Thursday, September 18, 2014
我的10th PPT
What I am trying to do in my research is to investigate why managers make management forecasts.
Management forecast is one important form of voluntary disclosure. The percentage of publicly traded companies providing annual guidance increased from 61% to 82% (Hirst et al., 2008)
Apparently, I am not the first person to ask and try to answer this question. There are a long list of literatures to show the real effects of management forecasts on firms' stock performance. Due to the limited space on my PPT, and more important, I do not want to hold everybody here through the whole weekend, I only list a few papers here.
Firms with higher information asymmetry release management forecasts to reduce information asymmetry. Management forecasts help firms to raise outside equity due to a better information environment. Increased frequency of management forecasts also increase liquidity, decrease cost of capital, reduce litigation costs, and attract more analysts following. Furthermore, managers have strong incentives to avoid equity mispricing especially when the mispricing could adversely affect their wealth. For example, they want to sell a portion of stocks but the stock price is undervalued.
All of these papers, even the summary paper from JAE, consider management forecast is voluntary disclosure. No wonder all these papers cite all the modelling and empirical papers about all the other kinds of voluntary disclosure in their literature reviews paragraph. However, management forecast is not equal to voluntary disclosure. Whether management forecasts can stand for overall voluntary disclosure is also questionable.
(1) Management forecasts do not provide information other than earnings guidance. Give a simple example. Apple Inc. would like to give investors its earnings forecasts for the next period, but the company will not give when it will launch Iphone 7 or whether they are going to produce an iCar as a new profit source.
Therefore, management forecast can only lower the information asymmetry related to the future earnings, only the number of earnings, but not other part of the firm.
(2) My calculation of correlation between management forecasts and one measure of voluntary disclosure is almost zero.
I look at a situation where information environment changes due to external reason. Specifically, I look at the spinoff event. Spinoff is a special restructuring event. The parent firm spin offs its subsidiary and create a new separate, independent, and public firm. Previously, there is only one public firm and one copy of financial statement. Now there are two public firms. Each has a separate financial statement. Therefore, by definition, information asymmetry about the earnings is lowered.
Endogenous problem? I think the problem is not very severe here. Compare spinoff decision and disclosure decision. Spinoff is much larger strategy decision and takes a lot of time, effort from the firm while disclosure is much smaller cost. I do not think that firms that intend to reduce management forecasts will intentionally choose spinoffs.
Usually, firms reduce management forecasts because they get through long term bad performance, they cannot meet analysts forecasts, and etc. Therefore, spinoff is a good event to test whether management forecasts behavior changes according to the change of information asymmetry.
Some CEOs mention their spinoff incentives in the media or the SEC filings. For example, AT&T says ...
Liberty say...
However, spinoff could also increase information asymmetry. Before the spinoff, parent is a large, diversified firm. It is easier for managers to smooth the earnings and firms less volatile earnings are more likely to give more forecasts. Now the firm size is smaller and segment number decreases, if CEOs still want to manipulate earnings, it could be harder for him.
But we do not know which hypothesis could dominate the other. Most literatures show that information asymmetry reduces after spinoffs except one paper shows the opposite. First two papers use analyst forecasts precision as the proxy of information asymmetry and choose the time period in -1 and +1. The last paper regresses the daily stock return on market stock return, and uses the standard deviation of error as the firms' specific information. Additionally, they choose a very short term before and after spinoff and find information asymmetry is increasing. The whole process is not convincable to me.
Wednesday, September 17, 2014
力力问,公司复杂程度与management forecasts的关系
Firm diversification and asymmetric information: evidence from analysts' forecasts and earnings announcements
Shawn Thomas
2002, JFE
Abstract
Managers frequently cite the desire to mitigate asymmetric information as a motivation for increasing firm focus. The information benefits of focus appear relevant for the subset of firms that actually increase their focus; however, the relevance of focus-related information benefits for the population of diversified firms is an open question. This paper examines the relation between corporate diversification and asymmetric information proxies derived from analysts’ forecasts and abnormal returns associated with earnings announcements. I find that greater diversification is not associated with increased asymmetric information. These results call into question the notion that corporate diversification strictly exacerbates information problems.
