Wednesday, August 26, 2015

Diary 20150826

Vol. 90 Issue 4 - Jul2015

这一期全在批判Bentley University的Hunton作假啊。吓死人了!!!



Delegating Disclosure and Production Choices (2015, TAR)

普渡的Modelling Paper
好像在说,经理人因为合同的incentives,所以会有ex ante的disclosure不同。
心累。。。

Six Decades of Research (2015, TAR, Beaver)

the mean ratio (U-statistics)???

Information Content of Prices (Part 2)
A reverse regression analysis???

Are Fraud Specialists Relatively More Effective than Auditors at Modifying Audit Programs in the Presence of Fraud Risk?

Abstract
Previous studies indicate that auditors are able to identify fraud risk factors, but may not be able to translate this knowledge into an audit plan that effectively takes these factors into account to increase the likelihood of detecting fraud. Fraud specialists may be able to compensate for such limitations. This study investigates the relative merits of involving fraud specialists in assisting auditors by developing an audit plan that would effectively address fraud risk in a revenue cycle. Results show that fraud specialists did not differ from auditors in the number of procedures selected from a standard audit program; nor were these procedures cumulatively more effective than those selected by auditors. Fraud specialists generated a greater number of non-standard additional audit procedures, and those procedures were marginally more effective, but less efficient, than those of auditors, except for certain groups of procedures. Finally, although the fraud specialists proposed significantly more additional (non-standard) procedures than auditors, their proposed budget increase for this category of procedures was significantly smaller than the budget increase proposed by auditors. Adjustments to the overall time budget did not differ between fraud specialists and auditors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Optimal Information Asymmetry, Control Environment, and Investment in Firm-Specific Human Capital.

Abstract
When future operations are expected to provide information rents, managers concerned with being replaced can entrench themselves with value-increasing firm-specific human capital (SHC). In motivating SHC investment, the firm trades off the incentive effects of an ex ante commitment to asymmetric information against the costs of compensation rents and private benefits. Firm value, therefore, is affected by (1) the accuracy with which the board observes and interprets information, and (2) the strength of the control environment restricting the manager's ability to benefit from concealing and diverting firm value. It is optimal to maintain a partially informed board to the mutual benefit of shareholders and managers, and for firms in a stricter control environment to maintain a more informed board. Due to the indirect effect on SHC, regulations that strengthen control adversely affect firm value unless the information and control environments are sufficiently biased toward managerial preferences.

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