The Economic Consequences of Financial Restatements: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control.
Abstract
This paper investigates whether and how financial restatements affect the market for corporate control. We show that firms that recently filed financial restatements are significantly less likely to become takeover targets than a propensity score matched sample of non-restating firms. For those restating firms that do receive takeover bids, the bids are more likely to be withdrawn or take longer to complete than those made to non-restating firms. Finally, there is some evidence that deal value multiples are significantly lower for restating targets than for non-restating targets. Our analyses suggest that the information risk associated with restating firms is the main driver of these results. Overall, this study finds that financial restatements have profound consequences for the allocation of economic resources in the market for corporate control.
The Effect of Superiors' Exogenous Constraints on Budget Negotiations.
Abstract
In a world characterized by increasing pressure from financial and product markets, the question of how exogenous constraints affect internal coordination and control processes has become increasingly important. This experiment investigates how two exogenous constraints that superiors can face in budget negotiation settings, increased opportunity costs and financial pressure to meet unit targets, affect budget negotiations and subordinate effort. The results show that both constraints induce more cooperation, but in different ways. Financial pressure on the superior leads to more cooperative negotiation behavior by superiors and subordinates than increased opportunity costs. Specifically, subordinates do not take advantage of the superior's increased financial pressure to enforce lower budgets. After negotiation, both constraints strongly mitigate the negative effects of superior budget imposition on subordinate effort because exogenous constraints eliminate the effect of procedural fairness considerations on subordinate effort.
Noncompliance with Mandatory Disclosure Requirements: The Magnitude and Determinants of Undisclosed Permanently Reinvested Earnings.
Abstract
We develop estimates of a firm's foreign earnings designated as permanently reinvested (PRE) and the unrecorded deferred tax liability (TAX) associated with PRE that are independent of whether a firm explicitly discloses this information. We then investigate firms' noncompliance with Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 740 provisions that require financial statement disclosure of PRE and either the tax associated with PRE or a statement that calculating the tax is not practicable. We find that a nontrivial portion of firms do not comply with the PRE disclosure requirements and that the amounts of undisclosed PRE and the related tax are substantial in magnitude. Cross-sectional evidence suggests managers opportunistically choose when to disclose PRE and TAX and that compliance with PRE disclosure requirements increased following the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which increased incentives to disclose PRE.
这个真是有点专业了,虽然是disclosure。
Friday, August 28, 2015
Thursday, August 27, 2015
Diary 20150827 (Vol. 90 Issue 2 - Mar 2015 TAR)
Did the 2007 PCAOB Disciplinary Order against Deloitte Impose Actual Costs on the Firm or Improve Its Audit Quality?
Abstract
We examine whether the December 2007 PCAOB disciplinary order against Deloitte affected Deloitte's switching risk, audit fees, and audit quality relative to the other Big 4 firms over a three-year period following the censure. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB censure was associated with a decrease in Deloitte's ability to retain clients and attract new clients, and a decrease in Deloitte's audit fee growth rates. However, methodologies used in extant archival studies yield little or no evidence to suggest that Deloitte's audit quality was different from that of the other Big 4 firms during a three-year window either before or after the censure. Overall, our results suggest that the PCAOB censure imposed actual costs on Deloitte.
Quality没变,但Deloitte成本增加了。
These disciplinary proceedings (PCAOB 2007) followed up on a prior-year inspection
report by publicly censuring Deloitte for violations of auditing standards in connection with the
2003 audit of Ligand Pharmaceuticals.2 Notably, the December 2007 censure came about more than
three years after Deloitte’s resignation from the Ligand engagement in August 2004, and more than
two years after the audit failure became public information in May 2005, when Ligand restated its
financial statements for 2003–2004. More importantly, unlike the public portion of the PCAOB’s
inspection reports, which disclose only engagement-level performance weaknesses, the 2007
PCAOB censure publicly revealed for the first time deficiencies in Deloitte’s firm-level quality
controls. Without admitting or denying the PCAOB’s findings, Deloitte consented to a $1 million
civil penalty and agreed to implement changes to its firm-level quality control policies and
procedures (PCAOB 2007, 12).
差不多这么一回事,这个2007PCAOB的处决。
Executive Compensation and Regulation-Imposed Governance: Evidence from the California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004.
Abstract
This study examines the impact of the California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 on CEO compensation costs in affected organizations. Contrary to the stated objective of the Act that executive compensation is ''just and reasonable,'' we find that CEO compensation costs for affected nonprofits during the post-regulation periods have increased by about 6.3 percent when compared with a control group of comparable unaffected nonprofits. In addition, the relative increase in CEO compensation appears to come from nonprofits that have experienced greater regulatory cost increases. We do not find evidence that the Act resulted in a change in CEO pay performance sensitivity. The observed CEO pay increase is not systematically different across nonprofits that underpaid versus those that overpaid their CEOs during pre-Act periods. Overall, this paper highlights the unintended consequences of regulatory attempts to enhance governance in the not-for-profit sector.
The Robustness of Honesty Effects on Budget Proposals when the Superior has Rejection Authority.
Abstract
Rankin, Schwartz, and Young (2008) find experimental evidence that manipulating whether the budget request of the subordinate requires a factual assertion has no effect on budgetary slack when the superior can reject the budget. This calls into question the role of honesty in participative budgeting settings. Using Rankin et al.'s (2008) manipulation to capture honesty effects, we examine the robustness of honesty effects on budget proposals when the superior has rejection authority in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we document that honesty has a strong effect on budgetary slack when the salience of distributional fairness is reduced by withholding the relative pay of the superior from the subordinate. In Experiment 2, we document that honesty continues to have a strong effect on budgetary slack when the salience of reciprocity is increased by giving the superior the ability to set the subordinate's salary. Thus, our evidence suggests that honesty effects on budget proposals are generally robust to giving the superior rejection authority. Our study helps explain prior experimental results and clarifies the role of honesty in participative budgeting settings.
Experimental Paper。唉。。。算了吧。。。
Does Internal Audit Function Quality Deter Management Misconduct?
Abstract
Standard-setters believe high-quality internal audit functions (IAFs) serve as a key resource to audit committees for monitoring senior management. However, regulators do not enforce IAF quality or require disclosures relating to IAF quality, which is in stark contrast to regulatory requirements placed on boards, audit committees, and external auditors. Using proprietary data, I find that a composite measure of IAF quality is negatively associated with the likelihood of management misconduct even after controlling for board, audit committee, and external auditor quality. This result is robust to a variety of other specifications, including controlling for internal control quality and separate estimation during the pre- and post-SOX time periods. A difference-indifferences analysis indicates that misconduct firms have low IAF quality and competence during misconduct years and improve IAF quality and competence in the post-misconduct years. These findings suggest that regulators, audit committees, and other stakeholders should consider ways to improve IAF quality.
Does Ineffective Internal Control over Financial Reporting affect a Firm's Operations? Evidence from Firms' Inventory Management.
Abstract
We investigate whether ineffective internal control over financial reporting has implications for firm operations by examining the association between inventory-related material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting and firms' inventory management. We find that firms with inventory-related material weaknesses have systematically lower inventory turnover ratios and are more likely to report inventory impairments relative to firms with effective internal control over financial reporting. We also find that inventory turnover rates increase for firms that remediate material weaknesses related to inventory tracking. Remediating firms also experience increases in sales, gross profit, and operating cash flows. Finally, we assess the generalizability of our findings by examining all material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting, regardless of type, and provide evidence that firms' returns on assets are associated with both their existence and remediation. Collectively, our findings support the general hypothesis that internal control over financial reporting has an economically significant effect on firm operations.
越是inventory turnover有问题的公司,越是有可能internal control有问题吧???
The Effect of Nonprofit Governance on Donations: Evidence from the Revised Form 990.
Abstract
We examine whether donors reward nonprofit organizations that report better governance. From a sample of 10,846 organizations from 2008 to 2010, we first identify seven nonprofit governance dimensions using factor analysis. We then test whether the quality of governance influences donor decisions by including the seven governance factors in the standard donor's demand model. We find consistent evidence that donations and government grants are positively associated with six of the seven factors that capture good governance, including formal written policies (e.g., conflict of interest), independent audits and audit committees, review and approval of executive compensation, board oversight (e.g., board independence), management characteristics (e.g., no related parties), and accessible financial information. Our results have implications for nonprofit managers and regulators. Moreover, mandatory disclosure of governance policies for nonprofit organizations provides an interesting contrast to mandatory adoption of governance policies for publicly traded companies.
