Discretionary Disclosure of Proprietary Information in a Multisegment Firm
Management Science
Grossman and Hart (1980)他们提出的unraveling results (几个condition,用于full disclosure),本问认为只适用于公司层面,不适用于segment level.
本文假设Ex Ante,公司withhold information.
实际例子:比如Apple拒绝提供Ipod部门的销售情况
Literature Review
Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford (2005)
后者研究了SFAS No. 131 (一个法令,要求企业进一步增加segment level的disclosure)
Berger and Hann (2007) 认为是agency problem,而不是proprietary costs,更能解释partial disclosure.
还有很多modeling papers.
本文的均衡也是partial disclosure.
3. Results
3.1 Single Market Benchmark
假设Incumbent的initial cost is more informative of its own future cost than its rival's
还假设了Bertrand competition
(i) Incumbent, Ex Ante, prefer withhold info.
(ii) Ex Post, fully reveal info.
3.2 Disclosure in Multiple Segments
segment aggregation是均衡
Corollary 1
aggregation的条件:
(i) 两部门的信息差异,smaller than
(a) the degree of uncertainty
(b) the competitive intensity
Corollary 2
In the case of no cross-firm correlation, mandatory segment disclosure regulations reduce total welfare.
强制信息披露降低social welfare
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