Friday, October 24, 2014

Ch 17 Executive Compensation and Incentives

Jensen and Murphy (1990)对于管理层激励的研究,影响深远。

P499

1. Introduction

管理层工资高于一线员工300倍,是因为寻租(rent extraction).

2. Trends and Components in executive compensation 趋势和构成

2.1 Short-term components

salary, bonus, and other annual compensation

quite small fraction of total incentives

测量公司绩效的常见工具:
ROE, ROA, ROI,EVA

还有比如plant quality ("zero-defects"),市场份额,等等。

2.2 Long-term components

new grants of restricted stock, new grants of stock options, long-term incentive plan payouts, and all other components

其他包括:

× gross-ups for tax liabilities (公司给的额外的税的优惠。比如给个价值$3000的搬家费,说的是税前)

Tax gross-ups are often used as a way to compensate employees in advance for tax liabilities. For example, if an employee is promised $3,000 for moving expenses with a gross-up of one-third of that amount added, the payment is $4,000. The extra $1,000 covers most of the tax liability that needs to be paid on the $3,000 payment; once that $1,000 is deducted from the $4,000 payment, the employee has $3,000 in actual funds for moving expenses. In that case, the recipient is compensated in advance for future taxes — the gross-up is a benefit.

http://smallbusiness.chron.com/tax-grossup-definition-30980.html

× perquisites 额外补贴,临时津贴

× preferential discounts on stock purchases

× contributions to benefit plans

× severance payments 分手费

以上这些"其他项目",通常被认为,不那么重要。relatively unimportant.

Yermack (2006) CEO买了corporate jet是寻租的表现。

Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2007) 捐款也是寻租的表征。

有些公司,比如GE的Jack  Welch的退休金相当显著。

Benchuk and Fried (2004)管retirement benefits叫做"stealth" compensation.

2.2.1 Restricted stock

通常5年

第一,CEO通常因为restricted stock,所以想长期服务于公司。

第二,在vesting period内,CEO不能卖股票,所以公司业绩与他的股票价值挂钩。



1990s 后,restricted stocks的使用减少。2000 stock market decline后,使用又增加。

2.2.2 Stock options

典型的option年限是10年。但是大都被提早行权。

一般条款说,每年25%被允许行权(还有25%一旦授予,就可以行权。)所以,通常需要3年时间,可以充分解套。之后有7年时间,可以hold直到maturity(过期)。

nonqualified options,大多数公司都在用这种options,因为CEO会支付option给的价格,与行权价格差之间的税。对于公司来说,这种方式省钱。

以前会计是不计入options在报表上的,所以Murphy (2002)谈到,公司都觉得这是一种低成本的奖励机制,因为deferred costs都不在报表内啊!

两种估算方式:

第一,把股票增幅设定在5%-10%

第二,用Black Scholes

Yermack (1997),管理层在好消息发放前,拿到options。在坏消息发放前,行权。(这个有悖于常理哇???!!!)

Lie (2005), Heron and Lie (2007) ,公司发放option的时间都很可疑,都是股价最低的时候。

2.2.3 Long-term incentive plans

IBM几大高管的长期incentive plans也挺多。

2.3 Aggregate measure of compensation

    Total annual compensation of the executives

+ Annual change in wealth for the executive based on changes in firm value
= 
Aggregate measure of compensation for incentive purposes 

Annual change in wealth for the executive based on changes in firm value包括这一年里股票,以及option的价值变化。

2.4.1 Total annual compensation

1999年Top 20的CEO工资,离散度也很大。

排名第一,Global Crossing, Ltd. 的Robert赚走了193 million。

排名20, Yahoo的Timothy,赚了44.6 million.

就工资,将近而言,CEO和普通工人的差距,在45倍左右,还没有business week讲的那么夸张。

2.4.2 Holdings of stock and options

mean和median差距很大,因为outliers的存在。


3. What determines incentives (什么决定了incentives,主要从agency的角度)

3.1 Pay-performance sensitivities (PPS)

Murphy (1999)有两种计算办法

第一,regress annual compensation on firm performance (dollar change in firm market value or percentage change)

历史数据有$3.25 (Jensen and Murphy, 1990)
$5.29 (Hall and Liebman, 1998)
for every $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth

Aggarwal and Samwick说,这种办法没有把risk考虑进去。所以用了如下方法。

第二,an executive's holdings of stock as a fraction of the total equity outstanding

管理层在总股本中占有的股票数量

share option另有一种算法(P508),option delta什么的。

平均explicit PPS是3.99%。

股价的增高也会增加PPS,因为option的价值更高了呀!