捐款的公司,corporate governance都不错。
Audit Fees and Social Capital.
Abstract
We examine the impact of social capital on audit fees. We find that firms headquartered in U.S. counties with high social capital pay lower audit fees. Social capital measures the level of mutual trust in a region. Our results suggest that auditors judge the trustworthiness of their clients based on where the firm is headquartered and charge a premium when they trust the firm less. The basis of our results is the examination of more than 28,000 audit fees for more than 5,000 firms spanning the period of 2000 to 2009. The results are robust to controlling for a large number of firm-level and county-level characteristics.
Social capital is often defined as the mutual trust in society. We propose that the social capital in the county where a U.S. firm is headquartered can have an impact on how much the auditors trust the managers of the firm. As we discuss below, auditors arguably have less trust when a firm is headquartered in a county with low social capital. We argue that this lack of trust will increase the auditor’s effort and his or her fear of litigation and, therefore, will increase fees.
真的有点奇怪的一篇paper。为啥子呢???
Rating Agency Adjustments to GAAP Financial Statements and Their Effect on Ratings and Credit Spreads.
Abstract
I examine a dataset of both quantitative (hard) adjustments to firms' reported U.S. GAAP financial statement numbers and qualitative (soft) adjustments to firms' credit ratings that Moody's develops and uses in its credit rating process. I first document differences between firms' reported and Moody's adjusted numbers that are both large and frequent across firms. For example, primarily because of upward adjustments to interest expense and debt attributable to firms' off-balance sheet debt, on average, adjusted coverage (cash flow-to-debt) ratios are 27 percent (8 percent) lower and adjusted leverage ratios are 70 percent higher than the corresponding U.S. GAAP ratios. I then find that Moody's hard and soft rating adjustments are associated with significantly higher credit spreads and flatter credit spread term structures. Overall, the results indicate that Moody's quantitative adjustments to financial statement numbers and qualitative adjustments to credit ratings enable it to better capture default risk, consistent with it effectively processing both hard and soft information.
所以Moody的数据更有信息量
Product Market Power and Tax Avoidance: Market Leaders, Mimicking Strategies, and Stock Returns.
Abstract
Product market power provides firms with comparative advantages through more persistent profitability and insulation from competitive threats. These advantages likely provide firms with the ability to engage in greater tax avoidance. We present evidence consistent with this hypothesis. We also show that firms mimic the tax outcomes of their product market leaders. Among firms with greater product market power and comparatively high cash tax avoidance, we find stock prices to be less informative and that investors require additional compensation for the risks associated with comparatively high cash tax avoidance. Our results survive numerous robustness tests. Overall, our results suggest that industry dynamics, particularly related to a firm's competitive position, play a meaningful role in corporate tax policy.
Following Peress (2010), we measure product market power as the industry-adjusted, firms pecific price-cost margin (PCM).
这文挺有意思,所以有Market power的公司,会tax avoidance,然后其他的followers还会模仿这些东西,所以followers的股票就没什么信息量。
Do Accounting and Audit Quality Affect World Bank Lending?
Abstract
We investigate the role of accounting and audit quality in the allocation of international development aid loans provided by the World Bank. This aid is crucial to improve governance functions, infrastructure, and capital markets, and the accounting and audit environments in a country can provide the World Bank with confidence that aid is being used as intended rather than being diverted for personal or political gain. We find that development aid loans are higher for countries with stronger accounting quality, where IFRS use is mandated, and where the audit environment is stronger. However, we also find that United States geo-political interests influence these results. Specifically, the World Bank appears to ''overlook'' accounting and audit quality in countries where geo-political interests are relatively aligned with those of the U.S. Finally, we find that accounting and auditing matter only in countries with relatively high corruption levels, indicating that the World Bank has greater trust that accounting and auditing are of relatively high quality in low-corruption countries.
Impaired Judgment: The Effects of Asset Impairment Reversibility and Cognitive Dissonance on Future
Abstract
This paper examines how the reversibility of the accounting effect of asset impairments affects managers' investment decisions. We conduct two experiments in which participants act as CEO of a multi-division electronics company that suffers a large asset impairment at one of the divisions. Drawing on prior psychology research involving cognitive dissonance and decision reversibility, we predict and find that managers who are responsible for the decision to record the asset impairment invest more in the impaired division when the accounting effect of the impairment is reversible than when it is irreversible. This is consistent with the idea that reversible accounting effects encourage behavioral attempts to alter the cash flow outcome, while irreversible accounting effects encourage belief revision to rationalize the cash flow outcome. Also in line with cognitive dissonance theory, we show that managers who are not responsible for the decision to impair the asset, or managers who are given the opportunity to deny responsibility for the asset impairment, do not differ in their investment in the impaired division, regardless of impairment reversibility.
好吧,experiment的paper,我就略过了。。。
Communication and Information Sharing in Teams.
Abstract
This paper studies whether dissemination of private, pre-decision signals about productivity is valuable to the principal when agents work sequentially and observe each other's effort. The benefit of dissemination is that when productivity states are correlated, each agent's signal is useful as a performance measure for the other agent and for making efficient production choices. The more informative the signal is about agents' efforts, the greater the benefit of the additional performance measure, but there is a cost due to higher information rents. With no dissemination, the downstream agent learns about the upstream agent's productivity state by observing that agent's effort. The upstream agent's rents are lower because he has no incentive to free-ride on the downstream agent, who follows his effort, but there is less information on which to base the payments. The choice between dissemination and no dissemination depends on the informativeness of the signal about agents' efforts.
好吧,一篇modelling paper,我又只能路过了。。。
Asymmetric Responses to Earnings News: A Case for Ambiguity.
Abstract
This study empirically examines the role of shocks to macro-uncertainty in shaping the responses of stock market participants to firm-specific earnings news. Specifically, I find that investors place greater weight on bad news following an increase in macro-uncertainty. By contrast, I find that investors place equal weight on both good and bad news following a decrease in macro-uncertainty. Furthermore, my findings show that these effects are more pronounced (1) for firms whose prior returns are more correlated with macro-uncertainty, (2) for firms that experience abnormally low trading volume during the earnings announcement, (3) for firms with relatively lower levels of institutional ownership, and (4) for firms with relatively higher information uncertainty. In sum, these findings provide novel empirical evidence that investors behave in a manner consistent with ambiguity aversion, with the effects strongest among unsophisticated investors.
也是一篇宏观经济和会计的文章。
宏观不好的时候,坏消息的比重就更大了。
宏观不确定性下降的时候,坏消息好消息的就等开。
Abstract
We examine whether the December 2007 PCAOB disciplinary order against Deloitte affected Deloitte's switching risk, audit fees, and audit quality relative to the other Big 4 firms over a three-year period following the censure. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB censure was associated with a decrease in Deloitte's ability to retain clients and attract new clients, and a decrease in Deloitte's audit fee growth rates. However, methodologies used in extant archival studies yield little or no evidence to suggest that Deloitte's audit quality was different from that of the other Big 4 firms during a three-year window either before or after the censure. Overall, our results suggest that the PCAOB censure imposed actual costs on Deloitte.
Quality没变,但Deloitte成本增加了。
These disciplinary proceedings (PCAOB 2007) followed up on a prior-year inspection
report by publicly censuring Deloitte for violations of auditing standards in connection with the
2003 audit of Ligand Pharmaceuticals.2 Notably, the December 2007 censure came about more than
three years after Deloitte’s resignation from the Ligand engagement in August 2004, and more than
two years after the audit failure became public information in May 2005, when Ligand restated its
financial statements for 2003–2004. More importantly, unlike the public portion of the PCAOB’s
inspection reports, which disclose only engagement-level performance weaknesses, the 2007
PCAOB censure publicly revealed for the first time deficiencies in Deloitte’s firm-level quality
controls. Without admitting or denying the PCAOB’s findings, Deloitte consented to a $1 million
civil penalty and agreed to implement changes to its firm-level quality control policies and
procedures (PCAOB 2007, 12).
差不多这么一回事,这个2007PCAOB的处决。
Executive Compensation and Regulation-Imposed Governance: Evidence from the California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004.
