneurs with investment opportunities
(2) agency problems

文章里说,information enviroment会受以下几种情况制约:

(i) the extent to which each of the conditions of the unraveling result do not hold (后来会列6种情况)

(ii) the availability and cost-effectiveness of alternative mechanisms or information from sources other than the firm itself (比如financial analysts, 或机构投资人)

(iii) the magnitude of the stewardship problem compared to the magnitude of the valuation problem

关键词:Interdependence

比如:earnings management, voluntary disclosure,和the informativeness of analyst forecasts之间的interrelation

Unanswered questions:
(1) the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure
(2) the reasons why disclosure regulation so prevalent in advanced and developed economies such as the U.S.
(3) the relation b/w firms' voluntary disclosure policies, mandatory disclosure requirements, and the information produced by security analysts

2. Sources of corporate financial information


3. Voluntary disclosures

3.1 Models of corporate voluntary disclosure

Unraveling result (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986)

(1) Disclosure are costless
(2) Investors know that firms have private information
(3) All investors interpret the firms' disclosure in the same way and firms know how investors will interpret that disclosure
(4) managers want to maximize their firms' share prices
(5) firms can credibly disclose their private information
(6) firms cannot commit ex-ante to a specific disclosure policy

3.1.1 Disclosure Costs







Tuesday, July 15, 2014

Archambault and Archambault (2003, IJA)

Archambault and Archambault (2003, IJA) International Journal of Accounting

A multinational test of determinants of corporate disclosure



2.3. Corporate systems

In addition to national systems that affect all companies within a country, individual
corporations engage in a number of social systems that result in each corporation being
unique. This study considers factors that relate to financial and operating systems. These
unique responses, however, are determined within the cultural and national systems that the corporation operates in. Likewise, the corporate finance and operating decisions can create changes in the national and cultural systems.

2.3.1. Financial systems

Financial systems deal with the capital-generation process. This study considers ownership, exchange listings, dividends, auditor, and leverage.

2.3.1.1. Ownership. 

Investors are a primary beneficiary of corporate disclosure. However, investors who own a large percentage of a company are more able to obtain information directly from the company. Companies with such large block owners are also less reliant on smaller 
investors. As a result, the need for corporate disclosure may decrease (LaPorta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Schadewitz & Blevins, 1998).

2.3.1.2. Exchange listings. 

Exchanges establish disclosure regulations. Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) report disclosure scores for leading exchanges. A company’s disclosure policy is expected to be influenced by the disclosure policies of the exchanges it trades on.
Ownership dispersion may increase with the number of exchanges on which a firm is listed, increasing a firm's disclosure.

2.3.1.3. Dividends. 

Dividends provide information to investors about the amount and timing of future cash flows(Miller & Rock, 1985). The information provided by dividends may substitute for other forms of corporate disclosure. This is especially true in instances where capital markets are less developed and/or subject to manipulation in the trading of securities
(Previts & Bricker, 1994). As a result, firms that pay dividends may reduce corporate disclosure.

2.3.1.4. Auditor. 

Wallace et al. (1994) suggest that the contents of annual reports may be influenced by auditors. Larger audit firms may try to improve the perceived quality of the annual reports by having clients disclose more information. As a result, firms audited by one of the Big Six accounting firms may disclose more information than other firms. However, Wallace et al. find no significant relation between auditor size and disclosure among Spanish firms. Similarly, based on a meta-analysis, Ahmed and Courtis (1999)find no relation between auditor size and disclosure.

2.3.1.5. Leverage. 

Meek et al. (1995)andWallace et al. (1994)predict that highly leveraged firms disclose more information in order to reduce the agency costs of debt. Wallace et al. find
no effect of leverage on disclosure. Meek et al. find that disclosure decreases with leverage.

Zarzeski (1996)predicts that disclosure decreases with leverage because creditors may be
able to obtain private information. She also finds that disclosure decreases with leverage.
Ahmed and Courtis (1999)conclude from their meta-analysis that disclosure increases with
leverage. Jaggi and Low (2000)find that disclosure increases with leverage in common law
systems and has no significant relation in code law systems. Thus, various studies have reported conflicting results.

Corporations make many decisions about the financial structure of the company. This
paper considers block ownership, foreign-exchange listings, dividend policies, auditor choice, and use of debt as components of corporate financial systems. Disclosure choices are expected to be a function of these finance-related decisions.