3.2 How should incentives be set?

谈到了Agency problem, Jensen and Mecking (1976)

Jensen (1986)调查了overinvestment.说在石油不景气的那些年,公司最佳的办法应该是把现金分给股东,而不是继续投资。

Aggarwal and Samwick (1999)发现股价的variance可以解释variation in incentives across CEOs. 两者负相关。

3.3 Executive discretion

Prendergast (2002) 说contracting environment对incentives有影响。

第一,不确定性越大,incentives越大。(但是以往的paper都不支持这种说法)

第二,不确定性越大,分权越多。(Nagar, 2002观察到banking中确实有类似的现象。)

3.4 Firm size

high compensation in dollar values and lower ownership in the firms

3.5 Accounting returns

是不是accounting-based outcome比market-return based outcome更能代表CEO的action呢?因为CEO不可控力之外的东西(比如股灾),不应该让CEO来受到惩罚。(P515)

3.6 Ability

Milbourn (2003)讲到,CEO ability是incentives的一个重要决定因素。

能力高的,不易被炒,股价更Informative,所以PPS也高。

反之,能力低的,容易被炒,股价不informative,所以PPS低。

Frydman (2005)发现,随着时间发展,general skills比specific skills对于CEO在Labor market中更重要。

Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2007) 发现,CAR(top管理层离职当天的return),和在他任期内公司的return负相关。

3.7 Incentives within firms

Oyer(2004) broad-based incentive pay can be optimal if an employee's future outside opportunities are positively correlated with firm performance.

Q: broad-based incentive pay什么意思?

Inderst and Mueller (2006)说broad-based incentive pay可以保护CEO,万一公司调整策略什么的,所以不需要他了。


Idea: 实施spin off的CEO中,是不是golden parachute或者broad-based incentive pay都比较高呢?

Oyer and Schaefer (2004)提到了公司给broad-based stock option plan的三个原因,
第一,incentive provision
第二,吸引外头的人才
第三,留住现有的人才

小公司用这招比较多。

Cichello, Fee, Hadlock, and Sonti (2006)研究的是部门级经理。部门绩效好,turnover就少,跟公司整体绩效,或者公司其他部门绩效没什么大关系。turnover只和同行业的其他类似部门绩效,相关。

又有一篇老文章,Lazear and Rosen 1981,讲的是tournament incentives.




4. the general absence of the use of relative performance evaluation when compensating and providing incentives to top managers(评估时,缺了什么?)

5. what managerial actions incentives should or do influence the associated impact on firm value (哪些行为反过来影响股价)

6. alternatives to the agency view (skimming or rent extraction view),skimming在这里什么意思?




Wednesday, September 24, 2014

Data Modification (38) - 漏网之鱼



1982/11/30 Key Electro Sonic(Applied Mag)

没找到!CRSP or Google



2005/6/6 RedShift Sys Corp



http://www.vision-systems.com/articles/2006/01/redshift-secures-12-million-first-round-funding.html

但是母公司从Edgar,到CRSP都找不到。

2007/3/1 Secure Network Inc




http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1024920/000000000008005520/filename1.pdf



2007/4/27 Global Visions Inc


http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=18231408



http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Esprit+Financial+Group+Inc.+(Esprit)+(EFGO.PK)+Announces+Completion...-a0162092212



http://www.otcbb.com/asp/dailylist_search.asp?DirectSymbol=CHNW&OTCBB=True


2008/2/19 Mobile Anesthesiologists-Procu


http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20080219006006/en/Mobile-Anesthesiologists-Announces-Spin-Off-Procurement-Operation-Serve#.VCMWH_ldUUM

2003/12/19 iNetXperts-Software Dvlp Bus


http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20031219005432/en/iNetXperts-Corporation-Completes-Spin-CyberTalkOnline-LLC#.VCMZ8vldUUM


1998/6/5 Great Xpectations Marketing



http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/EFX_dll/EDGARpro.dll?FetchFilingHtmlSection1?SectionID=213610-92964-110163&SessionID=QCsnFHPq9TDJm27


2003/9/10 Electronics For Imaging-eBeam



http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20030702005636/en/EFI-Spins-eBeam-Electronic-Whiteboard-Business-Investment#.VCxbe_ldUUM

GP Strategies Corp-Cert Asts



http://www.getfilings.com/o0000070415-04-000020.html

2004/11/12 GameStop Corp



http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20041004005536/en/Barnes-Noble-Announces-Sale-Shares-GameStop-Board#.VDvf9_ldUUM

2005/2/1 First Bank of Delaware




http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/834285/000095015904000937/exhibit99.txt

Hunstman-Chem & Polymer Units


http://cen.acs.org/articles/85/i8/Huntsman-Divestiture.html



Monday, September 22, 2014

200 Years of Accounting Research (Book)

2 The 19th century

2.1 The pioneers of early accounting research

Degrange 18xx

会计五要素: cash, goods, receivables, payables, profit and loss, 后来又加了miscellaneous

18世纪,Robert Hamilton, 著名章节farm accounting

然后就是一些double-entry的进步

19世纪上半叶,开始区分financial and factory accounting

von  Sonnenfels (with regard to cameralistic accounting) Q:这词什么意思???