Thomas发现diversification程度和information asymmetry没什么关系。
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International Diversification and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy and Bias
Augustine Duru and David M. Reeb
2002, TAR
Abstract
We investigate the association between corporate international diversification and the accuracy and bias of consensus analysts' earnings forecasts. We find that greater corporate international diversification is associated with less accurate and more optimistic forecasts. Our results suggest that international diversification reflects unique dimensions of forecasting difficulty that are not captured in previously identified determinants. This evidence suggests that as firms become more geographically diversified, forecasting their earnings becomes more complex.
Duru and Reeb发现,公司全球化越diversified,forecasts越困难。(对于financial analysts来说)
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WHY MANAGERS EXPLAIN EARNINGS FORECASTS
Baginski, Hassell, Kimbrough (2004, JAR)
解释earnings forecasts的一些理由
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Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives
Nagar et al. (2003, JAE)
# of segments和# management forecasts的correlation是-0.06,虽然显著,但是economics上几乎为零。
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力力问,Fog Index还有the number of numbers有没有办法编程?
晨晨问了吴凯。
Python
Topic Modeling
Maybe广宇。
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Tuesday, September 2, 2014
Sletten (2011, RAS)
The effect of stock price on discretionary disclosure
文章研究的是,在一个exogenous引起的股价下跌后,公司是否会发布一个消息。这消息,在股价下跌之前,肯定是坏消息无疑;但是股价下跌后,比起跌幅,这个消息反而不算太坏,甚至可以算好消息了。(原话是:previously considered bad (based on previous stock price) and withheld from investors, is now considered good (relative to revised stock price) and is thus disclosed.)
Sletten确实发现了, 股价下跌之后,公司发布好消息。
有些关于disclosure的common sense,Sletten甚至都不再引用作者了。
(1) size, analyst following, return on assets, and litigation risk are higher for firms issuing forecasts.各种表现好的时候,disclosure的可能性更大。
(2) managers are more likely to issue forecasts when investors' expectations are optimistic。未来预期如果好,disclosure的可能性更大。
(3) Forecasting firms come from more concentrated industries, possibly because of propriety costs. 集中度更高的行业,更多disclosure.(我觉得propriety costs好像不是很好的解释,在这里。)
(4) they are more likely to issue forecasts in the previous quarter and in the period between last quarter's earnings announcement and the peer firm's restatement announcement, which is consistent with some of the firms being "frequent guiders", as suggested by Bhojraj et al. (2011).
(5) firms with more days remaining before the end of the announcement quarter are also more likely issue forecasts, as are firms tat restate their own financial statements within the following 90 days.
文章研究的是,在一个exogenous引起的股价下跌后,公司是否会发布一个消息。这消息,在股价下跌之前,肯定是坏消息无疑;但是股价下跌后,比起跌幅,这个消息反而不算太坏,甚至可以算好消息了。(原话是:previously considered bad (based on previous stock price) and withheld from investors, is now considered good (relative to revised stock price) and is thus disclosed.)
Sletten确实发现了, 股价下跌之后,公司发布好消息。
有些关于disclosure的common sense,Sletten甚至都不再引用作者了。
(1) size, analyst following, return on assets, and litigation risk are higher for firms issuing forecasts.各种表现好的时候,disclosure的可能性更大。
(2) managers are more likely to issue forecasts when investors' expectations are optimistic。未来预期如果好,disclosure的可能性更大。
(3) Forecasting firms come from more concentrated industries, possibly because of propriety costs. 集中度更高的行业,更多disclosure.(我觉得propriety costs好像不是很好的解释,在这里。)
(4) they are more likely to issue forecasts in the previous quarter and in the period between last quarter's earnings announcement and the peer firm's restatement announcement, which is consistent with some of the firms being "frequent guiders", as suggested by Bhojraj et al. (2011).
(5) firms with more days remaining before the end of the announcement quarter are also more likely issue forecasts, as are firms tat restate their own financial statements within the following 90 days.
Bova, Dou, Hope (2014, CAR)
Employee Ownership and Firm Disclosure
两个发现:
(1) employee如果有强大bargaining power, 通常公司会less disclosure.(e.g. unions工会)
(2) 但是employee ownership如果增加,这种Information asymmetry就会降低。因为这时候他们的利益越来越像股东,而不是索取超额的工资。同时,股东也为此获益了,disclosure增加了。
Voluntary Disclosure Proxies
(1) management guidance
(2) conference calls - # of conference calls
(3) annual report readability - Fog index
(4) aggregate disclosure measure
两个发现:
(1) employee如果有强大bargaining power, 通常公司会less disclosure.(e.g. unions工会)
(2) 但是employee ownership如果增加,这种Information asymmetry就会降低。因为这时候他们的利益越来越像股东,而不是索取超额的工资。同时,股东也为此获益了,disclosure增加了。
Voluntary Disclosure Proxies
(1) management guidance
- # of management forecasts issued
- the quality of management forecasts (Francis, Nanda, and Olsson, 2008) (e.g. point, range, open-ended?)
