Thursday, August 27, 2015

Diary 20150827 (Vol. 90 Issue 3 - May 2015 TAR)

Macroeconomic Consequences of Accounting: The Effect of Accounting Conservatism on Macroeconomic Indicators and the Money Supply.

Abstract
This study investigates the macroeconomic consequences of firm-level accounting conservatism. Consistent with conditional conservatism extending to the aggregate level, I demonstrate that annual estimates of aggregate corporate profits and gross domestic product compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis are more sensitive to negative aggregate news than to positive aggregate news. Next, I estimate the dollar value impact of conservatism on measurements of macroeconomic fundamentals. Finally, I show that incorporating the dollar value impact of conservatism increases the explanatory power of a monetary policy reaction function that describes U.S. Federal Reserve interest rate decision behavior. These results suggest that accounting can impact social welfare by altering the measurement attributes of key macroeconomic indicators and by shaping monetary policy decisions that regulate the money supply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

First, census data indicate that publicly traded firms constitute only 1 percent of all U.S. firms (Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda 2006).上市公司只占1%。(是绝对数量,还是公司大小,还是revenue啊???)


Finally, I investigate whether accounting conservatism’s impact on macroeconomic indicators
affects macroeconomic decision making. Specifically, I examine monetary policy decisions made
by the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed). One way the Fed executes monetary policy is by
manipulating the federal funds rate in order to influence the money supply and alter macroeconomic
growth. The Fed relies on GDP measurements when setting the federal funds rate (Taylor 1993).
Therefore, firm-level accounting conservatism may influence federal funds rate decisions by
altering the GDP measurements upon which the Fed relies.

几段论。因为联储调整利息按照GDP,然而GDP由公司Revenue组成,所以公司的accounting conservatism会影响宏观政策吧?

很简单的regression,很聪明的切入点!!!

Are CEOs and CFOs Rewarded for Disclosure Quality?

Abstract
This study provides evidence regarding the importance that boards of directors place on effective communication with the investor community by examining whether CEO and CFO compensation are related to the quality of the firm's financial disclosures. Using an index derived from analyst forecast characteristics and management forecast accuracy to measure disclosure quality, we find changes in the annual bonus for both the CEO and CFO to be positively associated with changes in disclosure quality. We also find that the relation is stronger for high-growth firms, firms that have stronger governance structures, and for executives with lower equity incentives. Overall, our findings provide insight into the importance that boards place on effective communication with investors as a responsibility of the CEO and CFO and, therefore, provide them with contractual incentives to address the moral hazard problem associated with voluntary disclosures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

他们发现,有正相关的。

Analyst Interest as an Early Indicator of Firm Fundamental Changes and Stock Returns.

Abstract
We posit that a change in analyst interest in a firm is an early indicator of the firm's future fundamentals, capital market activities, and stock returns. We measure increases in analyst interest by observing analysts who do not cover a firm but participate in that firm's earnings conference call, and we measure decreases in analyst interest by observing analysts who cover a firm, yet are absent from that firm's call. We find that increases in analyst interest are positively associated with future changes in firm fundamentals and capital market activities, while decreases in analyst interest are negatively associated with capital market activities. We also find that increases (decreases) in analyst interest are positively (negatively) correlated with future stock returns over the next three months and that a hedge portfolio yields a significant abnormal return. Overall, our study shows that analyst interest is a novel and early indicator of future firm fundamentals and capital market consequences. 

a change in analyst interest, proxied by either the onset of non-covering sell-side equity analysts who participate in a firm’s earnings conference call or by the absence of participation from covering analysts
真的好细好细的视角。OMG!

Accounting Credibility and Liquidity Constraints: Evidence from Reactions of Small Banks to Monetary Tightening.
被Audited的银行,在货币收紧阶段,更容易借到钱呗。

Has the Quality of Accounting Education Declined?
Abstract
结论貌似是,质量大范围比较没下降,但在商学院内部,不太好说。

Does SOX 404 Have Teeth? Consequences of the Failure to Report Existing Internal Control Weaknesses.
Abstract
We examine various penalties that could serve as enforcement mechanisms for Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 404. We focus on firms with restatements, some of which had previously reported their control weaknesses as required and some of which acknowledged them only after announcing their restatement. We find no evidence that penalties are more likely for firms, managers, or auditors that fail to report existing control weaknesses. Instead, class action lawsuits, management turnover, and auditor turnover are all more likely in the wake of a restatement when control weaknesses had previously been reported. We find similar, although weaker, evidence for Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sanctions. These results are consistent with disclosure of control weaknesses making it difficult for management to plausibly claim later that they were unaware of the underlying conditions that led to restatements. The results also suggest that the public and private enforcement mechanisms surrounding SOX 404 are unlikely to provide strong incentives for compliance and offer a potential explanation for why most restatements are issued by firms that previously claimed to have effective internal controls. 
唉,不是特别感兴趣。。。






No comments:

Post a Comment