Tuesday, July 22, 2014

Program20140722 / SDC_GVKEY9b

SAS pro/spinoff

Program20140722
SDC_GVKEY9b

Target名称里本身有提示:

Sunbelt Nursery Grp(Pier 1) -- PIER 1 IMPORTS INC/DE

Westmark Intl(Squibb Corp) -- SQUIBB CORP


看时间段:

Alliant Techsystems -- HONEYWELL INC (1950-98)另一个obs则是2011年后才有数据的

Cytec Industries -- AMERICAN CYANAMID CO (spinoff发生于1994,母公司信息截至1993,另一个同名TIC,在08才开始有数据

National Gaming Corp -- HFS INC (94年的spinoff,另一个公司的信息始于2010年)

Pittston Svcs Grp-Pittston Bur -- PITTSTON CO-MINERALS GROUP (PZM) 查看了他们的COMPUSTAT,AT(Assets)规模相当,PZM比PZX成立时间稍微早了几年,所以选了PZM。96年spinoff, 98年PZM,PZX均再无信息更新。


Choice Hotels Holdings Inc -- MANOR CARE INC-OLD(MNR.1)
spinoff发生于1996,MNR.1止于1998,但是98之前,MNR.1比HCR体量要大。

ManorCare Health Services --  MANOR CARE INC-OLD(MNR.1)
同上。

Talbert Medical Management -- PACIFICARE HEALTH SYSTEMS (PHS)spinoff于1997,但 另一个止于1996.

Lakes Gaming Inc -- HILTON WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS (感觉还是HLT靠谱),同理,另一个TIC的截至数据期,发生于spinoff之前。

Key3Media Group Inc -- ZIFF-DAVIS INC(ZD比ZDZ资产大很多)。但他们的信息截止期都早于spinoff时间。



PS:
结果似乎不甚理想。这样merge得到的match有711个。但是之前从cusip=>CRSP=>linktable=>gvkey的路线,得到765个match。

SAS - Control Group

SAS - Control Group

好帖: http://www2.sas.com/proceedings/sugi29/173-29.pdf

1)两个条件下找exactly
2)配对后,随机的找2个
3)条件放宽,比如年龄+1或-1(range)
4)Keep the matches for the low frequency control subjects first.(也是一种法子,然后再随机)
5)Macro

Monday, July 21, 2014

Diary

1)SDC和IBES的merge也不知道对不对。用的是CUSIP。
2)小马说,他用PERMCO的aggregation来merge gvkey,而不是permno。因为很多公司都是major interest,所以这样计算比较正确。

接下来做这几件事:
1)找control group。按照2 digit SIC, size, MB
2)分别在restructuring之前和之后。两种time trend
3)找breakup子公司之后的disclosure情况,以及他们的control group

Friday, July 18, 2014

Diary

I/B/E/S 有些obs有点诡异。




看Avercrombie & Fitch Co.的management forecasts.同一天,差1个半小时,有两次forecasts,而且都是EPS,数字相同,所以I/B/E/S记录了两次。

除了Announcement时间不同以外,Mean_at_date应该是那个时间点Analysts的estimate mean,也不同。好奇怪的是,难道一个半小时内,analyst预期就调整了吗?

还有,从时间顺序上看,management给了一个较高的期望区间,所以analyst forecasts貌似是往上走了。这科学吗?

所以区别在于:

file path: SAS Pro\spinoff\Program20140718

proc sort data=sdc_Ibes2 noduplicate out=try dupout=dups; 
by Target__CUSIP parent_SDCCUSIP 
__Date__Effective IBES_ticker 
Announce_dt Prd_yr Prd_mon Periodicity Measure
Val_1 Val_2; 

run;

proc sort data=sdc_Ibes2 noduplicate out=try dupout=dups; 
by Target__CUSIP parent_SDCCUSIP 
__Date__Effective IBES_ticker 
IBES_Announce_dt Prd_yr Prd_mon Periodicity Measure
Val_1 Val_2; 

run;

第一种方式中,没有duplicates。

第二种方式中,会有duplicates。

Tuesday, July 15, 2014

Archambault and Archambault (2003, IJA)

Archambault and Archambault (2003, IJA) International Journal of Accounting

A multinational test of determinants of corporate disclosure



2.3. Corporate systems

In addition to national systems that affect all companies within a country, individual
corporations engage in a number of social systems that result in each corporation being
unique. This study considers factors that relate to financial and operating systems. These
unique responses, however, are determined within the cultural and national systems that the corporation operates in. Likewise, the corporate finance and operating decisions can create changes in the national and cultural systems.