H4. Corporate financial systems influence the amount of corporate disclosure.

2.3.2. Operating systems

Companies make a number of operating decisions that may influence the information
needs of financial-statement users. This study considers firm size, number of industries, and foreign sales.

2.3.2.1. Firm size. 

Several studies have found that disclosure increases with firm size. Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Meek et al. (1995), Wallace et al. (1994), and Zarzeski (1996) are recent examples of such studies. The theoretical reason for this relationship is less clear. Zarzeski claims it may be due to public demand for information and international resource dependence. Other possible explanations could be that large companies disclose more to reduce political pressure or that large companies have the resources to produce more disclosures. Whatever the reason, large firms are expected to disclose more information than small firms.

2.3.2.2. Number of industries. 

The disclosure needs of firms may increase as the firm operates in a larger number of industries in order to satisfy the information needs associated with obtaining a broader set of resources (Zarzeski, 1996). In addition, the competitive costs of disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983) may decrease as a firm becomes more diversified. Therefore, firms may increase disclosure as they increase the number of industries in which they operate.

2.3.2.3. Foreign sales. 

Companies with foreign sales are likely to require foreign resources, such as labor and capital, to support those operations. Zarzeski (1996) predicts that companies will disclose more information if they have large relative foreign sales in order to acquire the 
necessary resources. Her results support her prediction. Operating decisions are also made by corporate managers and directors. Firm size, number of industries, and percent of foreign sales revenue are identified in this study as operating decisions that are expected to lead to differential amounts of corporate disclosure.


H5. Corporate operating systems influence the amount of corporate disclosure.


Monday, July 14, 2014

Jo and Kim (2007, JFE)

Disclosure Frequency and Earnings Management 

他们主要研究了post-issue (SEO) 情形下,disclosure frequency和earnings MGMT的关系。多多信息披露的公司,less earnings MGMT,还有better post-issue performance.

1. Introduction

过去的研究发现,公司为了短期利益(上调股价),会采取earnings management的办法。可见Investors不能很快的分辨EM.

很多literature关于disclosure提高transparency,但也有人(Lang and Lundholm, 2000)提到,公司别有居心的disclosure(在SEO之前)反而降低了transparency.

但这篇文章倾向认为,disclosure提高transparency,所以更容易暴露earnings management,所以他们之间应该负相关。

2. Disclosure frequency, earnings management, and post-issue performance

EM的最主要的激励,就是inflate stock price.

Rangan (1998)说在SEO后的quarter里,公司也有incentives to EM,因为legal liabilities and lock-up agreements.第一,SEO后的价格突然逆转,会引起诉讼。第二,lock-up agreements提到Insiders在SEO后的90-180天内不能卖股票。

2.1 Transparency-increasing disclosure and EM

Prediction 1: EM is a decreasing function of the persistent level of disclosure.

2.2 Transparency-increasing disclosure and post-issue SEO performance

Two reasons:

第一,disclosure 降低了information gap。

第二,对于那些不disclosure又EM的公司来说,post-SEO 后市场价格会反转。

但是,不是所有的disclosure都credible.所以,SEO前的disclosure可能用来hype the stock。所以Post-issue SEO performance应该与之前之后的disclosure都有关。

Prediction 2. Post-issue SEO performance is less negative for firms that maintain a persistently high level of disclosure around the offering.

2.3 Opaque disclosure and earnings management

那些别有居心的disclosure,一般也会伴随着earnings management.

Prediction 3. EM is positively associated with a non-persistent disclosure increase.

2.4 Opaque disclosure and post-issue SEO performance

Following Lang and Lundholm (2000)

Prediction 4. Post-issue SEO performance is more negative for firms with a non-persistent disclosure increase.

3 Data and measurement

3.1 Data selection Disclosure proxy: press-release wires in the Dow Jones Interactive (DJI) database system

3.2 Measurement of disclosure frequency

103,032 press releases
(9 press releases per 6-month period on average multiplied by eight 6-month periods within a four-year span around the SEO announcement  multiplied by 1,431 SEOs)

press releases数量受两个因素影响:
the management disclosure strategy (transparent vs. opaque) and report-able events.

Monday, July 7, 2014

Hutton (2005, CAR)

Determinants of Managerial Earnings Guidance

这篇文章讲在FD政策出台前,哪些公司会去review analyst earnings model,并给予额外的private information.

