Monday, July 14, 2014

Allen, Lummer, McConnell, and Reed (1995, JFQA)

Can Takeover Losses Explain Spin-Off Gains? (Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis)

Allen et al. (1995)发现,在那些后来被spinoff,之前被收购的样本里,他们当年收购时的announcement returns to the bidder以及the combined bidder and target firms都是负且显著。而且呢,spin off这天的announcement returns与收购时的return 负相关,且显著。

力力说,文章这么写不对,不能只看那些被spin off的被收购公司。具体理由忘了,想起来再回来写。

Roosenboom, Schlingemann, and Vasconcelos (2014, FRS)

Does Stock Liquidity Affect Incentives to Monitor? Evidence from Corporate Takeovers

Does stock liquidity enhance or weaken institutional monitoring?股票流动性增加还是抑制了机构投资人的Monitoring动力?

一个比较严格的Monitoring监督环境,会有更好的takeover决策,所以CAR在announcement dates应该会更高。

Enhance论据一:

  • Institutions can acquire shares in the open market to recoup the costs of monitoring。他们可以买进股票,来弥补cost。
  • 买入价(没有包含,如果他们介入,会取得的增值。因此买入价还是偏低的)鼓励机构去买,多少克服了free riding的顾虑。
  • Liquidity越大,profits越大。因为高流动性的情况下,informed trades容易被隐藏。所以large institution提高了流动性。
Enhance论据二:
  • 因为高流动性,所以机构撤出(exit)更easy
  • Liquidity is more beneficial when there are multiple blockholders as it shifts the importance of monitoring from intervention ("voice") to threat of exit.流动性更有益,当该公司有不少大股东,因为流动性把monitoring的重要性从"介入,发声",转向了退出的威胁。
研究acquisition,liquidity的好处:
  • 第一,reverse causality不太可能(个人理解,之前你不知道是monitoring影响liquidity,还是反过来,在这里,先来后到很明显)。regress announcement returns of acquisitions on past liquidity
  • 第二,announcement dates are  easily identified(这个为什么是advantage?)
  • 第三,takeover是个重要的场景设定,因为agency conflict和institutional monitoring在这情形下很重要,不然的话,经理们的self-interested会对公司价值造成重大后果。
  • 最后,我们还可以研究liquidity对于ex-post的影响,比如the prob. of deal completion and CEO turnover, and on takeover premiums
发现:liquidity and voice(monitoring)负相关。

然后,他们考虑是否organizational form of the target和the form of payment影响liquidity和returns之间的关系。+ return for private targets, - for public targets, 尤其用equity来收购时。

liquidity and returns relationship:

  • (-), significantly large, for takeovers involving private targets
  • insignificant for public
  • weakly positive for takeovers of public targets where equity is included
另外,
  • within private targets sample, the form of payment不影响结果
那么究竟为什么,liquidity在对于private和public公司有区别?
  • the disciplining effect of the threat of exit is more relevant for acquisitions of public targets
  • 研究结果还显示,如果liquidity增加的话,就会加大收购private target的可能性(从而不收购public target了)
liquidity阻碍了Monitoring through voice. voice more likely(比如只有一个blockholder)情况下,liquidity和announcement return负相关。当threat of exit比较大(比如好几个blockholders),(-) relationship b/w liquidity and voice is mitigated by the (+) effect of liquidity on the effectiveness of the threat of exit. (Q: 这里有没有typo???(-) b/w liq and voice,还是应该liq and return???) Agency costs存在时,liquidity和returns之间也负的更厉害。

如果liquidity对monitoring ex-ante有影响,那么对于ex-post也应该有影响。

他们发现,如果流动性很差,机构投资人有更可能迫使经理drop value-destroying deals (i.e., deals with negative abnormal announcement returns)。

他们还发现负相关b/w liquidity and takeover premiums

解释:高流动性的股票可以很容易卖掉,所以机构投资人就不花太多功夫去监控了。反正,如果公司经营的不好,我可以卖嘛。


Summary

1029 obs. Since two duplicates in 1032 and one error (same target name, same parent name, same announcement date, but one week difference in the effective date. These two should be the same spinoff event.)