2.3.1. Financial systems

Financial systems deal with the capital-generation process. This study considers ownership, exchange listings, dividends, auditor, and leverage.

2.3.1.1. Ownership. 

Investors are a primary beneficiary of corporate disclosure. However, investors who own a large percentage of a company are more able to obtain information directly from the company. Companies with such large block owners are also less reliant on smaller 
investors. As a result, the need for corporate disclosure may decrease (LaPorta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Schadewitz & Blevins, 1998).

2.3.1.2. Exchange listings. 

Exchanges establish disclosure regulations. Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) report disclosure scores for leading exchanges. A company’s disclosure policy is expected to be influenced by the disclosure policies of the exchanges it trades on.
Ownership dispersion may increase with the number of exchanges on which a firm is listed, increasing a firm's disclosure.

2.3.1.3. Dividends. 

Dividends provide information to investors about the amount and timing of future cash flows(Miller & Rock, 1985). The information provided by dividends may substitute for other forms of corporate disclosure. This is especially true in instances where capital markets are less developed and/or subject to manipulation in the trading of securities
(Previts & Bricker, 1994). As a result, firms that pay dividends may reduce corporate disclosure.

2.3.1.4. Auditor. 

Wallace et al. (1994) suggest that the contents of annual reports may be influenced by auditors. Larger audit firms may try to improve the perceived quality of the annual reports by having clients disclose more information. As a result, firms audited by one of the Big Six accounting firms may disclose more information than other firms. However, Wallace et al. find no significant relation between auditor size and disclosure among Spanish firms. Similarly, based on a meta-analysis, Ahmed and Courtis (1999)find no relation between auditor size and disclosure.

2.3.1.5. Leverage. 

Meek et al. (1995)andWallace et al. (1994)predict that highly leveraged firms disclose more information in order to reduce the agency costs of debt. Wallace et al. find
no effect of leverage on disclosure. Meek et al. find that disclosure decreases with leverage.

Zarzeski (1996)predicts that disclosure decreases with leverage because creditors may be
able to obtain private information. She also finds that disclosure decreases with leverage.
Ahmed and Courtis (1999)conclude from their meta-analysis that disclosure increases with
leverage. Jaggi and Low (2000)find that disclosure increases with leverage in common law
systems and has no significant relation in code law systems. Thus, various studies have reported conflicting results.

Corporations make many decisions about the financial structure of the company. This
paper considers block ownership, foreign-exchange listings, dividend policies, auditor choice, and use of debt as components of corporate financial systems. Disclosure choices are expected to be a function of these finance-related decisions.

H4. Corporate financial systems influence the amount of corporate disclosure.

2.3.2. Operating systems

Companies make a number of operating decisions that may influence the information
needs of financial-statement users. This study considers firm size, number of industries, and foreign sales.

2.3.2.1. Firm size. 

Several studies have found that disclosure increases with firm size. Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Meek et al. (1995), Wallace et al. (1994), and Zarzeski (1996) are recent examples of such studies. The theoretical reason for this relationship is less clear. Zarzeski claims it may be due to public demand for information and international resource dependence. Other possible explanations could be that large companies disclose more to reduce political pressure or that large companies have the resources to produce more disclosures. Whatever the reason, large firms are expected to disclose more information than small firms.

2.3.2.2. Number of industries. 

The disclosure needs of firms may increase as the firm operates in a larger number of industries in order to satisfy the information needs associated with obtaining a broader set of resources (Zarzeski, 1996). In addition, the competitive costs of disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983) may decrease as a firm becomes more diversified. Therefore, firms may increase disclosure as they increase the number of industries in which they operate.