这不是一篇对公众disclose信息的文章。通常意义上,我们讲公司的disclosure,都是说对所有人。

Table 1
Firm Characteristics associated with management's decision 
to review analyst earnings models

Pressures from the investment community / incentives not to disappoint

Institutional Holdings (+)

Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2004) indicate that managers believe that institutional investors set their firms' stock prices and ,,, .

所以机构投资人持有比较高的公司,比较不希望令市场失望

# of Analysts (+)

Firms with a higher percentage of shares held by institutions or greater analyst following are also likely to face pressure to provide (private) earnings guidance because these capital-market intermediaries are the ones purported to benefit from the advanced earnings news.

机构投资人和analysts都有压力,因为他们是信息中介,他们应该披露一些额外的信息。

External Financing (+)

公司如果有杠杆压力,更要依赖于analysts和机构投资人的态度,来帮助公司发行新债券或股票。

Book-to-Market (-)

Research suggests that stock market's asymmetric response to earnings surprises (stock prices respond more to negative earnings surprises than to positive earnings surprises) is particularly large for high-growth firms (Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Therefore, managers of firms with higher valuation multiples (price-to-earnings and market-to-book) are likely to face greater pressure not to disappoint (Matsumoto 2002), and therefore are more likely to review analyst earnings models.

高增长的公司,更加不希望令市场失望。


Importance and predictability of earnings

Industry - ERC R2 (+)

earnings越容易被predict,有surprise的时候,市场的反应就越大。所以公司就更在意,要meet analysts' forecasts。可不可预测,跟行业的关系很大,所以作者加了这个variable。

Standard_Deviation_Revenues (+)
另一方面,如果earnings超级难预测,公司也会有动机去看看analysts的模型。

Complexity of the firm's business and frequency of sophisticated financial transactions

# of segments (+)
如果公司业务复杂,analyst 于是能力有限,因为他们不可能是每个行业的行家。(Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu 2001)

重组的时候,也给analyst预测带来困难(Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols 2001)。

% Intangibles (+)
Bingo

Chavent, Ding, Fu, Stolowy, and Wang (2006, EAR)

Disclosure and Determinants Studies: An Extension Using the Divisive Clustering Method (DIV)

Abstract

过去的研究问题是disclosure analysis is restricted to the determination of the disclosure index.

The objective of this paper is to introduce a divisive (descendant) clustering method, which splits the sample into homogeneous sub-groups corresponding to disclosure patterns (profiles), for clearer determination of the financial characteristics.

Q: 什么意思???

Disclosure pattern is related to provision intensity, size, leverage, and market expectation, but not to profit, return, and industry.

信息披露跟一些公司特性有关,跟另一些无关。

Page 188

3. Hypotheses

Provision Intensity (+)

A provision, defined as a liability of uncertain timing or amount, is calculated to cover general risks or potential losses not linked directly to assets.

When provisions are equivalent to a high percentage of total assets, they become a major factor in evaluating the firm's risk level. @当各种条款越多的话,他们就成为一个主要衡量公司风险的因素。

Size (+)

三个理由:

第一,large firms are more willing to disclose information to reduce their political costs, since their higher visibility can easily lead to more litigation and governmental intervention (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978)@大公司的litigation risk高,所以要disclose.

第二,thanks to their more developed internal reporting system, the costs associated ith a higher disclosure level are lower for large firms. @信息披露成本低

第三,smaller firms are more likely to hide crucial information because of their competitive disadvantage within their industry (Singhvi and Desai, 1971, TAR) @小公司好不容易有些相对竞争优势,当然不愿意说啦。

Leverage (+)

Corporate information disclosure is often considered as an instrument to reduce the monitoring costs for creditors. @通常情况下,杠杆越高,disclosure越高。

Profit and Return (predict +, but insignificant in this paper)

Singhvi and Desai (1971) propose that when the rate of return is high, managers are motivated to disclose detailed information in order to support the continuance of their positions and remuneration. Conversely, when the rate of return is low, they may disclose less information in order to conceal the reasons for losses or declining profits. @管理层都是报喜不报忧。

Market Expectation for the Firm's Future Growth (It's consequence, rather determinant!)
(+, but insignificant)

Disclosure reduces agency costs and minimize the firm's capital cost by resolving the information asymmetry problem. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)

Industry Type (Difference conclusions in prior literature reviews)

insignificant in this paper

注:这篇有个Appendix A总结了很多Disclosure的文章,值得好好收藏!