(2) conference calls - # of conference calls
(3) annual report readability - Fog index
(4) aggregate disclosure measure
PPT One Page
Why
do firms voluntarily disclose?
(1) Firms may decrease disclosures after
spin offs.
- Spinoffs decrease information asymmetry (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999), while private information is less valuable in a low information asymmetry environment (Frankel and Li, 2004).
(2) Firms may increase disclosures after
spin offs.
- Focus-increasing spinoffs have positive announcement returns (average 3.3%), long-run abnormal returns, and improvements in operating performance (Desai and Jain, 1999). Firms may increase disclosure when they perform well (Healy and Palepu, 2001).
(3) Firms may not change disclosures
after spin offs.
- Disclosure policies are usually sticky (Skinner, 2003).
(4) Other factors may dominate.
- Managers’ disclosure style may dominate other factors (Bamber et al., 2010).
- Industry membership may exert an influence on voluntary disclosure (Meek, 1995).
M's comments: The research question does not even include the word "spin offs". Why do you put them in arguments?
Write again!
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笔记:
关于friction和incentives
Gigler (1994. JAR)
Previous disclosure models assume that firms have incentives to disclose all private information in the absence of proprietary costs. In those models proprietary costs are the friction that prevents full disclosure. In contrast, my model assumes a manager wants to overstate profitability to the capital market in the absence of verification. But, since voluntary disclosures are unaudited and firms can lie, credibility becomes an issue.
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Incentives of Voluntary Disclosure
关于friction和incentives
Gigler (1994. JAR)
Previous disclosure models assume that firms have incentives to disclose all private information in the absence of proprietary costs. In those models proprietary costs are the friction that prevents full disclosure. In contrast, my model assumes a manager wants to overstate profitability to the capital market in the absence of verification. But, since voluntary disclosures are unaudited and firms can lie, credibility becomes an issue.
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Incentives of Voluntary Disclosure
Information asymmetry reduction
(1) Capital markets transactions hypothesis
Theory: Healy and Palepu (1993, 1995) hypothesize that investors’ perceptions of a firm are important to corporate managers expecting to issue public debt or equity or to acquire another company in a stock transaction.
Empirical papers: Lang and Lundholm (1993) document that analysts’ ratings of disclosures are higher for firms issuing securities in the current or future periods. Healy et al. (1999) find that firms with increased analyst ratings of disclosures have an abnormally high frequency of subsequent public debt offers. Ruland etal.(1990) and Marquardt andWiedman (1998) document that the number of management earnings forecasts increases significantly around equity offerings.
Mixed evidence on the other side.
(2) Stock-based Compensation and corporate control contest
(It's hard to say when managers intentionally release some particular good or bad news, though real, whether such disclosure is related to an increase or decrease of stock price through the increase or decrease of information asymmetry.) (Disclosure对股价有影响,是很明显的,但很难说是通过information asymmetry的改变,而导致最终对股价的影响吧?使得股价背离真实价格,无论高估或低估,都是增加information asymmetry的表现吧?)
Managers sell more shares after good-news than after bad-news releases, and buy more after bad-news than after good-news releases (Noe, 1999). Further, in periods when insiders buy more shares, there are more bad-news forecasts (which lower the purchase price) (Cheng and Lo, 2006).
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) show that firms delay disclosure of good news and accelerate the release of bad news prior to stock option award periods, consistent with manager s making disclosure decisions to increase stock-based compensation. Miller and Piotroski (2000) find that managers of firms in turnaround situations are more likely to provide earnings forecasts if they have higher stock option compensation at risk.
Nagar et al. (2003) find that both management earnings forecast frequency and the quality of firms’ disclosures, as measured by analysts’ subjective ratings of firms’ disclosure practices, are higher when the CEO’s compensation and wealth are more sensitive to stock price changes.
They argue that equity-based incentives encourage not only good-news but also bad-news disclosures.
(3) Litigation costs
Skinner (1994, 1997) finds that firms with bad earnings news are more than twice as likely to pre-disclose the poor earnings performance than are firms with good news. In addition, firms with negative earnings news are more likely to be subject to litigation.
