Consequences and Institutional Determinants of Unregulated Corporate Financial Statements: Evidence from Embedded Value Reporting
讲一种Embedded Value Reporting,主要用于保险行业,不是IFRS,也不是GAAP。是一种forward-looking measure that captures the expected net value of the underlying contracts signed by the insurer.
文章发现这种disclosure能够降低information asymmetry.该幅度还与EV的以下特性相关:点出methodological deficiencies,还有提供横向的可比性(comparability).
在以下国家内EV运用的更广泛:
(1) hostile takeovers恶意收购多的
(2) 经理人不规避volatile income的
(3) 法律法规很少进入product market
(4) 以及analysts认为EV确实增加了disclosure的价值
Monday, September 1, 2014
Roychowdhury and Sletten (2012, TAR)
Voluntary Disclosure Incentives and Earnings Informativeness
(1) Earnings informativeness relative to other sources is higher in bad-news quarters than in good-news quarters.
(2) 如果公司不主动披露信息,Information asymmetry更厉害,以及insider trading里面managers are net sellers,那么earnings differential informativeness in bad-news quarters is more pronounced.
H1: Earnings informativeness is higher when the overall news reaching the market during a quarter is negative than when it is positive.
H2: Earnings differential informativeness during bad-news quarters relative to good-news quarters is higher among firms with greater information asymmetry.
H3: Earnings differential informativeness during bad-news quarters relative to good-news quarters is higher in quarters with net insider sales if firm stock.
(1) Earnings informativeness relative to other sources is higher in bad-news quarters than in good-news quarters.
(2) 如果公司不主动披露信息,Information asymmetry更厉害,以及insider trading里面managers are net sellers,那么earnings differential informativeness in bad-news quarters is more pronounced.
H1: Earnings informativeness is higher when the overall news reaching the market during a quarter is negative than when it is positive.
H2: Earnings differential informativeness during bad-news quarters relative to good-news quarters is higher among firms with greater information asymmetry.
H3: Earnings differential informativeness during bad-news quarters relative to good-news quarters is higher in quarters with net insider sales if firm stock.
Tang (2011, JAE)
Isolating the effect of disclosure on information risk
Cost of capital reflect both information risk and fundamental risk.
文章认为A股B股的fundamental risk是一样的,但是information risk是不同的。因为本土和境外投资人有不同的投资机会,和risk-free interest rate。
备注里其实说,80%的B股投资人都是海外华人,他们是能看懂中国新闻和报表的,那么仍然有20%没有access,了解公司内幕。
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms with a greater disparity in public dislosure available to domestic and foreign investors have a higher level of price differences between A and B shares.
A,B股的disparity在沪市的差异比深圳还要大,解释之一,是B股投资人大多住在香港,离深圳很近。
H2:,Disparity in public disclosure available to domestic and foreign investors has a more pronounced effect on the level of price differences between A and B shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange than the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
有人问,这种disparity为什么不能被arbitrage away?这里说道杭州有21%的dispute通过法院解决,但在大连,这个比例只有0.1%.
H3: Disparity in public dislosure available to domestic and foreign investors has a more pronounced effect on the level of price differences between A and B shares in regions with weak protection than in regions with strong protection of property rights.
Measure of disparity in public disclosure,比较公司新闻在中外媒体上的数量差别。
Cost of capital reflect both information risk and fundamental risk.
文章认为A股B股的fundamental risk是一样的,但是information risk是不同的。因为本土和境外投资人有不同的投资机会,和risk-free interest rate。
备注里其实说,80%的B股投资人都是海外华人,他们是能看懂中国新闻和报表的,那么仍然有20%没有access,了解公司内幕。
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms with a greater disparity in public dislosure available to domestic and foreign investors have a higher level of price differences between A and B shares.
A,B股的disparity在沪市的差异比深圳还要大,解释之一,是B股投资人大多住在香港,离深圳很近。
H2:,Disparity in public disclosure available to domestic and foreign investors has a more pronounced effect on the level of price differences between A and B shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange than the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
有人问,这种disparity为什么不能被arbitrage away?这里说道杭州有21%的dispute通过法院解决,但在大连,这个比例只有0.1%.
H3: Disparity in public dislosure available to domestic and foreign investors has a more pronounced effect on the level of price differences between A and B shares in regions with weak protection than in regions with strong protection of property rights.
Measure of disparity in public disclosure,比较公司新闻在中外媒体上的数量差别。
Badertscher, Shroff, White (2013, JFE)
Externalities of public firm prescence:
Evidence from private firms' investment decisions
什么叫如果某行业的uncertainty比较低,then private firms are more responsive to their investment opportunities?
公司要做个trade off,(1)等等,再看看。也许项目的回报更清晰,但也许会错过投资机会;(2)不管三七二十一,拿了项目再说,但回报还看不太清楚。
Evidence from private firms' investment decisions
什么叫如果某行业的uncertainty比较低,then private firms are more responsive to their investment opportunities?
公司要做个trade off,(1)等等,再看看。也许项目的回报更清晰,但也许会错过投资机会;(2)不管三七二十一,拿了项目再说,但回报还看不太清楚。
El Ghoul et al. (2013, CAR)
Does Information Asymmetry Matter to Equity Pricing?
Evidence form Firms' Geographic Location
最早的CAPM model中,投资者的回报基于holding systematic risks。Information asymmetry不应该被计价。但是这个model太静态,怎么解释,在有了新消息来临后,价格的变动呢?(Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O' Hara, 2002)。更何况,还有Public和private消息之分?
