Archambault and Archambault (2003, IJA) International Journal of Accounting
A multinational test of determinants of corporate disclosure
2.3. Corporate systems
In addition to national systems that affect all companies within a country, individual
corporations engage in a number of social systems that result in each corporation being
unique. This study considers factors that relate to financial and operating systems. These
unique responses, however, are determined within the cultural and national systems that the corporation operates in. Likewise, the corporate finance and operating decisions can create changes in the national and cultural systems.
2.3.1. Financial systems
Financial systems deal with the capital-generation process. This study considers ownership, exchange listings, dividends, auditor, and leverage.
2.3.1.1. Ownership.
Investors are a primary beneficiary of corporate disclosure. However, investors who own a large percentage of a company are more able to obtain information directly from the company. Companies with such large block owners are also less reliant on smaller
investors. As a result, the need for corporate disclosure may decrease (LaPorta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Schadewitz & Blevins, 1998).
2.3.1.2. Exchange listings.
Exchanges establish disclosure regulations. Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) report disclosure scores for leading exchanges. A company’s disclosure policy is expected to be influenced by the disclosure policies of the exchanges it trades on.
Ownership dispersion may increase with the number of exchanges on which a firm is listed, increasing a firm's disclosure.
2.3.1.3. Dividends.
Dividends provide information to investors about the amount and timing of future cash flows(Miller & Rock, 1985). The information provided by dividends may substitute for other forms of corporate disclosure. This is especially true in instances where capital markets are less developed and/or subject to manipulation in the trading of securities
(Previts & Bricker, 1994). As a result, firms that pay dividends may reduce corporate disclosure.
2.3.1.4. Auditor.
Wallace et al. (1994) suggest that the contents of annual reports may be influenced by auditors. Larger audit firms may try to improve the perceived quality of the annual reports by having clients disclose more information. As a result, firms audited by one of the Big Six accounting firms may disclose more information than other firms. However, Wallace et al. find no significant relation between auditor size and disclosure among Spanish firms. Similarly, based on a meta-analysis, Ahmed and Courtis (1999)find no relation between auditor size and disclosure.
2.3.1.5. Leverage.
Meek et al. (1995)andWallace et al. (1994)predict that highly leveraged firms disclose more information in order to reduce the agency costs of debt. Wallace et al. find
no effect of leverage on disclosure. Meek et al. find that disclosure decreases with leverage.
Zarzeski (1996)predicts that disclosure decreases with leverage because creditors may be
able to obtain private information. She also finds that disclosure decreases with leverage.
Ahmed and Courtis (1999)conclude from their meta-analysis that disclosure increases with
leverage. Jaggi and Low (2000)find that disclosure increases with leverage in common law
systems and has no significant relation in code law systems. Thus, various studies have reported conflicting results.
Corporations make many decisions about the financial structure of the company. This
paper considers block ownership, foreign-exchange listings, dividend policies, auditor choice, and use of debt as components of corporate financial systems. Disclosure choices are expected to be a function of these finance-related decisions.
H4. Corporate financial systems influence the amount of corporate disclosure.
2.3.2. Operating systems
Companies make a number of operating decisions that may influence the information
needs of financial-statement users. This study considers firm size, number of industries, and foreign sales.
2.3.2.1. Firm size.
Several studies have found that disclosure increases with firm size. Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Meek et al. (1995), Wallace et al. (1994), and Zarzeski (1996) are recent examples of such studies. The theoretical reason for this relationship is less clear. Zarzeski claims it may be due to public demand for information and international resource dependence. Other possible explanations could be that large companies disclose more to reduce political pressure or that large companies have the resources to produce more disclosures. Whatever the reason, large firms are expected to disclose more information than small firms.
2.3.2.2. Number of industries.
The disclosure needs of firms may increase as the firm operates in a larger number of industries in order to satisfy the information needs associated with obtaining a broader set of resources (Zarzeski, 1996). In addition, the competitive costs of disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983) may decrease as a firm becomes more diversified. Therefore, firms may increase disclosure as they increase the number of industries in which they operate.
2.3.2.3. Foreign sales.
Companies with foreign sales are likely to require foreign resources, such as labor and capital, to support those operations. Zarzeski (1996) predicts that companies will disclose more information if they have large relative foreign sales in order to acquire the
necessary resources. Her results support her prediction. Operating decisions are also made by corporate managers and directors. Firm size, number of industries, and percent of foreign sales revenue are identified in this study as operating decisions that are expected to lead to differential amounts of corporate disclosure.
H5. Corporate operating systems influence the amount of corporate disclosure.
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