Field etal.(2005) find no evidence that disclosure triggers litigation. Their findings suggest, however, that disclosure deters certain types of litigation.
Managers talent signaling
Healy and Palepu (2001); Trueman (1986)
Trueman (1986) argues that talented managers have an incentive to make voluntary earnings forecasts to reveal their type. A firm’s market value is a function of investors’ perceptions of its managers’ ability to anticipate and respond to future changes in the firm’s economic environment. The earlier that investors infer that the manager has received information, the more favorable will be their assessment of the manager’s ability to anticipate future changes and the higher will be the firm’s market value. To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence to either support or refute this hypothesis.
Information asymmetry addition
(1) Capital markets transactions hypothesis
Lang and Lundholm (1997) analyze disclosures specifically for firms that make equity offerings and find that there is a significant increase in disclosure beginning six months before the offering, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms have the most discretion.
Modeling papers: Barry and Brown (1985, 1986) ; Diamond and Verrecchia (1991); Easley and O’Hara (2004); Glosten and Milgrom (1985); Healy and Palepu (1993, 1995); Kim and Verrecchia (1994); Merton (1987)
Empirical papers: Amihud and Mendelson (1986); Welker (1995); Botosan and Harris (2000); Lang and Lundholm (1993); Healy et al. (1999); Leuz and Verrecchia (2000)
(2) Stock-based Compensation and corporate control contest
更像是这一头的
Oligopoly, disclosure, and earnings management
M Bagnoli, SG Watts - The Accounting Review, 2010
Cournot competitors bias their reports to create the impression that their costs are lower than they actually are. On the association between voluntary disclosure and earnings management
R Kasznik - Journal of accounting research, 1999
managers manage reported earnings toward their forecasts
Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison
C Leuz, D Nanda, PD Wysocki - Journal of financial economics, 2003
earnings management is more pervasive in countries characterized by less developed stock markets, more concentrated ownership and lower disclosure levels. The latter correlation suggests that firms engaging in earnings management also provide fewer disclosures. This finding questions the use of disclosure indices as exogenous variables in prior research
Incentives of Non-Disclosure
(3) Litigation costs
Francis et al. (1994) find that 62% of the firms in their litigation
sample were sued over earnings forecasts or pre-emptive earnings disclosures.
In contrast, 87% of their sample of no-litigation firms with comparable stock
price declines pre-announced an earnings decline. They concluded that predisclosure
does not appear to be a deterrent to litigation.
Baginski etal.(2002) find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts, both bad and good news, in the less litigious Canadian financial reporting environment.
Incentives of Disclosure Decrease (through information asymmetry addition)
(3) Litigation costs
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) find that firms reduce disclosures subsequent to class-action lawsuits. Their findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the litigation process decreases managers’ incentives to disclose, despite the increased protections afforded by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. However, Lowry (2009) points out that the
evidence in Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) is based on a sample of firms that were actually sued; as such, the results cannot be generalized to the larger population of firms who were not sued.
反驳文章的意思是,其他那些没被sue的公司,也许正是因为提高了disclosure,所以无需被告呢。
Monday, September 1, 2014
Marquardt (1998, CAR)
Voluntary Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, and Insider Selling through Secondary Equity Offerings
这篇文章研究的是SEO前的information asymmetry以及management forecasts.
SEO前的9个月,disclosure frequency和insider trading成正比。
也发现了management participation和两个information asymmetry的proxies负相关。
2 proxies:
(1) analyst forecast accuracy
(2) the timing of the equity offering registration
Korajczyk et al. (1991) argue that information asymmetry is at its lowest level at the time of an earnings release, when relevant information has been made public to all market participants. They use the number of days elapsed since the last earnings announcement as a measure of the degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors.
这篇文章研究的是SEO前的information asymmetry以及management forecasts.
SEO前的9个月,disclosure frequency和insider trading成正比。
也发现了management participation和两个information asymmetry的proxies负相关。
2 proxies:
(1) analyst forecast accuracy
(2) the timing of the equity offering registration
Korajczyk et al. (1991) argue that information asymmetry is at its lowest level at the time of an earnings release, when relevant information has been made public to all market participants. They use the number of days elapsed since the last earnings announcement as a measure of the degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors.