902 spinoffs with public parents. 772 obs with complete cusip/permn match

Process:

1. merge_20140529.SAS => Mainly merge Cusip with CRSP (Permnos)

2. Clear v1.SAS => Mainly merge above with Compustat (Gvkey)

3. Final2.SAS => Event study on the spinoff announcement date

4. Final3.SAS => Event study on the management forecast date

5. Compustat_Firm_Characters => ROA, BM, Leverage of parent firms pre & post-spinoffs

6. list_20140613.SAS => I list target firms with public status and chech whether those firms are active before spinoffs. I start with 181 obs. 91 are active. 66 are inactive, which have less than 15 daily CRSP obs in the previous month of spinoffs. The remaining ones are lack of permnos.

7. permno_gvkey macth_20140613.SAS => permno and gvkey should be 100% match. If not, find a reason. So far, 4 out of 506 target_permnos cannot be matached with a gvkey. 7 out of 772 parent_permnos have missing gvkeys.

8. Program20140718 => Merge SDC with IBES by 6-digit CUSIP

9. Program20140722 => Merge SDC with COMPUSTAT by 6-digit CUSIP
9a. Try to find a closest control group
9b. Same 2-digit SIC / 30% Assets / Closest MB ratio

10. manual 20140804 (3).xlsx 是一个重要的文件!我花了500年时间在上面!校对了很多SDC的spin off的母公司和子公司,以及他们的Permno和GVKEY。里面有全系列的a2,b1,b2,c1,c2,d1,d2。和部分a1,如果spin off当日,母公司的RET呈现missing状态。

11. munual_check.SAS => 这个有校对了一下上面的manual 20140804 (3).xlsx有没有漏信息,漏了两个,已经补齐。所以只需看manual 20140804 (3).xlsx即可.

12. SDC_permno_withdup3是从Program20140725来的。Program20140725是一个新的merge。从SDC到CRSP,通过四种不同的方式merge。

第一步,用6-digit CUSIP和time.
第二步,放宽条件,不要求Time也对。
第三步,用Immediate parent cusip,无关time。
第四步,用Ticker.
第五步,手动查找Missing obs。

看这个链接,关于这几步的详细分解。
http://accandfin.blogspot.com/2014/08/data-summary.html

13. AllInOne现在是最牛逼的文件了。1029个SDC过来的spin off都被手动找了一遍。

Tuesday, July 8, 2014

Handbook of Corporate Finance Ch8

Conglomerate Firms and Internal Capital Markets

1. Introduction

Coase (1937) - boundaries of firms (公司为什么要有边界,为什么要有size,因为economy of scale,因为fixed costs存在)

公司边界:the costs of carrying out transactions within a firm = those of carrying them out in the open market or in another firm

Q: 公司边界什么时候停?A: 就是公司自己的cost和从外面融资的cost一样。

Q: 为什么Internal capital investment? A: 因为MGMT有private information但是外头的银行或市场不知道啊。因为他们不确定,所以他们要charge更高的risk费用,自己用Internal capital就可以省钱。

对于多元化的公司来讲,他们的boundary就跟diversification有关,他们的cost和boundary境内包含什么行业相关。

Q: 为什么公司cost和boundary中的行业相关? A: 因为financial externalities (risk sharing) 和real externalities (共享某种资源)。

2. Conglomerate discount

2.1 Documenting the discount: Early Research

Lang and Stulz (1994)
Berger and Ofek (1995)

两篇里程碑式的文章关于diversification discount

these papers decompose conglomerate firms into constituent industry segments and then value these segments using the "comparables" approach to valuation.

@把大企业按行业拆分成部门,用近似办法来给他们估价

LS (1994) 没有探讨discount的原因,不过早期很多文章都觉得是因为agency cost,就是万恶的经理人为了一己私欲,把公司做大,都为了中饱私囊。云云。

两文之前的文章,很多研究了"EX-POST"(前后?)俩阶段里,conglomerate和single-segment firm的区别。

反其道而行之,LS(1994)和BO(1995)问:股东在diversification中得到什么好处?

LS (1994)计算diversification discount = the difference between a conglomerate's Tobin's q and its comparable q computed.

LS计算diversification的两个办法:

1) # of segments from the Business Information File of Compustat
2) Two Herfindahl indices (Sales / Assets)

两种test

1) regress firm's Tobin's qs on a constant and four dummy variables
D(j), j=2,...,5.
比如公司有5个部门,那么D(5)=1.