Abstract
This study examines the impact of the California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 on CEO compensation costs in affected organizations. Contrary to the stated objective of the Act that executive compensation is ''just and reasonable,'' we find that CEO compensation costs for affected nonprofits during the post-regulation periods have increased by about 6.3 percent when compared with a control group of comparable unaffected nonprofits. In addition, the relative increase in CEO compensation appears to come from nonprofits that have experienced greater regulatory cost increases. We do not find evidence that the Act resulted in a change in CEO pay performance sensitivity. The observed CEO pay increase is not systematically different across nonprofits that underpaid versus those that overpaid their CEOs during pre-Act periods. Overall, this paper highlights the unintended consequences of regulatory attempts to enhance governance in the not-for-profit sector.
The Robustness of Honesty Effects on Budget Proposals when the Superior has Rejection Authority.
Abstract
Rankin, Schwartz, and Young (2008) find experimental evidence that manipulating whether the budget request of the subordinate requires a factual assertion has no effect on budgetary slack when the superior can reject the budget. This calls into question the role of honesty in participative budgeting settings. Using Rankin et al.'s (2008) manipulation to capture honesty effects, we examine the robustness of honesty effects on budget proposals when the superior has rejection authority in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we document that honesty has a strong effect on budgetary slack when the salience of distributional fairness is reduced by withholding the relative pay of the superior from the subordinate. In Experiment 2, we document that honesty continues to have a strong effect on budgetary slack when the salience of reciprocity is increased by giving the superior the ability to set the subordinate's salary. Thus, our evidence suggests that honesty effects on budget proposals are generally robust to giving the superior rejection authority. Our study helps explain prior experimental results and clarifies the role of honesty in participative budgeting settings.
Experimental Paper。唉。。。算了吧。。。
Does Internal Audit Function Quality Deter Management Misconduct?
Abstract
Standard-setters believe high-quality internal audit functions (IAFs) serve as a key resource to audit committees for monitoring senior management. However, regulators do not enforce IAF quality or require disclosures relating to IAF quality, which is in stark contrast to regulatory requirements placed on boards, audit committees, and external auditors. Using proprietary data, I find that a composite measure of IAF quality is negatively associated with the likelihood of management misconduct even after controlling for board, audit committee, and external auditor quality. This result is robust to a variety of other specifications, including controlling for internal control quality and separate estimation during the pre- and post-SOX time periods. A difference-indifferences analysis indicates that misconduct firms have low IAF quality and competence during misconduct years and improve IAF quality and competence in the post-misconduct years. These findings suggest that regulators, audit committees, and other stakeholders should consider ways to improve IAF quality.
Does Ineffective Internal Control over Financial Reporting affect a Firm's Operations? Evidence from Firms' Inventory Management.
Abstract
We investigate whether ineffective internal control over financial reporting has implications for firm operations by examining the association between inventory-related material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting and firms' inventory management. We find that firms with inventory-related material weaknesses have systematically lower inventory turnover ratios and are more likely to report inventory impairments relative to firms with effective internal control over financial reporting. We also find that inventory turnover rates increase for firms that remediate material weaknesses related to inventory tracking. Remediating firms also experience increases in sales, gross profit, and operating cash flows. Finally, we assess the generalizability of our findings by examining all material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting, regardless of type, and provide evidence that firms' returns on assets are associated with both their existence and remediation. Collectively, our findings support the general hypothesis that internal control over financial reporting has an economically significant effect on firm operations.
越是inventory turnover有问题的公司,越是有可能internal control有问题吧???
The Effect of Nonprofit Governance on Donations: Evidence from the Revised Form 990.
Abstract
We examine whether donors reward nonprofit organizations that report better governance. From a sample of 10,846 organizations from 2008 to 2010, we first identify seven nonprofit governance dimensions using factor analysis. We then test whether the quality of governance influences donor decisions by including the seven governance factors in the standard donor's demand model. We find consistent evidence that donations and government grants are positively associated with six of the seven factors that capture good governance, including formal written policies (e.g., conflict of interest), independent audits and audit committees, review and approval of executive compensation, board oversight (e.g., board independence), management characteristics (e.g., no related parties), and accessible financial information. Our results have implications for nonprofit managers and regulators. Moreover, mandatory disclosure of governance policies for nonprofit organizations provides an interesting contrast to mandatory adoption of governance policies for publicly traded companies.
捐款的公司,corporate governance都不错。
Audit Fees and Social Capital.
Abstract
We examine the impact of social capital on audit fees. We find that firms headquartered in U.S. counties with high social capital pay lower audit fees. Social capital measures the level of mutual trust in a region. Our results suggest that auditors judge the trustworthiness of their clients based on where the firm is headquartered and charge a premium when they trust the firm less. The basis of our results is the examination of more than 28,000 audit fees for more than 5,000 firms spanning the period of 2000 to 2009. The results are robust to controlling for a large number of firm-level and county-level characteristics.
Social capital is often defined as the mutual trust in society. We propose that the social capital in the county where a U.S. firm is headquartered can have an impact on how much the auditors trust the managers of the firm. As we discuss below, auditors arguably have less trust when a firm is headquartered in a county with low social capital. We argue that this lack of trust will increase the auditor’s effort and his or her fear of litigation and, therefore, will increase fees.
真的有点奇怪的一篇paper。为啥子呢???
Rating Agency Adjustments to GAAP Financial Statements and Their Effect on Ratings and Credit Spreads.
Abstract
I examine a dataset of both quantitative (hard) adjustments to firms' reported U.S. GAAP financial statement numbers and qualitative (soft) adjustments to firms' credit ratings that Moody's develops and uses in its credit rating process. I first document differences between firms' reported and Moody's adjusted numbers that are both large and frequent across firms. For example, primarily because of upward adjustments to interest expense and debt attributable to firms' off-balance sheet debt, on average, adjusted coverage (cash flow-to-debt) ratios are 27 percent (8 percent) lower and adjusted leverage ratios are 70 percent higher than the corresponding U.S. GAAP ratios. I then find that Moody's hard and soft rating adjustments are associated with significantly higher credit spreads and flatter credit spread term structures. Overall, the results indicate that Moody's quantitative adjustments to financial statement numbers and qualitative adjustments to credit ratings enable it to better capture default risk, consistent with it effectively processing both hard and soft information.
所以Moody的数据更有信息量
Product Market Power and Tax Avoidance: Market Leaders, Mimicking Strategies, and Stock Returns.
Abstract
Product market power provides firms with comparative advantages through more persistent profitability and insulation from competitive threats. These advantages likely provide firms with the ability to engage in greater tax avoidance. We present evidence consistent with this hypothesis. We also show that firms mimic the tax outcomes of their product market leaders. Among firms with greater product market power and comparatively high cash tax avoidance, we find stock prices to be less informative and that investors require additional compensation for the risks associated with comparatively high cash tax avoidance. Our results survive numerous robustness tests. Overall, our results suggest that industry dynamics, particularly related to a firm's competitive position, play a meaningful role in corporate tax policy.
Following Peress (2010), we measure product market power as the industry-adjusted, firms pecific price-cost margin (PCM).
这文挺有意思,所以有Market power的公司,会tax avoidance,然后其他的followers还会模仿这些东西,所以followers的股票就没什么信息量。
Do Accounting and Audit Quality Affect World Bank Lending?
Abstract
We investigate the role of accounting and audit quality in the allocation of international development aid loans provided by the World Bank. This aid is crucial to improve governance functions, infrastructure, and capital markets, and the accounting and audit environments in a country can provide the World Bank with confidence that aid is being used as intended rather than being diverted for personal or political gain. We find that development aid loans are higher for countries with stronger accounting quality, where IFRS use is mandated, and where the audit environment is stronger. However, we also find that United States geo-political interests influence these results. Specifically, the World Bank appears to ''overlook'' accounting and audit quality in countries where geo-political interests are relatively aligned with those of the U.S. Finally, we find that accounting and auditing matter only in countries with relatively high corruption levels, indicating that the World Bank has greater trust that accounting and auditing are of relatively high quality in low-corruption countries.
Impaired Judgment: The Effects of Asset Impairment Reversibility and Cognitive Dissonance on Future
Abstract
This paper examines how the reversibility of the accounting effect of asset impairments affects managers' investment decisions. We conduct two experiments in which participants act as CEO of a multi-division electronics company that suffers a large asset impairment at one of the divisions. Drawing on prior psychology research involving cognitive dissonance and decision reversibility, we predict and find that managers who are responsible for the decision to record the asset impairment invest more in the impaired division when the accounting effect of the impairment is reversible than when it is irreversible. This is consistent with the idea that reversible accounting effects encourage behavioral attempts to alter the cash flow outcome, while irreversible accounting effects encourage belief revision to rationalize the cash flow outcome. Also in line with cognitive dissonance theory, we show that managers who are not responsible for the decision to impair the asset, or managers who are given the opportunity to deny responsibility for the asset impairment, do not differ in their investment in the impaired division, regardless of impairment reversibility.
