Wednesday, August 27, 2014

Rogers and Stocken (2005, TAR)

Credibility of Management Forecasts

The Accounting Review

Lev and Penman (1990) 说,management forecasts是credible因为ex post,市场可以验证他们说的话。

但本文第一句就说Managers have incentives to bias their earnings forecasts. (此话从何而来?好莫名其妙。)

本文最主要的发现:
The willingness of managers to misrepresent their information in response to their incentives varies with the market's ability to detect their misrepresentation.

MF是否misrepresent,和市场有没有能力发现他们的Misrepresentation有关。

Litigation Environment
H1a:
有可能面临Litigation risk的公司,更可能发布less optimistic or more pessimistic forecasts.当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,这个问题更严重。

Insider Transactions
H1b:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,公司更可能发布more optimistic before disposing of stock and more pessimistic forecasts before acquiring stock.

Financial Distress
H1c:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,financial distress的公司更可能发布more optimistic forecast。

Competitive Enviroment
H1d:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,concentrated market里的公司更可能发布more pessimistic forecasts。(因为不希望有entrants嘛)

Management Incentives and Market Price Response

H2:
Investors respond less positively (or more negatively) to forecasts with higher predicted optimism and more positively (or less negatively) to forecasts with higher predicted pessimism.



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