2)接下来,LS把dependent换成了comparable Tobin's q

结论:
LS发现D(2)负且显著。但如果跨行超过2个,也不见得就更糟。

LS发现控制了size和公司的financial constraint后,discount也还在。

Q: financial constraint的measure是什么?A: 根据Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) ,whether it pays dividends,看公司是否发股利。

另外,LS还调查了discount是不是因为大小公司的研发成本不同。因为balance sheet没有很好的捕捉R&D信息,所以R&D高的公司,tobin's q会被高估(over state)。但是LS没有发现,小公司的高tobin's q是因为他们高R&D。

这就有个问题,为什么多元化的公司tobin's q会低?

LS发现,single-segment firms that diversify have lower qs than single-segment firms that do not choose to diversify.选择多元化的公司,比没那么做的,q要低。

但是他们的industry-adjusted tobin's q 在多元化之前,并不低。这跟Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002)的结论不一样。

Berger and Ofek (1995)也认同LS,他们算出来discount有13-15%。BO发现,如果公司多元化如果不是很厉害(in the same 2-digit SIC),discount就很小。他们还发现了discount的原因,就是cross-subsidization and overinvestment。

Overinvestment measure: the ratio of the sum of a conglomerate's capital expenditures and depreciation in 3-digit SIC code industries whose median Tobin's q in the bottom quartile, to the conglomerate's total sales.

Regression:
BO regress the firm's excess value on an indicator equal to 1 if the firm has a segment with a negative cash flow and zero otherwise. 结果当然是,coefficient在diversified firms里负且显著,但是在single-segment firm里不显著。所以产生负现金流的segment对于大公司的影响,比single-segment firm要大很多。

BO还按照comparable的方法来计算大公司的借债,他们发现大公司借钱借的比Predicted要多,但是影响很小。

Comment and Jarrell (1995) 用了别的办法来证实diversification discount.CJ发现公司refocus的时候,价值上升。





Monday, July 7, 2014

Hutton (2005, CAR)

Determinants of Managerial Earnings Guidance

这篇文章讲在FD政策出台前,哪些公司会去review analyst earnings model,并给予额外的private information.

这不是一篇对公众disclose信息的文章。通常意义上,我们讲公司的disclosure,都是说对所有人。

Table 1
Firm Characteristics associated with management's decision 
to review analyst earnings models

Pressures from the investment community / incentives not to disappoint

Institutional Holdings (+)

Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2004) indicate that managers believe that institutional investors set their firms' stock prices and ,,, .

所以机构投资人持有比较高的公司,比较不希望令市场失望

# of Analysts (+)

Firms with a higher percentage of shares held by institutions or greater analyst following are also likely to face pressure to provide (private) earnings guidance because these capital-market intermediaries are the ones purported to benefit from the advanced earnings news.

机构投资人和analysts都有压力,因为他们是信息中介,他们应该披露一些额外的信息。

External Financing (+)

公司如果有杠杆压力,更要依赖于analysts和机构投资人的态度,来帮助公司发行新债券或股票。

Book-to-Market (-)

Research suggests that stock market's asymmetric response to earnings surprises (stock prices respond more to negative earnings surprises than to positive earnings surprises) is particularly large for high-growth firms (Skinner and Sloan, 2002). Therefore, managers of firms with higher valuation multiples (price-to-earnings and market-to-book) are likely to face greater pressure not to disappoint (Matsumoto 2002), and therefore are more likely to review analyst earnings models.

高增长的公司,更加不希望令市场失望。


Importance and predictability of earnings

Industry - ERC R2 (+)

earnings越容易被predict,有surprise的时候,市场的反应就越大。所以公司就更在意,要meet analysts' forecasts。可不可预测,跟行业的关系很大,所以作者加了这个variable。

Standard_Deviation_Revenues (+)
另一方面,如果earnings超级难预测,公司也会有动机去看看analysts的模型。

Complexity of the firm's business and frequency of sophisticated financial transactions

# of segments (+)
如果公司业务复杂,analyst 于是能力有限,因为他们不可能是每个行业的行家。(Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu 2001)

重组的时候,也给analyst预测带来困难(Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols 2001)。

% Intangibles (+)
Bingo

Chavent, Ding, Fu, Stolowy, and Wang (2006, EAR)

Disclosure and Determinants Studies: An Extension Using the Divisive Clustering Method (DIV)

Abstract

过去的研究问题是disclosure analysis is restricted to the determination of the disclosure index.

The objective of this paper is to introduce a divisive (descendant) clustering method, which splits the sample into homogeneous sub-groups corresponding to disclosure patterns (profiles), for clearer determination of the financial characteristics.

Q: 什么意思???