Leuchs (1806) 用了这样的字眼:'cost or market value, whichever is lower' and divide acquisition cost into sales-related and independent (or fixed) cost

2.2 Theories of 'accounts'

science of bookkeeping

Schneider highly praises Besta and points out that: (page 25)

He is the first to relate accounting to economic theory, e.g. he uses replacement values by appealing to Ricardo's value theory (reproduction costs) and concerns himself thoroughly with present value )Ertragswert) calculations of real estate and leases.

2.3 Personalistic versus materialistic theories of 'accounts'

把accounts拟人化(personalization)

这段主要讲分类,怎么演变的

2.4 The proprietary theory

to define a conceptual framework based upon logic to replace 'rationalization' as used in personifcation of accounts (page 27)

proprietary theory的核心,最重要的是capital account and capital  preservation。重要的是赚没赚钱,而不是记账。

2.5 The entity theory

Assets were occasionally regarded to be future expenses, and the previous distinction between ownership claims and debt claims may become blurred, as both were now accepted as equities.

Thursday, September 18, 2014

我的10th PPT


What I am trying to do in my research is to investigate why managers make management forecasts.

Management forecast is one important form of voluntary disclosure. The percentage of publicly traded companies providing annual guidance increased from 61% to 82% (Hirst et al., 2008)

Apparently, I am not the first person to ask and try to answer this question. There are a long list of literatures to show the real effects of management forecasts on firms' stock performance. Due to the limited space on my PPT, and more important, I do not want to hold everybody here through the whole weekend, I only list a few papers here.

Firms with higher information asymmetry release management forecasts to reduce information asymmetry. Management forecasts help firms to raise outside equity due to a better information environment. Increased frequency of management forecasts also increase liquidity, decrease cost of capital, reduce litigation costs, and attract  more analysts following. Furthermore, managers have strong incentives to avoid equity mispricing especially when the mispricing could adversely affect their wealth. For example,  they want to sell a portion of stocks but the stock price is undervalued.

All of these papers, even the summary paper from JAE, consider management forecast is voluntary disclosure. No wonder all these papers cite all the modelling and empirical papers about all the other kinds of voluntary disclosure in their literature reviews paragraph. However, management forecast is not equal to voluntary disclosure. Whether management forecasts can stand for overall voluntary disclosure is also questionable. 

(1) Management forecasts do not provide information other than earnings guidance. Give a simple example. Apple Inc. would like to give investors its earnings forecasts for the next period, but the company will not give when it will launch Iphone 7 or whether they are going to produce an iCar as a new profit source.

Therefore, management forecast can only lower the information asymmetry related to the future earnings, only the number of earnings, but not other part of the firm. 

(2) My calculation of correlation between management forecasts and one measure of voluntary disclosure is almost zero.



I look at a situation where information environment changes due to external reason. Specifically, I look at the spinoff event. Spinoff is a special restructuring event. The parent firm spin offs its subsidiary and create a new separate, independent, and public firm. Previously, there is only one public firm and one copy of financial statement. Now there are two public firms. Each has a separate financial statement. Therefore, by definition, information asymmetry about the earnings is lowered.

Endogenous problem? I think the problem is not very severe here. Compare spinoff decision and disclosure decision. Spinoff is much larger strategy decision and takes a lot of time, effort from the firm while disclosure is much smaller cost. I do not think that firms that intend to reduce management forecasts will intentionally choose spinoffs.

Usually, firms reduce management forecasts because they get through long term bad performance, they cannot meet analysts forecasts, and etc. Therefore, spinoff is a good event to test whether management forecasts behavior changes according to the change of information asymmetry.

Some CEOs mention their spinoff incentives in the media or the SEC filings. For example, AT&T says ...
Liberty say...

However, spinoff could also increase information asymmetry. Before the spinoff, parent is a large, diversified firm. It is easier for managers to smooth the earnings and firms less volatile earnings are more likely to give more forecasts. Now the firm size is smaller and segment number decreases, if CEOs still want to manipulate earnings, it could be harder for him.