随想
主要
1. Analyst coverage的增加,或者准确率提高导致的information asymmetry reduction,是不是也算另外一种,不是由disclosure increase引起的information asymmetry reduction。公司怎么回应呢?也会降低disclosure吗?好像不合理。
2. Why will firms increase disclosure after spin offs?
(1) Spin off 通常是增加公司价值的,(analyst 会上调预期),Healy and Palepu (2001, JAE)说firms with the highest disclosure ratings tend to also show the highest contemporaneous earnings performance (see Lang and Lundholm, 1993). This may be caused by a self-selection bias -- firms may increase disclosure when they are performing well.
是Endogeneity的问题!
(2) CEO style
(3) Industry form
反方:
"However, most disclosure types (fair business practice, human resources, products, other disclosures) do not appear to be significantly affected by industry category."
Abstract - "Corporate size and industry category are found to correlate with certain types of disclosures while the existence of a corporate social responsibility committee appears to correlate with one particular type of disclosure."
正方:
3. Why will firms decrease disclosure after spin offs?
(1) incentives are weakened.
4. Information asymmetry and information value
Frankel and Li (2004, JAE)
"(2) the frequency of insider trades. Measuring the frequency of insider trading is important for another reason. If insiders incur a fixed cost when executing a trade, then they will not trade unless the expected profits of the trade exceed this cost. If this cost is cross-sectionally constant, then we should see fewer trades when insiders’private information is less valuable (e.g. situations of low information asymmetry).8 Thus trading frequency can serve as an important measure of information asymmetry."
5. factor analysis
可不可以用factor analysis来测量一下现今的latent variable,到底哪些measurement比较靠谱?能想到的除了有information asymmetry,还有accrual quality, earnings quality等等。
6. spin off和information asymmetry
Huson and MacKinnon (2003, JCF)
Why spin off increases information asymmetry?
(1) 对于informed investor,现在的信息价值少了,所以他们的交易也少了,因此information asymmetry 反而降低。
(2) 反而增加了informed investors和uninformed investors的disparity,因为informed investors可以结合better public information和自己的private information来得到更好的信息。
1. Analyst coverage的增加,或者准确率提高导致的information asymmetry reduction,是不是也算另外一种,不是由disclosure increase引起的information asymmetry reduction。公司怎么回应呢?也会降低disclosure吗?好像不合理。
2. Why will firms increase disclosure after spin offs?
(1) Spin off 通常是增加公司价值的,(analyst 会上调预期),Healy and Palepu (2001, JAE)说firms with the highest disclosure ratings tend to also show the highest contemporaneous earnings performance (see Lang and Lundholm, 1993). This may be caused by a self-selection bias -- firms may increase disclosure when they are performing well.
是Endogeneity的问题!
(2) CEO style
What's my style? The influence of top managers on voluntary corporate financial disclosure
LS Bamber, J Jiang, IY Wang - The Accounting Review, 2010
(3) Industry form
反方:
The impact of corporate characteristics on social responsibility disclosure: a typology and frequency-based analysis
SS Cowen, LB Ferreri, LD Parker - Accounting, Organizations and society, 1987
Abstract - "Corporate size and industry category are found to correlate with certain types of disclosures while the existence of a corporate social responsibility committee appears to correlate with one particular type of disclosure."
正方:
Factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by US, UK and continental European multinational corporations
GK Meek, CB Roberts, SJ Gray - Journal of international business studies, 1995
"Therefore, industry membership may exert an influence on voluntary disclosure."3. Why will firms decrease disclosure after spin offs?
(1) incentives are weakened.
4. Information asymmetry and information value
Frankel and Li (2004, JAE)
"(2) the frequency of insider trades. Measuring the frequency of insider trading is important for another reason. If insiders incur a fixed cost when executing a trade, then they will not trade unless the expected profits of the trade exceed this cost. If this cost is cross-sectionally constant, then we should see fewer trades when insiders’private information is less valuable (e.g. situations of low information asymmetry).8 Thus trading frequency can serve as an important measure of information asymmetry."
5. factor analysis
可不可以用factor analysis来测量一下现今的latent variable,到底哪些measurement比较靠谱?能想到的除了有information asymmetry,还有accrual quality, earnings quality等等。
6. spin off和information asymmetry
Huson and MacKinnon (2003, JCF)
Why spin off increases information asymmetry?
(1) 对于informed investor,现在的信息价值少了,所以他们的交易也少了,因此information asymmetry 反而降低。
(2) 反而增加了informed investors和uninformed investors的disparity,因为informed investors可以结合better public information和自己的private information来得到更好的信息。
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