Disclosure pattern is related to provision intensity, size, leverage, and market expectation, but not to profit, return, and industry.

信息披露跟一些公司特性有关,跟另一些无关。

Page 188

3. Hypotheses

Provision Intensity (+)

A provision, defined as a liability of uncertain timing or amount, is calculated to cover general risks or potential losses not linked directly to assets.

When provisions are equivalent to a high percentage of total assets, they become a major factor in evaluating the firm's risk level. @当各种条款越多的话,他们就成为一个主要衡量公司风险的因素。

Size (+)

三个理由:

第一,large firms are more willing to disclose information to reduce their political costs, since their higher visibility can easily lead to more litigation and governmental intervention (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978)@大公司的litigation risk高,所以要disclose.

第二,thanks to their more developed internal reporting system, the costs associated ith a higher disclosure level are lower for large firms. @信息披露成本低

第三,smaller firms are more likely to hide crucial information because of their competitive disadvantage within their industry (Singhvi and Desai, 1971, TAR) @小公司好不容易有些相对竞争优势,当然不愿意说啦。

Leverage (+)

Corporate information disclosure is often considered as an instrument to reduce the monitoring costs for creditors. @通常情况下,杠杆越高,disclosure越高。

Profit and Return (predict +, but insignificant in this paper)

Singhvi and Desai (1971) propose that when the rate of return is high, managers are motivated to disclose detailed information in order to support the continuance of their positions and remuneration. Conversely, when the rate of return is low, they may disclose less information in order to conceal the reasons for losses or declining profits. @管理层都是报喜不报忧。

Market Expectation for the Firm's Future Growth (It's consequence, rather determinant!)
(+, but insignificant)

Disclosure reduces agency costs and minimize the firm's capital cost by resolving the information asymmetry problem. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)

Industry Type (Difference conclusions in prior literature reviews)

insignificant in this paper

注:这篇有个Appendix A总结了很多Disclosure的文章,值得好好收藏!

Financial Accounting Theory (6th) Ch 12.9.2

12.9 ARE FIRMS REWARDED FOR SUPERIOR DISCLOSURE?

12.9.2 Empirical Tests of Disclosure Models

The Merton Model was tested by Lehavy and Sloan (2008), based on a large sample of firms over 1982-2004. They used the number of wealthy investors holding a stock as a proxy for the number who "know about" that stock. After following for other factors that affect stock returns, they found that when the number of investors knowing about a stock increased, further returns on that stock fell (i.e., lower cost of capital), consistent with Merton's prediction.

验证Merton模型的是LS(2008).他们用wealthy investor来表现有多少知情人了解这支股票。(有钱人多少有点内幕消息。)他们发现持有某支股票的有钱人越多,这支股票的return越低,cost of capital也越低,符合Merton的猜想。

They also found that this effect strengthened as idiosyncratic risk increased. That is, when investors are poorly diversified, firm-specific risk decreased rapidly as more stocks were added to their portfolios. This result is consistent with the demonstration that much of the benefits of diversification are attained with relatively few securities.

LS(2008)也发现,idiosyncratic risk越大的时候,上述的这个"有钱人比例"的影响也越大。也就是说,如果投资人的Portfolio不大,只要多加一点其他股票,公司的specific risk立刻就下降很多。

Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) tested implications of the Diamond and Verrecchia model. They used financial analysts' ratings of disclosure quality. 他们发现disclosure quality增高的公司,之后的share price performance也变好了。他们也发现了机构投资人的比重也增加了。HHP的发现和D-V model的预测一致。

Welker (1995) found a significant negative relationship between disclosure quality and bid-ask spread.

信息披露质量越高,bid-ask spread越小。和D-V model一致。

Hail and Leuz (2009) pointed out that foreign firms that crosslist their shares in the U.S. face increased disclosure obligations since they then become subject to SEC regulatory enforcement.外国公司,在美国上市,他们会披露更多信息,因为SEC的法令强制。而且这些外国公司的cost of capital大幅下降。这结论和Merton也一致,因为the set of investors who know about the firm增多了。

Sengupta (1998) investigated the impact of disclosure quality on the cost of debt. He found a 0.02% reduction in interest cost for every 1% increase in their disclosure quality. He also found that this result strengthened for riskier firms.

Sengupta (1998) 发现信息披露质量好的公司,借贷的利息也比较低。

The market response to lack of disclosure quality is also worth noting. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) 发现被SEC调查的公司,股价都大跌9%.