Monday, September 1, 2014

Tang (2011, JAE)

Isolating the effect of disclosure on information risk

Cost of capital reflect both information risk and fundamental risk.

文章认为A股B股的fundamental risk是一样的,但是information risk是不同的。因为本土和境外投资人有不同的投资机会,和risk-free interest rate。

备注里其实说,80%的B股投资人都是海外华人,他们是能看懂中国新闻和报表的,那么仍然有20%没有access,了解公司内幕。

H1: Ceteris paribus, firms with a greater disparity in public dislosure available to domestic and foreign investors have a higher level of price differences between A and B shares.

A,B股的disparity在沪市的差异比深圳还要大,解释之一,是B股投资人大多住在香港,离深圳很近。

H2:,Disparity in public disclosure available to domestic and foreign investors has a more pronounced effect on the level of price differences between A and B shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange than the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.

有人问,这种disparity为什么不能被arbitrage away?这里说道杭州有21%的dispute通过法院解决,但在大连,这个比例只有0.1%.

H3: Disparity in public dislosure available to domestic and foreign investors has a more pronounced effect on the level of price differences between A and B shares in regions with weak protection than in regions with strong protection of property rights.

Measure of disparity in public disclosure,比较公司新闻在中外媒体上的数量差别。

Badertscher, Shroff, White (2013, JFE)

Externalities of public firm prescence:
Evidence from private firms' investment decisions

什么叫如果某行业的uncertainty比较低,then private firms are more responsive to their investment opportunities?

公司要做个trade off,(1)等等,再看看。也许项目的回报更清晰,但也许会错过投资机会;(2)不管三七二十一,拿了项目再说,但回报还看不太清楚。

El Ghoul et al. (2013, CAR)

Does Information Asymmetry Matter to Equity Pricing?
Evidence form Firms' Geographic Location

最早的CAPM model中,投资者的回报基于holding systematic risks。Information asymmetry不应该被计价。但是这个model太静态,怎么解释,在有了新消息来临后,价格的变动呢?(Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O' Hara, 2002)。更何况,还有Public和private消息之分?

所以Information asymmetry是不是该记入cost of capital,还没有定论。

文章发现:公司地处6大金融城市附近100公里,他们的融资成本要低7个basis points.

我总是觉得用Location来作为information asymmetry的proxy,怪怪的。

Blankespoor, Miller, and White (2014, TAR)

The Role of Dissemination in Market Liquidity: 
Evidence from Firms' Use of Twitter

Twitter的使用降低了Information Asymmetry. (lower abnormal bid-ask spreads and greater abnormal depths.Q: 后面这个什么意思?)

page 86

Role of DAIT Dissemination Based on Firm Visibility

Information acquisition costs (这个一种cost。从另一种角度,adverse selection也是一种cost。) Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)等等。

Bushess et al. (2010) 讲的是information intermediaries, such as the press, 也有助于降低information acquisition costs.

Miller (2006)说business press有bias,并且toward coverage of high visibility firms.

page 88

Information Asymmetry Measures

Leuz and Verrecchia (1999, 2000) - bid-ask spread

Lee et al. 1993; Kavajecz, 1999 - depth

Q: 用了两个liquidity相关的Measure来测量information asymmetry,这对吗?

Page 99

Impact of Dissemination Based on Firm Visibility

文章说DAIT是降低了information asymmetry,但其实对于high visibility firms的帮助不大,因为他们传统的信息渠道已经很多了。

Wednesday, August 27, 2014

Rogers and Stocken (2005, TAR)

Credibility of Management Forecasts

The Accounting Review

Lev and Penman (1990) 说,management forecasts是credible因为ex post,市场可以验证他们说的话。

但本文第一句就说Managers have incentives to bias their earnings forecasts. (此话从何而来?好莫名其妙。)

本文最主要的发现:
The willingness of managers to misrepresent their information in response to their incentives varies with the market's ability to detect their misrepresentation.