好吧,experiment的paper,我就略过了。。。
Communication and Information Sharing in Teams.
Abstract
This paper studies whether dissemination of private, pre-decision signals about productivity is valuable to the principal when agents work sequentially and observe each other's effort. The benefit of dissemination is that when productivity states are correlated, each agent's signal is useful as a performance measure for the other agent and for making efficient production choices. The more informative the signal is about agents' efforts, the greater the benefit of the additional performance measure, but there is a cost due to higher information rents. With no dissemination, the downstream agent learns about the upstream agent's productivity state by observing that agent's effort. The upstream agent's rents are lower because he has no incentive to free-ride on the downstream agent, who follows his effort, but there is less information on which to base the payments. The choice between dissemination and no dissemination depends on the informativeness of the signal about agents' efforts.
好吧,一篇modelling paper,我又只能路过了。。。
Asymmetric Responses to Earnings News: A Case for Ambiguity.
Abstract
This study empirically examines the role of shocks to macro-uncertainty in shaping the responses of stock market participants to firm-specific earnings news. Specifically, I find that investors place greater weight on bad news following an increase in macro-uncertainty. By contrast, I find that investors place equal weight on both good and bad news following a decrease in macro-uncertainty. Furthermore, my findings show that these effects are more pronounced (1) for firms whose prior returns are more correlated with macro-uncertainty, (2) for firms that experience abnormally low trading volume during the earnings announcement, (3) for firms with relatively lower levels of institutional ownership, and (4) for firms with relatively higher information uncertainty. In sum, these findings provide novel empirical evidence that investors behave in a manner consistent with ambiguity aversion, with the effects strongest among unsophisticated investors.
也是一篇宏观经济和会计的文章。
宏观不好的时候,坏消息的比重就更大了。
宏观不确定性下降的时候,坏消息好消息的就等开。
Diary 20150827 (Vol. 90 Issue 3 - May 2015 TAR)
Macroeconomic Consequences of Accounting: The Effect of Accounting Conservatism on Macroeconomic Indicators and the Money Supply.
Abstract
This study investigates the macroeconomic consequences of firm-level accounting conservatism. Consistent with conditional conservatism extending to the aggregate level, I demonstrate that annual estimates of aggregate corporate profits and gross domestic product compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis are more sensitive to negative aggregate news than to positive aggregate news. Next, I estimate the dollar value impact of conservatism on measurements of macroeconomic fundamentals. Finally, I show that incorporating the dollar value impact of conservatism increases the explanatory power of a monetary policy reaction function that describes U.S. Federal Reserve interest rate decision behavior. These results suggest that accounting can impact social welfare by altering the measurement attributes of key macroeconomic indicators and by shaping monetary policy decisions that regulate the money supply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
First, census data indicate that publicly traded firms constitute only 1 percent of all U.S. firms (Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda 2006).上市公司只占1%。(是绝对数量,还是公司大小,还是revenue啊???)
Finally, I investigate whether accounting conservatism’s impact on macroeconomic indicators
affects macroeconomic decision making. Specifically, I examine monetary policy decisions made
by the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed). One way the Fed executes monetary policy is by
manipulating the federal funds rate in order to influence the money supply and alter macroeconomic
growth. The Fed relies on GDP measurements when setting the federal funds rate (Taylor 1993).
Therefore, firm-level accounting conservatism may influence federal funds rate decisions by
altering the GDP measurements upon which the Fed relies.
几段论。因为联储调整利息按照GDP,然而GDP由公司Revenue组成,所以公司的accounting conservatism会影响宏观政策吧?
很简单的regression,很聪明的切入点!!!
Are CEOs and CFOs Rewarded for Disclosure Quality?
Abstract
This study provides evidence regarding the importance that boards of directors place on effective communication with the investor community by examining whether CEO and CFO compensation are related to the quality of the firm's financial disclosures. Using an index derived from analyst forecast characteristics and management forecast accuracy to measure disclosure quality, we find changes in the annual bonus for both the CEO and CFO to be positively associated with changes in disclosure quality. We also find that the relation is stronger for high-growth firms, firms that have stronger governance structures, and for executives with lower equity incentives. Overall, our findings provide insight into the importance that boards place on effective communication with investors as a responsibility of the CEO and CFO and, therefore, provide them with contractual incentives to address the moral hazard problem associated with voluntary disclosures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
他们发现,有正相关的。
Analyst Interest as an Early Indicator of Firm Fundamental Changes and Stock Returns.
Abstract
We posit that a change in analyst interest in a firm is an early indicator of the firm's future fundamentals, capital market activities, and stock returns. We measure increases in analyst interest by observing analysts who do not cover a firm but participate in that firm's earnings conference call, and we measure decreases in analyst interest by observing analysts who cover a firm, yet are absent from that firm's call. We find that increases in analyst interest are positively associated with future changes in firm fundamentals and capital market activities, while decreases in analyst interest are negatively associated with capital market activities. We also find that increases (decreases) in analyst interest are positively (negatively) correlated with future stock returns over the next three months and that a hedge portfolio yields a significant abnormal return. Overall, our study shows that analyst interest is a novel and early indicator of future firm fundamentals and capital market consequences.
a change in analyst interest, proxied by either the onset of non-covering sell-side equity analysts who participate in a firm’s earnings conference call or by the absence of participation from covering analysts
真的好细好细的视角。OMG!
Accounting Credibility and Liquidity Constraints: Evidence from Reactions of Small Banks to Monetary Tightening.
被Audited的银行,在货币收紧阶段,更容易借到钱呗。
Has the Quality of Accounting Education Declined?
Abstract
结论貌似是,质量大范围比较没下降,但在商学院内部,不太好说。
Does SOX 404 Have Teeth? Consequences of the Failure to Report Existing Internal Control Weaknesses.
Abstract
We examine various penalties that could serve as enforcement mechanisms for Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 404. We focus on firms with restatements, some of which had previously reported their control weaknesses as required and some of which acknowledged them only after announcing their restatement. We find no evidence that penalties are more likely for firms, managers, or auditors that fail to report existing control weaknesses. Instead, class action lawsuits, management turnover, and auditor turnover are all more likely in the wake of a restatement when control weaknesses had previously been reported. We find similar, although weaker, evidence for Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sanctions. These results are consistent with disclosure of control weaknesses making it difficult for management to plausibly claim later that they were unaware of the underlying conditions that led to restatements. The results also suggest that the public and private enforcement mechanisms surrounding SOX 404 are unlikely to provide strong incentives for compliance and offer a potential explanation for why most restatements are issued by firms that previously claimed to have effective internal controls.
唉,不是特别感兴趣。。。
Abstract
This study investigates the macroeconomic consequences of firm-level accounting conservatism. Consistent with conditional conservatism extending to the aggregate level, I demonstrate that annual estimates of aggregate corporate profits and gross domestic product compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis are more sensitive to negative aggregate news than to positive aggregate news. Next, I estimate the dollar value impact of conservatism on measurements of macroeconomic fundamentals. Finally, I show that incorporating the dollar value impact of conservatism increases the explanatory power of a monetary policy reaction function that describes U.S. Federal Reserve interest rate decision behavior. These results suggest that accounting can impact social welfare by altering the measurement attributes of key macroeconomic indicators and by shaping monetary policy decisions that regulate the money supply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
First, census data indicate that publicly traded firms constitute only 1 percent of all U.S. firms (Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda 2006).上市公司只占1%。(是绝对数量,还是公司大小,还是revenue啊???)
Finally, I investigate whether accounting conservatism’s impact on macroeconomic indicators
affects macroeconomic decision making. Specifically, I examine monetary policy decisions made
by the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed). One way the Fed executes monetary policy is by
manipulating the federal funds rate in order to influence the money supply and alter macroeconomic
growth. The Fed relies on GDP measurements when setting the federal funds rate (Taylor 1993).
Therefore, firm-level accounting conservatism may influence federal funds rate decisions by
altering the GDP measurements upon which the Fed relies.
几段论。因为联储调整利息按照GDP,然而GDP由公司Revenue组成,所以公司的accounting conservatism会影响宏观政策吧?
