Credibility of Management Forecasts
The Accounting Review
Lev and Penman (1990) 说,management forecasts是credible因为ex post,市场可以验证他们说的话。
但本文第一句就说Managers have incentives to bias their earnings forecasts. (此话从何而来?好莫名其妙。)
本文最主要的发现:
The willingness of managers to misrepresent their information in response to their incentives varies with the market's ability to detect their misrepresentation.
MF是否misrepresent,和市场有没有能力发现他们的Misrepresentation有关。
Litigation Environment
H1a:
有可能面临Litigation risk的公司,更可能发布less optimistic or more pessimistic forecasts.当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,这个问题更严重。
Insider Transactions
H1b:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,公司更可能发布more optimistic before disposing of stock and more pessimistic forecasts before acquiring stock.
Financial Distress
H1c:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,financial distress的公司更可能发布more optimistic forecast。
Competitive Enviroment
H1d:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,concentrated market里的公司更可能发布more pessimistic forecasts。(因为不希望有entrants嘛)
Management Incentives and Market Price Response
H2:
Investors respond less positively (or more negatively) to forecasts with higher predicted optimism and more positively (or less negatively) to forecasts with higher predicted pessimism.
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