所以Information asymmetry是不是该记入cost of capital,还没有定论。
文章发现:公司地处6大金融城市附近100公里,他们的融资成本要低7个basis points.
我总是觉得用Location来作为information asymmetry的proxy,怪怪的。
Evidence form Firms' Geographic Location
最早的CAPM model中,投资者的回报基于holding systematic risks。Information asymmetry不应该被计价。但是这个model太静态,怎么解释,在有了新消息来临后,价格的变动呢?(Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O' Hara, 2002)。更何况,还有Public和private消息之分?
所以Information asymmetry是不是该记入cost of capital,还没有定论。
文章发现:公司地处6大金融城市附近100公里,他们的融资成本要低7个basis points.
我总是觉得用Location来作为information asymmetry的proxy,怪怪的。
Blankespoor, Miller, and White (2014, TAR)
The Role of Dissemination in Market Liquidity:
Evidence from Firms' Use of Twitter
Twitter的使用降低了Information Asymmetry. (lower abnormal bid-ask spreads and greater abnormal depths.Q: 后面这个什么意思?)
page 86
Role of DAIT Dissemination Based on Firm Visibility
Information acquisition costs (这个一种cost。从另一种角度,adverse selection也是一种cost。) Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)等等。
Bushess et al. (2010) 讲的是information intermediaries, such as the press, 也有助于降低information acquisition costs.
Miller (2006)说business press有bias,并且toward coverage of high visibility firms.
page 88
Information Asymmetry Measures
Leuz and Verrecchia (1999, 2000) - bid-ask spread
Lee et al. 1993; Kavajecz, 1999 - depth
Q: 用了两个liquidity相关的Measure来测量information asymmetry,这对吗?
Page 99
Impact of Dissemination Based on Firm Visibility
文章说DAIT是降低了information asymmetry,但其实对于high visibility firms的帮助不大,因为他们传统的信息渠道已经很多了。
Evidence from Firms' Use of Twitter
Twitter的使用降低了Information Asymmetry. (lower abnormal bid-ask spreads and greater abnormal depths.Q: 后面这个什么意思?)
page 86
Role of DAIT Dissemination Based on Firm Visibility
Information acquisition costs (这个一种cost。从另一种角度,adverse selection也是一种cost。) Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)等等。
Bushess et al. (2010) 讲的是information intermediaries, such as the press, 也有助于降低information acquisition costs.
Miller (2006)说business press有bias,并且toward coverage of high visibility firms.
page 88
Information Asymmetry Measures
Leuz and Verrecchia (1999, 2000) - bid-ask spread
Lee et al. 1993; Kavajecz, 1999 - depth
Q: 用了两个liquidity相关的Measure来测量information asymmetry,这对吗?
Page 99
Impact of Dissemination Based on Firm Visibility
文章说DAIT是降低了information asymmetry,但其实对于high visibility firms的帮助不大,因为他们传统的信息渠道已经很多了。
Wednesday, August 27, 2014
Rogers and Stocken (2005, TAR)
Credibility of Management Forecasts
The Accounting Review
Lev and Penman (1990) 说,management forecasts是credible因为ex post,市场可以验证他们说的话。
但本文第一句就说Managers have incentives to bias their earnings forecasts. (此话从何而来?好莫名其妙。)
本文最主要的发现:
The willingness of managers to misrepresent their information in response to their incentives varies with the market's ability to detect their misrepresentation.
MF是否misrepresent,和市场有没有能力发现他们的Misrepresentation有关。
Litigation Environment
H1a:
有可能面临Litigation risk的公司,更可能发布less optimistic or more pessimistic forecasts.当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,这个问题更严重。
Insider Transactions
H1b:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,公司更可能发布more optimistic before disposing of stock and more pessimistic forecasts before acquiring stock.
Financial Distress
H1c:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,financial distress的公司更可能发布more optimistic forecast。
Competitive Enviroment
H1d:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,concentrated market里的公司更可能发布more pessimistic forecasts。(因为不希望有entrants嘛)
Management Incentives and Market Price Response
H2:
Investors respond less positively (or more negatively) to forecasts with higher predicted optimism and more positively (or less negatively) to forecasts with higher predicted pessimism.
The Accounting Review
Lev and Penman (1990) 说,management forecasts是credible因为ex post,市场可以验证他们说的话。
但本文第一句就说Managers have incentives to bias their earnings forecasts. (此话从何而来?好莫名其妙。)
本文最主要的发现:
The willingness of managers to misrepresent their information in response to their incentives varies with the market's ability to detect their misrepresentation.
MF是否misrepresent,和市场有没有能力发现他们的Misrepresentation有关。
Litigation Environment
H1a:
有可能面临Litigation risk的公司,更可能发布less optimistic or more pessimistic forecasts.当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,这个问题更严重。
Insider Transactions
H1b:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,公司更可能发布more optimistic before disposing of stock and more pessimistic forecasts before acquiring stock.
Financial Distress
H1c:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,financial distress的公司更可能发布more optimistic forecast。
Competitive Enviroment
H1d:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,concentrated market里的公司更可能发布more pessimistic forecasts。(因为不希望有entrants嘛)
Management Incentives and Market Price Response
H2:
Investors respond less positively (or more negatively) to forecasts with higher predicted optimism and more positively (or less negatively) to forecasts with higher predicted pessimism.
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