很简单的regression,很聪明的切入点!!!
Are CEOs and CFOs Rewarded for Disclosure Quality?
Abstract
This study provides evidence regarding the importance that boards of directors place on effective communication with the investor community by examining whether CEO and CFO compensation are related to the quality of the firm's financial disclosures. Using an index derived from analyst forecast characteristics and management forecast accuracy to measure disclosure quality, we find changes in the annual bonus for both the CEO and CFO to be positively associated with changes in disclosure quality. We also find that the relation is stronger for high-growth firms, firms that have stronger governance structures, and for executives with lower equity incentives. Overall, our findings provide insight into the importance that boards place on effective communication with investors as a responsibility of the CEO and CFO and, therefore, provide them with contractual incentives to address the moral hazard problem associated with voluntary disclosures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
他们发现,有正相关的。
Analyst Interest as an Early Indicator of Firm Fundamental Changes and Stock Returns.
Abstract
We posit that a change in analyst interest in a firm is an early indicator of the firm's future fundamentals, capital market activities, and stock returns. We measure increases in analyst interest by observing analysts who do not cover a firm but participate in that firm's earnings conference call, and we measure decreases in analyst interest by observing analysts who cover a firm, yet are absent from that firm's call. We find that increases in analyst interest are positively associated with future changes in firm fundamentals and capital market activities, while decreases in analyst interest are negatively associated with capital market activities. We also find that increases (decreases) in analyst interest are positively (negatively) correlated with future stock returns over the next three months and that a hedge portfolio yields a significant abnormal return. Overall, our study shows that analyst interest is a novel and early indicator of future firm fundamentals and capital market consequences.
a change in analyst interest, proxied by either the onset of non-covering sell-side equity analysts who participate in a firm’s earnings conference call or by the absence of participation from covering analysts
真的好细好细的视角。OMG!
Accounting Credibility and Liquidity Constraints: Evidence from Reactions of Small Banks to Monetary Tightening.
被Audited的银行,在货币收紧阶段,更容易借到钱呗。
Has the Quality of Accounting Education Declined?
Abstract
结论貌似是,质量大范围比较没下降,但在商学院内部,不太好说。
Does SOX 404 Have Teeth? Consequences of the Failure to Report Existing Internal Control Weaknesses.
Abstract
We examine various penalties that could serve as enforcement mechanisms for Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 404. We focus on firms with restatements, some of which had previously reported their control weaknesses as required and some of which acknowledged them only after announcing their restatement. We find no evidence that penalties are more likely for firms, managers, or auditors that fail to report existing control weaknesses. Instead, class action lawsuits, management turnover, and auditor turnover are all more likely in the wake of a restatement when control weaknesses had previously been reported. We find similar, although weaker, evidence for Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sanctions. These results are consistent with disclosure of control weaknesses making it difficult for management to plausibly claim later that they were unaware of the underlying conditions that led to restatements. The results also suggest that the public and private enforcement mechanisms surrounding SOX 404 are unlikely to provide strong incentives for compliance and offer a potential explanation for why most restatements are issued by firms that previously claimed to have effective internal controls.
唉,不是特别感兴趣。。。
Wednesday, August 26, 2015
Diary 20150826
Vol. 90 Issue 4 - Jul2015
这一期全在批判Bentley University的Hunton作假啊。吓死人了!!!
Delegating Disclosure and Production Choices (2015, TAR)
普渡的Modelling Paper
好像在说,经理人因为合同的incentives,所以会有ex ante的disclosure不同。
心累。。。
Six Decades of Research (2015, TAR, Beaver)
the mean ratio (U-statistics)???
Information Content of Prices (Part 2)
A reverse regression analysis???
Are Fraud Specialists Relatively More Effective than Auditors at Modifying Audit Programs in the Presence of Fraud Risk?
Abstract
Previous studies indicate that auditors are able to identify fraud risk factors, but may not be able to translate this knowledge into an audit plan that effectively takes these factors into account to increase the likelihood of detecting fraud. Fraud specialists may be able to compensate for such limitations. This study investigates the relative merits of involving fraud specialists in assisting auditors by developing an audit plan that would effectively address fraud risk in a revenue cycle. Results show that fraud specialists did not differ from auditors in the number of procedures selected from a standard audit program; nor were these procedures cumulatively more effective than those selected by auditors. Fraud specialists generated a greater number of non-standard additional audit procedures, and those procedures were marginally more effective, but less efficient, than those of auditors, except for certain groups of procedures. Finally, although the fraud specialists proposed significantly more additional (non-standard) procedures than auditors, their proposed budget increase for this category of procedures was significantly smaller than the budget increase proposed by auditors. Adjustments to the overall time budget did not differ between fraud specialists and auditors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Optimal Information Asymmetry, Control Environment, and Investment in Firm-Specific Human Capital.
Abstract
When future operations are expected to provide information rents, managers concerned with being replaced can entrench themselves with value-increasing firm-specific human capital (SHC). In motivating SHC investment, the firm trades off the incentive effects of an ex ante commitment to asymmetric information against the costs of compensation rents and private benefits. Firm value, therefore, is affected by (1) the accuracy with which the board observes and interprets information, and (2) the strength of the control environment restricting the manager's ability to benefit from concealing and diverting firm value. It is optimal to maintain a partially informed board to the mutual benefit of shareholders and managers, and for firms in a stricter control environment to maintain a more informed board. Due to the indirect effect on SHC, regulations that strengthen control adversely affect firm value unless the information and control environments are sufficiently biased toward managerial preferences.
Wednesday, August 19, 2015
Sub CEO
355 4-Jan-96 Bally's Health & Tennis
Paul Toback, a former White House aide in the Clinton administration who joined Bally as a corporate development officer in 1997, was named Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in December 2002, immediately after predecessor Lee Hillman resigned.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bally_Total_Fitness
382 16-Oct-96 Union Pacific Resources Group
1991: The company name is changed to Payless ShoeSource, Inc.
1996:
May spins Payless off to shareholders, making it once again an independent, publicly traded firm.
1997:
The mid-priced shoe chain Parade of Shoes is acquired from J. Baker, Inc.; the first Canadian Payless stores open.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bally_Total_Fitness
382 16-Oct-96 Union Pacific Resources Group
M&A at the same time
http://www.company-histories.com/Union-Pacific-Corporation-Company-History.html
391 3-Dec-96 Consolidated Freightways Corp
In 1996, Consolidated Freightways, Inc. spun off its unionized long-haul trucking company, CF MotorFreight, creating two separate publicly traded companies. Parent company, Consolidated Freightways, Inc. was renamed CNF Transportation Inc., reflecting the familiar stock ticker symbol of the company (CNF). CNF retained the Con-Way regional truck companies, Emery Worldwide and a growing logistical systems department.[5]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consolidated_Freightways
ATTN:
Consolidated Freightways Corp is not subsidiary. It seems like it's parent.
362 11-Mar-96 Morrison Health Care Inc
- 1996 – Morrison Restaurants Inc. officially split into three separate companies: Ruby Tuesday Inc., Morrison Fresh Cooking Inc., and Morrison Health Care Inc.[2]
MORRISON HEALTH CARE, INC. Date 08/23/96 By:/s/ Glenn A. Davenport Glenn A. Davenport President, Chief Executive Officer and Director
Glenn Davenport’s 33 Years at Morrison
- 1973: Joined Morrison’s Restaurants Inc.
- 1982-’86: Served as managing director of Saudi Arabia Morrison
- 1994: Named president of Morrison’s Healthcare Division
- 1996: Named ceo of Morrison Healthcare (a separate corporation)
- 2000: Awarded IFMA’s Silver Plate Award, Healthcare
- 2001: Remained ceo when Compass Group acquired Morrison Healthcare
- 2006: Retires after 33 years
http://www.foodservicedirector.com/archive/archived-content/articles/glenn-davenports-legacy-keeping-change
387 1-Nov-96 Choice Hotels Holdings Inc
Can't find
365 9-May-96 Payless ShoeSource Inc
CANT FIND
401 31-Dec-96 Primex Technologies Inc
before Charles E. Bunch ( 7 years in PPG) but can't find the person before him
402 31-Dec-96 Quest Diagnostics Inc
CEO Kenneth W. Freeman
https://books.google.com/books?id=VSsHiZlPieAC&pg=PA114&lpg=PA114&dq=Quest+Diagnostics+Inc+ceo+1996&source=bl&ots=V15jR4f6Gc&sig=bv4wPPp9J_2ZdXuLECm0Tu5iipk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAzgKahUKEwiw_OfU8bLHAhUJcT4KHWINCgU#v=onepage&q=Quest%20Diagnostics%20Inc%20ceo%201996&f=false
Tuesday, July 28, 2015
CEO Bio
ID 525, 526
In 1968, he co-founded the Hospital Corporation of America with his father, Thomas F. Frist, Sr., and Jack C. Massey.[3][4][5][7][8][11][12] In 1977, he became President of HCA and, in 1987, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer.[5][7] He served as Chairman of the Board in 1994, after the merger with Columbia, and after the merger with HealthTrust Inc. in April 1995, as Vice Chairman.[5][7] He returned as Chairman and CEO of the company in 1997.[5][7] He was Chairman and CEO until January 2001 and Chairman until January 2002.
