Thursday, August 27, 2015

Diary 20150827 (Vol. 90 Issue 2 - Mar 2015 TAR)

Did the 2007 PCAOB Disciplinary Order against Deloitte Impose Actual Costs on the Firm or Improve Its Audit Quality?

Abstract
We examine whether the December 2007 PCAOB disciplinary order against Deloitte affected Deloitte's switching risk, audit fees, and audit quality relative to the other Big 4 firms over a three-year period following the censure. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB censure was associated with a decrease in Deloitte's ability to retain clients and attract new clients, and a decrease in Deloitte's audit fee growth rates. However, methodologies used in extant archival studies yield little or no evidence to suggest that Deloitte's audit quality was different from that of the other Big 4 firms during a three-year window either before or after the censure. Overall, our results suggest that the PCAOB censure imposed actual costs on Deloitte.

Quality没变,但Deloitte成本增加了。

These disciplinary proceedings (PCAOB 2007) followed up on a prior-year inspection
report by publicly censuring Deloitte for violations of auditing standards in connection with the
2003 audit of Ligand Pharmaceuticals.2 Notably, the December 2007 censure came about more than
three years after Deloitte’s resignation from the Ligand engagement in August 2004, and more than
two years after the audit failure became public information in May 2005, when Ligand restated its
financial statements for 2003–2004. More importantly, unlike the public portion of the PCAOB’s
inspection reports, which disclose only engagement-level performance weaknesses, the 2007
PCAOB censure publicly revealed for the first time deficiencies in Deloitte’s firm-level quality
controls. Without admitting or denying the PCAOB’s findings, Deloitte consented to a $1 million
civil penalty and agreed to implement changes to its firm-level quality control policies and

procedures (PCAOB 2007, 12).

差不多这么一回事,这个2007PCAOB的处决。

Executive Compensation and Regulation-Imposed Governance: Evidence from the California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004.

Abstract
This study examines the impact of the California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 on CEO compensation costs in affected organizations. Contrary to the stated objective of the Act that executive compensation is ''just and reasonable,'' we find that CEO compensation costs for affected nonprofits during the post-regulation periods have increased by about 6.3 percent when compared with a control group of comparable unaffected nonprofits. In addition, the relative increase in CEO compensation appears to come from nonprofits that have experienced greater regulatory cost increases. We do not find evidence that the Act resulted in a change in CEO pay performance sensitivity. The observed CEO pay increase is not systematically different across nonprofits that underpaid versus those that overpaid their CEOs during pre-Act periods. Overall, this paper highlights the unintended consequences of regulatory attempts to enhance governance in the not-for-profit sector.

The Robustness of Honesty Effects on Budget Proposals when the Superior has Rejection Authority.

Abstract
Rankin, Schwartz, and Young (2008) find experimental evidence that manipulating whether the budget request of the subordinate requires a factual assertion has no effect on budgetary slack when the superior can reject the budget. This calls into question the role of honesty in participative budgeting settings. Using Rankin et al.'s (2008) manipulation to capture honesty effects, we examine the robustness of honesty effects on budget proposals when the superior has rejection authority in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we document that honesty has a strong effect on budgetary slack when the salience of distributional fairness is reduced by withholding the relative pay of the superior from the subordinate. In Experiment 2, we document that honesty continues to have a strong effect on budgetary slack when the salience of reciprocity is increased by giving the superior the ability to set the subordinate's salary. Thus, our evidence suggests that honesty effects on budget proposals are generally robust to giving the superior rejection authority. Our study helps explain prior experimental results and clarifies the role of honesty in participative budgeting settings.

Experimental Paper。唉。。。算了吧。。。

Does Internal Audit Function Quality Deter Management Misconduct?

Abstract
Standard-setters believe high-quality internal audit functions (IAFs) serve as a key resource to audit committees for monitoring senior management. However, regulators do not enforce IAF quality or require disclosures relating to IAF quality, which is in stark contrast to regulatory requirements placed on boards, audit committees, and external auditors. Using proprietary data, I find that a composite measure of IAF quality is negatively associated with the likelihood of management misconduct even after controlling for board, audit committee, and external auditor quality. This result is robust to a variety of other specifications, including controlling for internal control quality and separate estimation during the pre- and post-SOX time periods. A difference-indifferences analysis indicates that misconduct firms have low IAF quality and competence during misconduct years and improve IAF quality and competence in the post-misconduct years. These findings suggest that regulators, audit committees, and other stakeholders should consider ways to improve IAF quality. 