But we do not know which hypothesis could dominate the other. Most literatures show that information asymmetry reduces after spinoffs except one paper shows the opposite. First two papers use analyst forecasts precision as the proxy of information asymmetry and choose the time period in -1 and +1. The last paper regresses the daily stock return on market stock return, and uses the standard deviation of error as the firms' specific information. Additionally, they choose a very short term before and after spinoff and find information asymmetry is increasing. The whole process is not convincable to me.


Wednesday, September 17, 2014

力力问,公司复杂程度与management forecasts的关系


Firm diversification and asymmetric information: evidence from analysts' forecasts and earnings announcements

Shawn Thomas

2002, JFE

Abstract


Managers frequently cite the desire to mitigate asymmetric information as a motivation for increasing firm focus. The information benefits of focus appear relevant for the subset of firms that actually increase their focus; however, the relevance of focus-related information benefits for the population of diversified firms is an open question. This paper examines the relation between corporate diversification and asymmetric information proxies derived from analysts’ forecasts and abnormal returns associated with earnings announcements. I find that greater diversification is not associated with increased asymmetric information. These results call into question the notion that corporate diversification strictly exacerbates information problems.

Thomas发现diversification程度和information asymmetry没什么关系。

=================================================

International Diversification and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy and Bias


Augustine Duru and David M. Reeb

2002, TAR

Abstract

We investigate the association between corporate international diversification and the accuracy and bias of consensus analysts' earnings forecasts. We find that greater corporate international diversification is associated with less accurate and more optimistic forecasts. Our results suggest that international diversification reflects unique dimensions of forecasting difficulty that are not captured in previously identified determinants. This evidence suggests that as firms become more geographically diversified, forecasting their earnings becomes more complex.

Duru and Reeb发现,公司全球化越diversified,forecasts越困难。(对于financial analysts来说)

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WHY MANAGERS EXPLAIN EARNINGS FORECASTS

Baginski, Hassell, Kimbrough (2004, JAR)

解释earnings forecasts的一些理由



=================================================

Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives

Nagar et al. (2003, JAE)



# of segments和# management forecasts的correlation是-0.06,虽然显著,但是economics上几乎为零。

=================================================

力力问,Fog Index还有the number of numbers有没有办法编程?

晨晨问了吴凯。

Python
Topic Modeling

Maybe广宇。

=================================================


Tuesday, September 2, 2014

Sletten (2011, RAS)

The effect of stock price on discretionary disclosure

文章研究的是,在一个exogenous引起的股价下跌后,公司是否会发布一个消息。这消息,在股价下跌之前,肯定是坏消息无疑;但是股价下跌后,比起跌幅,这个消息反而不算太坏,甚至可以算好消息了。(原话是:previously considered bad (based on previous stock price) and withheld from investors, is now considered good (relative to revised stock price) and is thus disclosed.)

Sletten确实发现了, 股价下跌之后,公司发布好消息。

有些关于disclosure的common sense,Sletten甚至都不再引用作者了。

(1) size, analyst following, return on assets, and litigation risk are higher for firms issuing forecasts.各种表现好的时候,disclosure的可能性更大。

(2) managers are more likely to issue forecasts when investors' expectations are optimistic。未来预期如果好,disclosure的可能性更大。

(3) Forecasting firms come from more concentrated industries, possibly because of propriety costs. 集中度更高的行业,更多disclosure.(我觉得propriety costs好像不是很好的解释,在这里。)

(4) they are more likely to issue forecasts in the previous quarter and in the period between last quarter's earnings announcement and the peer firm's restatement announcement, which is consistent with some of the firms being "frequent guiders", as suggested by Bhojraj et al. (2011).

(5) firms with more days remaining before the end of the announcement quarter are also more likely issue forecasts, as are firms tat restate their own financial statements within the following 90 days.

Bova, Dou, Hope (2014, CAR)

Employee Ownership and Firm Disclosure

两个发现:

(1) employee如果有强大bargaining power, 通常公司会less disclosure.(e.g. unions工会)

(2) 但是employee ownership如果增加,这种Information asymmetry就会降低。因为这时候他们的利益越来越像股东,而不是索取超额的工资。同时,股东也为此获益了,disclosure增加了。

Voluntary Disclosure Proxies

(1) management guidance

  • # of management forecasts issued
  • the quality of management forecasts (Francis, Nanda, and Olsson, 2008) (e.g. point, range, open-ended?)

(2) conference calls - # of conference calls

(3) annual report readability - Fog index

(4) aggregate disclosure measure