CANNOT be restructuring CEO
ID 575
Nasser had a long career at Ford Motor Company which he joined in 1968, rising to President and Chief Executive Officer where he served from 1998 to 2001.
Under Nasser's watch, Ford acquired Volvo Cars and Land Rover and placed them under the newly Premier Automotive Group in order to expand its market share in the luxury segment.
CANNOT be restructuring CEO
ID 601
Philip J. Carroll, Jr. (born 1937) is active in a variety of corporate and government roles. Carroll earned a Bachelor of science in Physics from Loyola University New Orleans in 1958 and a M.S. in physics from Tulane University in 1961, after which he joined the Shell Oil company as an engineer.
Carroll became the CEO of Shell Oil in 1993 and served in that position until July 1998, when he became the Chairman and CEO of Fluor Corporation, an engineering and construction services firm. He retired from Fluor in February 2002.
CANNOT be restructuring CEO
ID 618
618 2-Apr-01 Mirant Corp SOUTHERN CO 20-Feb-01 88601 9850 H. Allen Franklin 655.81 1014.7 . . . . 43.21 2000
618 2-Apr-01 Mirant Corp SOUTHERN CO 20-Feb-01 88601 9850 H. Allen Franklin 855.97 1867.32 . . . . 47.56 2001
618 2-Apr-01 Mirant Corp SOUTHERN CO 20-Feb-01 88601 9850 H. Allen Franklin 929.22 1984.32 . . . . 68.9 2002
618 2-Apr-01 Mirant Corp SOUTHERN CO 20-Feb-01 88601 9850 H. Allen Franklin 966.24 2083.16 . . . . 65.82 2003
CANNOT be restructuring CEO
ID 634
634 9-Aug-01 Thermo Fibertek Inc THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC 31-Jan-00 78077 10530 Richard Francis Syron, Ph.D. 514.67 370 . . . . 309.4 1999
634 9-Aug-01 Thermo Fibertek Inc THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC 31-Jan-00 78077 10530 Richard Francis Syron, Ph.D. 800 1120 . . . . 152.28 2000
634 9-Aug-01 Thermo Fibertek Inc THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC 31-Jan-00 78077 10530 Richard Francis Syron, Ph.D. 800 800 . . . . 38.94 2001
634 9-Aug-01 Thermo Fibertek Inc THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC 31-Jan-00 78077 10530 Richard Francis Syron, Ph.D. 800 741.6 . . . . 1902.59 2002
Mr. Richard Francis Syron, also known as Dick, Ph.D., served as the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman at Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation from December 2003 to September 8, 2008. Mr. Syron served as Chief Executive Officer of Thermo Electron Corp. from June 1999 to November 2002, served as its President from June 1999 to July 2000 & as its Chairman from January 2000 to December 2002. He served at the Boston Fed at two separate times from 1974 to 1985, he served as an economist, officer, and economic advisor in the Boston Fed's research department. He left the Boston Fed in 1994. He served as Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Freddie Mac Foundation from December 2003 to February 2005. Mr. Syron served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of American Stock Exchange Inc. from April 1994 to May 1999. He served as the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston from January 1989 to March 1994. He served as President of Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston from 1986 to 1989.
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=189925&ticker=TMO&previousCapId=&previousTitle=
CANNOT be restructuring CEO
ID 659
He served as the Chairman of Lucent Technologies Inc., from 1996 to 1998 and again from October 2000 to February 2003 and also its Chief Executive Officer from 1996 to 1997 and again from October 2000 to January 2002. He served as the Chairman of Avaya Inc., from October 1, 2000 to October 23, 2000 and Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., from 1996 to February 2003.
NOT be restructuring CEO
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=611535&ticker=ALU
ID 660
SWS President and CEO David Glatstein Retires;
SWS Chairman Don A. Buchholz to Serve as CEO
ID 673
"Steve Letbetter has consistently demonstrated outstanding leadership
capabilities in his 25 years of service with the company," said Jordan.
"Steve has been the primary architect of our strategic plans, and his efforts
have significantly contributed to the dramatic expansion our company has
enjoyed in recent years. I have total confidence that Steve's experience and
leadership will ensure Reliant Energy's future success as the energy services
business moves into a deregulated and increasingly competitive environment."
Jordan's tenure as chief executive officer is one of the longest among
CEO's in the energy industry. He was initially elected chief executive
officer of Houston Lighting & Power Company (then Reliant Energy's principal
operating unit) in 1977.
Inside promotion
NOT be restructuring CEO
ID 680
David M. Thomas
David is the former Chairman and CEO of IMS Health, the global leader in information and consulting solutions for the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries. He served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the company from November 2000 to January 2005. He was Executive Chairman from January 2005 through March 2006.
Before joining IMS, David was Senior Vice President and Group Executive at IBM, responsible for its global Personal Systems Group, and served as a member of IBM’s Corporate Executive Committee, overseeing all of IBM’s worldwide business operations. From 1996 to 1998, David was General Manager, IBM Global Industries, responsible for sales and support of IBM’s top enterprise customers worldwide. Prior to 1996, David held progressively responsible executive positions at IBM, including General Manager, North America; General Manager, Asia Pacific; General Manager, AS/400 Division; President, National Distribution Division. He joined IBM in 1972 as a Marketing Representative.
NOT be restructuring CEO
ID 716
Robert H. Bohannon served as Chief Executive Officer of Viad Corp. (a payments and conventions and events services provider) from1997 to April 1, 2006 and served as its President from 1996 to April 1, 2006. Mr. Bohannon joined Viad Corp. in 1993, serving as President and Chief Executive Officer of Travelers Express Company, the payment services and money order subsidiary of Viad Corp., From 1993 to August 1996, when he was appointed President and Chief Operating Officer of Viad Corp. after its spin-off of The Dial Corporation, a consumer products company. He served as Chairman Emeritus at Viad Corp. He served as Chairman of the Board of Viad Corp. from April 1, 2006 to March 31, 2008. He served as Chairman of the Board of Viad Corp. since 1997. He served as Chairman of the Board and Director of Moneygram International Inc. until December 31, 2006. He served as Director of Viad Corp. since 1996. He served as a Director of Certegy Inc. from June 2001 to November 7, 2003.
EXECUCOMP doesn't record for some reasons.
ID 735
Travis Engen retired in March, 2006 after five years as President & CEO of Alcan. During his tenure, Alcan grew from $9 billion to $20 billion in revenues and created Novelis, an independent $8 billion revenue producer of rolled aluminum products. Mr. Engen served on the Board of Alcan as a Director from 1996 to 2006.
http://www.logistiikkayritykset.fi/businessforums/eu_china/en/liitteet/CV_Engen.pdf
CANNOT be restructuring CEO
ID 871
| 525 | 10-May-99 | Columbia/HCA Healthcare-Pac Gp | HCA HOLDINGS INC | 29-Jul-98 | 86923 | 22260 | Thomas F. Frist Jr. | 2.22 | 0 | . | . | . | . | 22.97 | 1998 |
| 525 | 10-May-99 | Columbia/HCA Healthcare-Pac Gp | HCA HOLDINGS INC | 29-Jul-98 | 86923 | 22260 | Thomas F. Frist Jr. | 2.22 | 0 | . | . | . | . | 30.36 | 1999 |
| 525 | 10-May-99 | Columbia/HCA Healthcare-Pac Gp | HCA HOLDINGS INC | 29-Jul-98 | 86923 | 22260 | Thomas F. Frist Jr. | 2.42 | 0 | . | . | . | . | 25.3 | 2000 |
In 1968, he co-founded the Hospital Corporation of America with his father, Thomas F. Frist, Sr., and Jack C. Massey.[3][4][5][7][8][11][12] In 1977, he became President of HCA and, in 1987, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer.[5][7] He served as Chairman of the Board in 1994, after the merger with Columbia, and after the merger with HealthTrust Inc. in April 1995, as Vice Chairman.[5][7] He returned as Chairman and CEO of the company in 1997.[5][7] He was Chairman and CEO until January 2001 and Chairman until January 2002.