Does Ineffective Internal Control over Financial Reporting affect a Firm's Operations? Evidence from Firms' Inventory Management.

Abstract
We investigate whether ineffective internal control over financial reporting has implications for firm operations by examining the association between inventory-related material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting and firms' inventory management. We find that firms with inventory-related material weaknesses have systematically lower inventory turnover ratios and are more likely to report inventory impairments relative to firms with effective internal control over financial reporting. We also find that inventory turnover rates increase for firms that remediate material weaknesses related to inventory tracking. Remediating firms also experience increases in sales, gross profit, and operating cash flows. Finally, we assess the generalizability of our findings by examining all material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting, regardless of type, and provide evidence that firms' returns on assets are associated with both their existence and remediation. Collectively, our findings support the general hypothesis that internal control over financial reporting has an economically significant effect on firm operations.

越是inventory turnover有问题的公司,越是有可能internal control有问题吧???

The Effect of Nonprofit Governance on Donations: Evidence from the Revised Form 990.

Abstract
We examine whether donors reward nonprofit organizations that report better governance. From a sample of 10,846 organizations from 2008 to 2010, we first identify seven nonprofit governance dimensions using factor analysis. We then test whether the quality of governance influences donor decisions by including the seven governance factors in the standard donor's demand model. We find consistent evidence that donations and government grants are positively associated with six of the seven factors that capture good governance, including formal written policies (e.g., conflict of interest), independent audits and audit committees, review and approval of executive compensation, board oversight (e.g., board independence), management characteristics (e.g., no related parties), and accessible financial information. Our results have implications for nonprofit managers and regulators. Moreover, mandatory disclosure of governance policies for nonprofit organizations provides an interesting contrast to mandatory adoption of governance policies for publicly traded companies.

捐款的公司,corporate governance都不错。

Audit Fees and Social Capital.

Abstract
We examine the impact of social capital on audit fees. We find that firms headquartered in U.S. counties with high social capital pay lower audit fees. Social capital measures the level of mutual trust in a region. Our results suggest that auditors judge the trustworthiness of their clients based on where the firm is headquartered and charge a premium when they trust the firm less. The basis of our results is the examination of more than 28,000 audit fees for more than 5,000 firms spanning the period of 2000 to 2009. The results are robust to controlling for a large number of firm-level and county-level characteristics. 

Social capital is often defined as the mutual trust in society. We propose that the social capital in the county where a U.S. firm is headquartered can have an impact on how much the auditors trust the managers of the firm. As we discuss below, auditors arguably have less trust when a firm is headquartered in a county with low social capital. We argue that this lack of trust will increase the auditor’s effort and his or her fear of litigation and, therefore, will increase fees.

真的有点奇怪的一篇paper。为啥子呢???

Rating Agency Adjustments to GAAP Financial Statements and Their Effect on Ratings and Credit Spreads.

Abstract
I examine a dataset of both quantitative (hard) adjustments to firms' reported U.S. GAAP financial statement numbers and qualitative (soft) adjustments to firms' credit ratings that Moody's develops and uses in its credit rating process. I first document differences between firms' reported and Moody's adjusted numbers that are both large and frequent across firms. For example, primarily because of upward adjustments to interest expense and debt attributable to firms' off-balance sheet debt, on average, adjusted coverage (cash flow-to-debt) ratios are 27 percent (8 percent) lower and adjusted leverage ratios are 70 percent higher than the corresponding U.S. GAAP ratios. I then find that Moody's hard and soft rating adjustments are associated with significantly higher credit spreads and flatter credit spread term structures. Overall, the results indicate that Moody's quantitative adjustments to financial statement numbers and qualitative adjustments to credit ratings enable it to better capture default risk, consistent with it effectively processing both hard and soft information. 

所以Moody的数据更有信息量

Product Market Power and Tax Avoidance: Market Leaders, Mimicking Strategies, and Stock Returns.