MF是否misrepresent,和市场有没有能力发现他们的Misrepresentation有关。

Litigation Environment
H1a:
有可能面临Litigation risk的公司,更可能发布less optimistic or more pessimistic forecasts.当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,这个问题更严重。

Insider Transactions
H1b:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,公司更可能发布more optimistic before disposing of stock and more pessimistic forecasts before acquiring stock.

Financial Distress
H1c:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,financial distress的公司更可能发布more optimistic forecast。

Competitive Enviroment
H1d:
当misrepresentation很难为侦测出来,concentrated market里的公司更可能发布more pessimistic forecasts。(因为不希望有entrants嘛)

Management Incentives and Market Price Response

H2:
Investors respond less positively (or more negatively) to forecasts with higher predicted optimism and more positively (or less negatively) to forecasts with higher predicted pessimism.



Arya, Frimor, Mittendorf (2010, MS)

Discretionary Disclosure of Proprietary Information in a Multisegment Firm

Management Science

Grossman and Hart (1980)他们提出的unraveling results (几个condition,用于full disclosure),本问认为只适用于公司层面,不适用于segment level.

本文假设Ex Ante,公司withhold information.

实际例子:比如Apple拒绝提供Ipod部门的销售情况

Literature Review

Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford (2005)
后者研究了SFAS No. 131 (一个法令,要求企业进一步增加segment level的disclosure)

Berger and Hann (2007) 认为是agency problem,而不是proprietary costs,更能解释partial disclosure.

还有很多modeling papers.

本文的均衡也是partial disclosure.

3. Results

3.1 Single Market Benchmark

假设Incumbent的initial cost is more informative of its own future cost than its rival's

还假设了Bertrand competition

(i) Incumbent, Ex Ante, prefer withhold info.
(ii) Ex Post, fully reveal info.

3.2 Disclosure in Multiple Segments

segment aggregation是均衡

Corollary 1

aggregation的条件:
(i) 两部门的信息差异,smaller than 
(a) the degree of uncertainty
(b) the competitive intensity

Corollary 2
In the case of no cross-firm correlation, mandatory segment disclosure regulations reduce total welfare.

强制信息披露降低social welfare


Monday, August 25, 2014

Beyer, Cohen, Lys, Walther (2010, JAE)

The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature

I. Introduction

Accounting info的作用

关键词:
(1)Evaluate (the ex ante or valuation role of accounting information) 估价
著名例子:Lemon market (Akerlof, 1970)

(2)Monitor (the ex-post or stewardship role of accounting info.) 监督
因为所有权和管理分离

同样,两种information asymmetry

(1) b/w capital providers and entrepreneurs with investment opportunities
(2) agency problems

文章里说,information enviroment会受以下几种情况制约:

(i) the extent to which each of the conditions of the unraveling result do not hold (后来会列6种情况)

(ii) the availability and cost-effectiveness of alternative mechanisms or information from sources other than the firm itself (比如financial analysts, 或机构投资人)

(iii) the magnitude of the stewardship problem compared to the magnitude of the valuation problem

关键词:Interdependence

比如:earnings management, voluntary disclosure,和the informativeness of analyst forecasts之间的interrelation

Unanswered questions:
(1) the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosure
(2) the reasons why disclosure regulation so prevalent in advanced and developed economies such as the U.S.
(3) the relation b/w firms' voluntary disclosure policies, mandatory disclosure requirements, and the information produced by security analysts

2. Sources of corporate financial information


3. Voluntary disclosures

3.1 Models of corporate voluntary disclosure

Unraveling result (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986)

(1) Disclosure are costless
(2) Investors know that firms have private information
(3) All investors interpret the firms' disclosure in the same way and firms know how investors will interpret that disclosure
(4) managers want to maximize their firms' share prices
(5) firms can credibly disclose their private information
(6) firms cannot commit ex-ante to a specific disclosure policy

3.1.1 Disclosure Costs