CANNOT be restructuring CEO
ID 575
| 575 | 28-Jun-00 | Visteon Corp | FORD MOTOR CO | 14-Apr-00 | 88319 | 4839 | Jacques A. Nasser | 1500 | 6722 | . | . | . | . | 1932.27 | 1999 |
| 575 | 28-Jun-00 | Visteon Corp | FORD MOTOR CO | 14-Apr-00 | 88319 | 4839 | Jacques A. Nasser | 1625 | 7700 | . | . | . | . | 2820.11 | 2000 |
| 575 | 28-Jun-00 | Visteon Corp | FORD MOTOR CO | 14-Apr-00 | 88319 | 4839 | Jacques A. Nasser | 1750 | 0 | . | . | . | . | 3180.16 | 2001 |
Nasser had a long career at Ford Motor Company which he joined in 1968, rising to President and Chief Executive Officer where he served from 1998 to 2001.
Under Nasser's watch, Ford acquired Volvo Cars and Land Rover and placed them under the newly Premier Automotive Group in order to expand its market share in the luxury segment.
CANNOT be restructuring CEO
ID 601
| 601 | 1-Dec-00 | Fluor Corp | FLUOR CORP | 8-Jun-00 | 88853 | 4818 | Philip J. Carroll, Jr. | 252.69 | 360 | . | . | . | . | 816.33 | 1998 |
| 601 | 1-Dec-00 | Fluor Corp | FLUOR CORP | 8-Jun-00 | 88853 | 4818 | Philip J. Carroll, Jr. | 900 | 1000 | . | . | . | . | 1088.16 | 1999 |
| 601 | 1-Dec-00 | Fluor Corp | FLUOR CORP | 8-Jun-00 | 88853 | 4818 | Philip J. Carroll, Jr. | 1050 | 0 | . | . | . | . | 677.02 | 2000 |
| 601 | 1-Dec-00 | Fluor Corp | FLUOR CORP | 8-Jun-00 | 88853 | 4818 | Philip J. Carroll, Jr. | 1326.92 | 1747.4 | . | . | . | . | 1211.6 | 2001 |
Philip J. Carroll, Jr. (born 1937) is active in a variety of corporate and government roles. Carroll earned a Bachelor of science in Physics from Loyola University New Orleans in 1958 and a M.S. in physics from Tulane University in 1961, after which he joined the Shell Oil company as an engineer.
Carroll became the CEO of Shell Oil in 1993 and served in that position until July 1998, when he became the Chairman and CEO of Fluor Corporation, an engineering and construction services firm. He retired from Fluor in February 2002.
CANNOT be restructuring CEO
ID 618
618 2-Apr-01 Mirant Corp SOUTHERN CO 20-Feb-01 88601 9850 H. Allen Franklin 655.81 1014.7 . . . . 43.21 2000
618 2-Apr-01 Mirant Corp SOUTHERN CO 20-Feb-01 88601 9850 H. Allen Franklin 855.97 1867.32 . . . . 47.56 2001
618 2-Apr-01 Mirant Corp SOUTHERN CO 20-Feb-01 88601 9850 H. Allen Franklin 929.22 1984.32 . . . . 68.9 2002
618 2-Apr-01 Mirant Corp SOUTHERN CO 20-Feb-01 88601 9850 H. Allen Franklin 966.24 2083.16 . . . . 65.82 2003
In 2001 Southern spun off its global energy company, Mirant Corporation, which then acquired a majority stake of the wholesale gas-marketing business of TransCanada PipeLines. The move made Mirant the number-two gas marketer in North America and the top exporter to the United States. "Our strategy is to focus our efforts in the Southeast, the area we understand best, and stick to electric power, the business we know best," Franklin told Georgia Trend (January 2002).
Waiting for the right moment, Franklin seized the opportunity to quietly enter the natural gas retail market. That opportunity came during bankruptcy hearings for Georgia's New Power Company. After spinning off Mirant, Southern formed a new subsidiary, Southern Company Gas and, with bankruptcy court approval, acquired New Power's gas customers for $58 million. It, too, was a calculated smart move. When the gas market was opened to competition in Georgia in the mid-1990s, a great deal of confusion was generated over billing issues and customer service. Franklin sat back and watched, waiting for the initial shakeout to pass. With New Power's demise, Franklin decided the time was ripe, but he was quick to note that Southern's business was tied to power generation and long-term contracts, not to natural gas price volatility. This gave Southern long-term staying power in an otherwise uncertain market. Moreover, it allowed Southern to operate in a geographical and demographic area already served by the company.
In future years Franklin hoped to concentrate on the company's traditional, regulated business, with a goal to incrementally expand its area coverage beyond the Southeast. He also planned for Southern to sell additional energy-related products and services to its existing customers. The company also worked to maintain its reputation for top customer satisfaction.
Read more: http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/biography/F-L/Franklin-H-Allen-1944.html#ixzz3h7RfmcLa
ID 634
634 9-Aug-01 Thermo Fibertek Inc THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC 31-Jan-00 78077 10530 Richard Francis Syron, Ph.D. 514.67 370 . . . . 309.4 1999
634 9-Aug-01 Thermo Fibertek Inc THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC 31-Jan-00 78077 10530 Richard Francis Syron, Ph.D. 800 1120 . . . . 152.28 2000
634 9-Aug-01 Thermo Fibertek Inc THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC 31-Jan-00 78077 10530 Richard Francis Syron, Ph.D. 800 800 . . . . 38.94 2001
634 9-Aug-01 Thermo Fibertek Inc THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC 31-Jan-00 78077 10530 Richard Francis Syron, Ph.D. 800 741.6 . . . . 1902.59 2002
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=189925&ticker=TMO&previousCapId=&previousTitle=
CANNOT be restructuring CEO
ID 659
| 659 | 3-Jun-02 | Agere Systems Inc | LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC | 20-Jul-00 | 89400 | 62599 | Richard A. McGinn | 1100 | 0 | . | . | . | . | 173.17 | 2000 |
| 659 | 3-Jun-02 | Agere Systems Inc | LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC | 20-Jul-00 | 89400 | 62599 | Henry Brewer Schacht | 1008.33 | 0 | . | . | . | . | 199.91 | 2001 |
| 659 | 3-Jun-02 | Agere Systems Inc | LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC | 20-Jul-00 | 89400 | 62599 | Patricia F. Russo | 887.69 | 1800 | . | . | . | . | 583.2 | 2002 |
| 659 | 3-Jun-02 | Agere Systems Inc | LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC | 20-Jul-00 | 89400 | 62599 | Patricia F. Russo | 1200 | 3245.33 | . | . | . | . | 41.21 | 2003 |
He served as the Chairman of Lucent Technologies Inc., from 1996 to 1998 and again from October 2000 to February 2003 and also its Chief Executive Officer from 1996 to 1997 and again from October 2000 to January 2002. He served as the Chairman of Avaya Inc., from October 1, 2000 to October 23, 2000 and Alcatel-Lucent USA, Inc., from 1996 to February 2003.
