Thursday, September 18, 2014

我的10th PPT


What I am trying to do in my research is to investigate why managers make management forecasts.

Management forecast is one important form of voluntary disclosure. The percentage of publicly traded companies providing annual guidance increased from 61% to 82% (Hirst et al., 2008)

Apparently, I am not the first person to ask and try to answer this question. There are a long list of literatures to show the real effects of management forecasts on firms' stock performance. Due to the limited space on my PPT, and more important, I do not want to hold everybody here through the whole weekend, I only list a few papers here.

Firms with higher information asymmetry release management forecasts to reduce information asymmetry. Management forecasts help firms to raise outside equity due to a better information environment. Increased frequency of management forecasts also increase liquidity, decrease cost of capital, reduce litigation costs, and attract  more analysts following. Furthermore, managers have strong incentives to avoid equity mispricing especially when the mispricing could adversely affect their wealth. For example,  they want to sell a portion of stocks but the stock price is undervalued.

All of these papers, even the summary paper from JAE, consider management forecast is voluntary disclosure. No wonder all these papers cite all the modelling and empirical papers about all the other kinds of voluntary disclosure in their literature reviews paragraph. However, management forecast is not equal to voluntary disclosure. Whether management forecasts can stand for overall voluntary disclosure is also questionable. 

(1) Management forecasts do not provide information other than earnings guidance. Give a simple example. Apple Inc. would like to give investors its earnings forecasts for the next period, but the company will not give when it will launch Iphone 7 or whether they are going to produce an iCar as a new profit source.

Therefore, management forecast can only lower the information asymmetry related to the future earnings, only the number of earnings, but not other part of the firm. 

(2) My calculation of correlation between management forecasts and one measure of voluntary disclosure is almost zero.



I look at a situation where information environment changes due to external reason. Specifically, I look at the spinoff event. Spinoff is a special restructuring event. The parent firm spin offs its subsidiary and create a new separate, independent, and public firm. Previously, there is only one public firm and one copy of financial statement. Now there are two public firms. Each has a separate financial statement. Therefore, by definition, information asymmetry about the earnings is lowered.

Endogenous problem? I think the problem is not very severe here. Compare spinoff decision and disclosure decision. Spinoff is much larger strategy decision and takes a lot of time, effort from the firm while disclosure is much smaller cost. I do not think that firms that intend to reduce management forecasts will intentionally choose spinoffs.

Usually, firms reduce management forecasts because they get through long term bad performance, they cannot meet analysts forecasts, and etc. Therefore, spinoff is a good event to test whether management forecasts behavior changes according to the change of information asymmetry.

Some CEOs mention their spinoff incentives in the media or the SEC filings. For example, AT&T says ...
Liberty say...

However, spinoff could also increase information asymmetry. Before the spinoff, parent is a large, diversified firm. It is easier for managers to smooth the earnings and firms less volatile earnings are more likely to give more forecasts. Now the firm size is smaller and segment number decreases, if CEOs still want to manipulate earnings, it could be harder for him.

But we do not know which hypothesis could dominate the other. Most literatures show that information asymmetry reduces after spinoffs except one paper shows the opposite. First two papers use analyst forecasts precision as the proxy of information asymmetry and choose the time period in -1 and +1. The last paper regresses the daily stock return on market stock return, and uses the standard deviation of error as the firms' specific information. Additionally, they choose a very short term before and after spinoff and find information asymmetry is increasing. The whole process is not convincable to me.


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