力力问，公司复杂程度与management forecasts的关系

Firm diversification and asymmetric information: evidence from analysts' forecasts and earnings announcements

Shawn Thomas

2002, JFE

Abstract


Managers frequently cite the desire to mitigate asymmetric information as a motivation for increasing firm focus. The information benefits of focus appear relevant for the subset of firms that actually increase their focus; however, the relevance of focus-related information benefits for the population of diversified firms is an open question. This paper examines the relation between corporate diversification and asymmetric information proxies derived from analysts’ forecasts and abnormal returns associated with earnings announcements. I find that greater diversification is not associated with increased asymmetric information. These results call into question the notion that corporate diversification strictly exacerbates information problems.

Thomas发现diversification程度和information asymmetry没什么关系。

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International Diversification and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy and Bias


Augustine Duru and David M. Reeb

2002, TAR

Abstract

We investigate the association between corporate international diversification and the accuracy and bias of consensus analysts' earnings forecasts. We find that greater corporate international diversification is associated with less accurate and more optimistic forecasts. Our results suggest that international diversification reflects unique dimensions of forecasting difficulty that are not captured in previously identified determinants. This evidence suggests that as firms become more geographically diversified, forecasting their earnings becomes more complex.

Duru and Reeb发现，公司全球化越diversified，forecasts越困难。（对于financial analysts来说）

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WHY MANAGERS EXPLAIN EARNINGS FORECASTS

Baginski, Hassell, Kimbrough (2004, JAR)

解释earnings forecasts的一些理由

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Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives

Nagar et al. (2003, JAE)

# of segments和# management forecasts的correlation是-0.06,虽然显著，但是economics上几乎为零。

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力力问，Fog Index还有the number of numbers有没有办法编程？

晨晨问了吴凯。

Python

Topic Modeling

Maybe广宇。

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