NOT be restructuring CEO
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=611535&ticker=ALU
ID 660
| 660 | 28-Jun-02 | Westwood Holdings Group | SWS GROUP INC | 14-Dec-01 | 89443 | 24547 | David Glatstein | 464.02 | 800 | . | . | . | . | 14.4 | 1999 |
| 660 | 28-Jun-02 | Westwood Holdings Group | SWS GROUP INC | 14-Dec-01 | 89443 | 24547 | David Glatstein | 600 | 600 | . | . | . | . | 19.2 | 2000 |
| 660 | 28-Jun-02 | Westwood Holdings Group | SWS GROUP INC | 14-Dec-01 | 89443 | 24547 | David Glatstein | 600 | 0 | . | . | . | . | 15.3 | 2001 |
| 660 | 28-Jun-02 | Westwood Holdings Group | SWS GROUP INC | 14-Dec-01 | 89443 | 24547 | Don A. Buchholz | 252 | 0 | . | . | . | . | 0.75 | 2002 |
| 660 | 28-Jun-02 | Westwood Holdings Group | SWS GROUP INC | 14-Dec-01 | 89443 | 24547 | Donald W. Hultgren | 443.4 | 0 | . | . | . | . | 23 | 2003 |
| 660 | 28-Jun-02 | Westwood Holdings Group | SWS GROUP INC | 14-Dec-01 | 89443 | 24547 | Donald W. Hultgren | 450 | 0 | . | . | . | . | 21 | 2004 |
| 660 | 28-Jun-02 | Westwood Holdings Group | SWS GROUP INC | 14-Dec-01 | 89443 | 24547 | Donald W. Hultgren | 450 | 225 | . | . | . | . | 18.8 | 2005 |
SWS President and CEO David Glatstein Retires;
SWS Chairman Don A. Buchholz to Serve as CEO
Mr. Buchholz co-founded SWS Securities (formerly Southwest Securities) with the late Alan Cobb as a Dallas-based securities broker/dealer and New York Stock Exchange member firm in 1972.NOT be restructuring CEO
ID 673
| 673 | 30-Sep-02 | Reliant Resources Inc | CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC | 17-Oct-00 | 88992 | 5742 | R. Steve Letbetter | 762.08 | 1215.5 | . | . | . | . | 88.56 | 1999 |
| 673 | 30-Sep-02 | Reliant Resources Inc | CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC | 17-Oct-00 | 88992 | 5742 | R. Steve Letbetter | 913.75 | 2101.62 | . | . | . | . | 121.87 | 2000 |
| 673 | 30-Sep-02 | Reliant Resources Inc | CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC | 17-Oct-00 | 88992 | 5742 | R. Steve Letbetter | 983.75 | 1739.27 | . | . | . | . | 318.06 | 2001 |
| 673 | 30-Sep-02 | Reliant Resources Inc | CENTERPOINT ENERGY INC | 17-Oct-00 | 88992 | 5742 | R. Steve Letbetter | 708.33 | 0 | . | . | . | . | 207.11 | 2002 |
capabilities in his 25 years of service with the company," said Jordan.
"Steve has been the primary architect of our strategic plans, and his efforts
have significantly contributed to the dramatic expansion our company has
enjoyed in recent years. I have total confidence that Steve's experience and
leadership will ensure Reliant Energy's future success as the energy services
business moves into a deregulated and increasingly competitive environment."
Jordan's tenure as chief executive officer is one of the longest among
CEO's in the energy industry. He was initially elected chief executive
officer of Houston Lighting & Power Company (then Reliant Energy's principal
operating unit) in 1977.
Inside promotion
NOT be restructuring CEO
ID 680
| 7-Feb-03 | Cognizant Tech Solutions Corp | IMS HEALTH HOLDINGS INC | 14-Nov-02 | 86158 | 63800 | David M Thomas | 750 | 750 | . | . | . | . | 304.7 | 2001 |
| 7-Feb-03 | Cognizant Tech Solutions Corp | IMS HEALTH HOLDINGS INC | 14-Nov-02 | 86158 | 63800 | David M Thomas | 750 | 562.5 | . | . | . | . | 269.63 | 2002 |
| 7-Feb-03 | Cognizant Tech Solutions Corp | IMS HEALTH HOLDINGS INC | 14-Nov-02 | 86158 | 63800 | David M Thomas | 787.5 | 984.38 | . | . | . | . | 172.77 | 2003 |
| 7-Feb-03 | Cognizant Tech Solutions Corp | IMS HEALTH HOLDINGS INC | 14-Nov-02 | 86158 | 63800 | David M Thomas | 837.5 | 1052.87 | . | . | . | . | 206.8 | 2004 |
David M. Thomas
David is the former Chairman and CEO of IMS Health, the global leader in information and consulting solutions for the pharmaceutical and healthcare industries. He served as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the company from November 2000 to January 2005. He was Executive Chairman from January 2005 through March 2006.
Before joining IMS, David was Senior Vice President and Group Executive at IBM, responsible for its global Personal Systems Group, and served as a member of IBM’s Corporate Executive Committee, overseeing all of IBM’s worldwide business operations. From 1996 to 1998, David was General Manager, IBM Global Industries, responsible for sales and support of IBM’s top enterprise customers worldwide. Prior to 1996, David held progressively responsible executive positions at IBM, including General Manager, North America; General Manager, Asia Pacific; General Manager, AS/400 Division; President, National Distribution Division. He joined IBM in 1972 as a Marketing Representative.
NOT be restructuring CEO
ID 716
| 716 | 1-Jul-04 | Travelers Express Co Inc | VIAD CORP | 24-Jul-03 | 90213 | 160785 | Robert H. Bohannon | 900 | 939.6 | . | . | . | . | 34.76 | 2003 |
| 716 | 1-Jul-04 | Travelers Express Co Inc | VIAD CORP | 24-Jul-03 | 90213 | 160785 | Robert H. Bohannon | 750 | 1004.4 | . | . | . | . | 37.33 | 2004 |
Robert H. Bohannon served as Chief Executive Officer of Viad Corp. (a payments and conventions and events services provider) from1997 to April 1, 2006 and served as its President from 1996 to April 1, 2006. Mr. Bohannon joined Viad Corp. in 1993, serving as President and Chief Executive Officer of Travelers Express Company, the payment services and money order subsidiary of Viad Corp., From 1993 to August 1996, when he was appointed President and Chief Operating Officer of Viad Corp. after its spin-off of The Dial Corporation, a consumer products company. He served as Chairman Emeritus at Viad Corp. He served as Chairman of the Board of Viad Corp. from April 1, 2006 to March 31, 2008. He served as Chairman of the Board of Viad Corp. since 1997. He served as Chairman of the Board and Director of Moneygram International Inc. until December 31, 2006. He served as Director of Viad Corp. since 1996. He served as a Director of Certegy Inc. from June 2001 to November 7, 2003.
EXECUCOMP doesn't record for some reasons.
ID 735
| 735 | 19-Jan-05 | Novelis Inc | ALCAN INC | 18-May-04 | 90528 | 1243 | Travis Engen | 968.18 | 1200 | . | . | . | . | 76.56 | 2001 |
| 735 | 19-Jan-05 | Novelis Inc | ALCAN INC | 18-May-04 | 90528 | 1243 | Travis Engen | 1225 | 1605 | . | . | . | . | 69.81 | 2002 |
| 735 | 19-Jan-05 | Novelis Inc | ALCAN INC | 18-May-04 | 90528 | 1243 | Travis Engen | 1350 | 2031.75 | . | . | . | . | 500.1 | 2004 |
| 735 | 19-Jan-05 | Novelis Inc | ALCAN INC | 18-May-04 | 90528 | 1243 | Travis Engen | 1500 | 3500 | . | . | . | . | -861.89 | 2005 |
| 735 | 19-Jan-05 | Novelis Inc | ALCAN INC | 18-May-04 | 90528 | 1243 | Richard B. Evans | 1037.26 | 1611.54 | . | . | . | . | 1130.38 | 2006 |
Travis Engen retired in March, 2006 after five years as President & CEO of Alcan. During his tenure, Alcan grew from $9 billion to $20 billion in revenues and created Novelis, an independent $8 billion revenue producer of rolled aluminum products. Mr. Engen served on the Board of Alcan as a Director from 1996 to 2006.
http://www.logistiikkayritykset.fi/businessforums/eu_china/en/liitteet/CV_Engen.pdf
CANNOT be restructuring CEO
ID 871
| 871 | 1-Jun-08 | Ascent Media Group Inc | DISCOVERY COMMUNICATIONS INC | 13-Dec-07 | 92777 | 164296 | John C. Malone, Ph.D. | 0.39 | 0 | 0 | 278.9 | 0 | 0 | 150 | 2007 |
| 871 | 1-Jun-08 | Ascent Media Group Inc | DISCOVERY COMMUNICATIONS INC | 13-Dec-07 | 92777 | 164296 | David Zaslav | 2000 | 3500 | 0 | 2071.46 | 0 | 0 | 298.87 | 2008 |
| 871 | 1-Jun-08 | Ascent Media Group Inc | DISCOVERY COMMUNICATIONS INC | 13-Dec-07 | 92777 | 164296 | David Zaslav | 2000 | 0 | 0 | 5483.46 | 3900 | 0 | 272.39 | 2009 |
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