2.3.2.3. Foreign sales. 

Companies with foreign sales are likely to require foreign resources, such as labor and capital, to support those operations. Zarzeski (1996) predicts that companies will disclose more information if they have large relative foreign sales in order to acquire the 
necessary resources. Her results support her prediction. Operating decisions are also made by corporate managers and directors. Firm size, number of industries, and percent of foreign sales revenue are identified in this study as operating decisions that are expected to lead to differential amounts of corporate disclosure.


H5. Corporate operating systems influence the amount of corporate disclosure.


Diary

Reference:
Jo and Kim (2007, JFE)

Try to summarize disclosure frequency like below

Panel A: Number of disclosure frequency

Month -24 to -18                             M(-24, -18)
Month -18 to -12                             M(-18, -12)
Month -12 to -6                               M(-12, -6)
Month -6 to -0                                 M(-6, 0)
Month 0 to +6                                 M(0,+6)
Month +6 to +12                            M(+6, +12)
Month +12 to +18                          M(+12, +18)
Month +18 to +24                          M(+18, +24)

Panel B: Changes in the number of disclosure frequency

From M(-24, -18) to M(-18, -12)
From M(-18, -12) to M(-12, -6)
From M(-12, -6) to M(-6, 0)
From M(-6, 0) to M(0,+6)
From M(0,+6) to M(+6, +12)
From M(+6, +12) to M(+12, +18)
From M(+12, +18) to M(+18, +24)

Monday, July 14, 2014

Jo and Kim (2007, JFE)

Disclosure Frequency and Earnings Management 

他们主要研究了post-issue (SEO) 情形下,disclosure frequency和earnings MGMT的关系。多多信息披露的公司,less earnings MGMT,还有better post-issue performance.

1. Introduction

过去的研究发现,公司为了短期利益(上调股价),会采取earnings management的办法。可见Investors不能很快的分辨EM.

很多literature关于disclosure提高transparency,但也有人(Lang and Lundholm, 2000)提到,公司别有居心的disclosure(在SEO之前)反而降低了transparency.

但这篇文章倾向认为,disclosure提高transparency,所以更容易暴露earnings management,所以他们之间应该负相关。

2. Disclosure frequency, earnings management, and post-issue performance

EM的最主要的激励,就是inflate stock price.

Rangan (1998)说在SEO后的quarter里,公司也有incentives to EM,因为legal liabilities and lock-up agreements.第一,SEO后的价格突然逆转,会引起诉讼。第二,lock-up agreements提到Insiders在SEO后的90-180天内不能卖股票。

2.1 Transparency-increasing disclosure and EM

Prediction 1: EM is a decreasing function of the persistent level of disclosure.

2.2 Transparency-increasing disclosure and post-issue SEO performance

Two reasons:

第一,disclosure 降低了information gap。

第二,对于那些不disclosure又EM的公司来说,post-SEO 后市场价格会反转。

但是,不是所有的disclosure都credible.所以,SEO前的disclosure可能用来hype the stock。所以Post-issue SEO performance应该与之前之后的disclosure都有关。

Prediction 2. Post-issue SEO performance is less negative for firms that maintain a persistently high level of disclosure around the offering.

2.3 Opaque disclosure and earnings management

那些别有居心的disclosure,一般也会伴随着earnings management.

Prediction 3. EM is positively associated with a non-persistent disclosure increase.

2.4 Opaque disclosure and post-issue SEO performance

Following Lang and Lundholm (2000)

Prediction 4. Post-issue SEO performance is more negative for firms with a non-persistent disclosure increase.

3 Data and measurement

3.1 Data selection Disclosure proxy: press-release wires in the Dow Jones Interactive (DJI) database system

3.2 Measurement of disclosure frequency

103,032 press releases
(9 press releases per 6-month period on average multiplied by eight 6-month periods within a four-year span around the SEO announcement  multiplied by 1,431 SEOs)

press releases数量受两个因素影响:
the management disclosure strategy (transparent vs. opaque) and report-able events.