Abstract
Product market power provides firms with comparative advantages through more persistent profitability and insulation from competitive threats. These advantages likely provide firms with the ability to engage in greater tax avoidance. We present evidence consistent with this hypothesis. We also show that firms mimic the tax outcomes of their product market leaders. Among firms with greater product market power and comparatively high cash tax avoidance, we find stock prices to be less informative and that investors require additional compensation for the risks associated with comparatively high cash tax avoidance. Our results survive numerous robustness tests. Overall, our results suggest that industry dynamics, particularly related to a firm's competitive position, play a meaningful role in corporate tax policy. 

Following Peress (2010), we measure product market power as the industry-adjusted, firms pecific price-cost margin (PCM).
这文挺有意思,所以有Market power的公司,会tax avoidance,然后其他的followers还会模仿这些东西,所以followers的股票就没什么信息量。

Do Accounting and Audit Quality Affect World Bank Lending?

Abstract
We investigate the role of accounting and audit quality in the allocation of international development aid loans provided by the World Bank. This aid is crucial to improve governance functions, infrastructure, and capital markets, and the accounting and audit environments in a country can provide the World Bank with confidence that aid is being used as intended rather than being diverted for personal or political gain. We find that development aid loans are higher for countries with stronger accounting quality, where IFRS use is mandated, and where the audit environment is stronger. However, we also find that United States geo-political interests influence these results. Specifically, the World Bank appears to ''overlook'' accounting and audit quality in countries where geo-political interests are relatively aligned with those of the U.S. Finally, we find that accounting and auditing matter only in countries with relatively high corruption levels, indicating that the World Bank has greater trust that accounting and auditing are of relatively high quality in low-corruption countries. 

Impaired Judgment: The Effects of Asset Impairment Reversibility and Cognitive Dissonance on Future 

Abstract
This paper examines how the reversibility of the accounting effect of asset impairments affects managers' investment decisions. We conduct two experiments in which participants act as CEO of a multi-division electronics company that suffers a large asset impairment at one of the divisions. Drawing on prior psychology research involving cognitive dissonance and decision reversibility, we predict and find that managers who are responsible for the decision to record the asset impairment invest more in the impaired division when the accounting effect of the impairment is reversible than when it is irreversible. This is consistent with the idea that reversible accounting effects encourage behavioral attempts to alter the cash flow outcome, while irreversible accounting effects encourage belief revision to rationalize the cash flow outcome. Also in line with cognitive dissonance theory, we show that managers who are not responsible for the decision to impair the asset, or managers who are given the opportunity to deny responsibility for the asset impairment, do not differ in their investment in the impaired division, regardless of impairment reversibility.

好吧,experiment的paper,我就略过了。。。

Communication and Information Sharing in Teams.

Abstract
This paper studies whether dissemination of private, pre-decision signals about productivity is valuable to the principal when agents work sequentially and observe each other's effort. The benefit of dissemination is that when productivity states are correlated, each agent's signal is useful as a performance measure for the other agent and for making efficient production choices. The more informative the signal is about agents' efforts, the greater the benefit of the additional performance measure, but there is a cost due to higher information rents. With no dissemination, the downstream agent learns about the upstream agent's productivity state by observing that agent's effort. The upstream agent's rents are lower because he has no incentive to free-ride on the downstream agent, who follows his effort, but there is less information on which to base the payments. The choice between dissemination and no dissemination depends on the informativeness of the signal about agents' efforts.

好吧,一篇modelling paper,我又只能路过了。。。

Asymmetric Responses to Earnings News: A Case for Ambiguity.

Abstract
This study empirically examines the role of shocks to macro-uncertainty in shaping the responses of stock market participants to firm-specific earnings news. Specifically, I find that investors place greater weight on bad news following an increase in macro-uncertainty. By contrast, I find that investors place equal weight on both good and bad news following a decrease in macro-uncertainty. Furthermore, my findings show that these effects are more pronounced (1) for firms whose prior returns are more correlated with macro-uncertainty, (2) for firms that experience abnormally low trading volume during the earnings announcement, (3) for firms with relatively lower levels of institutional ownership, and (4) for firms with relatively higher information uncertainty. In sum, these findings provide novel empirical evidence that investors behave in a manner consistent with ambiguity aversion, with the effects strongest among unsophisticated investors.

也是一篇宏观经济和会计的文章。
宏观不好的时候,坏消息的比重就更大了。
宏观不确定性下降的时候,坏消息好消息的就等开。


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