P499
1. Introduction
管理层工资高于一线员工300倍,是因为寻租(rent extraction).
2. Trends and Components in executive compensation 趋势和构成
2.1 Short-term components
salary, bonus, and other annual compensation
quite small fraction of total incentives
测量公司绩效的常见工具:
ROE, ROA, ROI,EVA
还有比如plant quality ("zero-defects"),市场份额,等等。
2.2 Long-term components
new grants of restricted stock, new grants of stock options, long-term incentive plan payouts, and all other components
其他包括:
× gross-ups for tax liabilities (公司给的额外的税的优惠。比如给个价值$3000的搬家费,说的是税前)
Tax gross-ups are often used as a way to compensate employees in advance for tax liabilities. For example, if an employee is promised $3,000 for moving expenses with a gross-up of one-third of that amount added, the payment is $4,000. The extra $1,000 covers most of the tax liability that needs to be paid on the $3,000 payment; once that $1,000 is deducted from the $4,000 payment, the employee has $3,000 in actual funds for moving expenses. In that case, the recipient is compensated in advance for future taxes — the gross-up is a benefit.
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/tax-grossup-definition-30980.html
× perquisites 额外补贴,临时津贴
× preferential discounts on stock purchases
× contributions to benefit plans
× severance payments 分手费
以上这些"其他项目",通常被认为,不那么重要。relatively unimportant.
Yermack (2006) CEO买了corporate jet是寻租的表现。
Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2007) 捐款也是寻租的表征。
有些公司,比如GE的Jack Welch的退休金相当显著。
Benchuk and Fried (2004)管retirement benefits叫做"stealth" compensation.
2.2.1 Restricted stock
通常5年
第一,CEO通常因为restricted stock,所以想长期服务于公司。
第二,在vesting period内,CEO不能卖股票,所以公司业绩与他的股票价值挂钩。
1990s 后,restricted stocks的使用减少。2000 stock market decline后,使用又增加。
2.2.2 Stock options
典型的option年限是10年。但是大都被提早行权。
一般条款说,每年25%被允许行权(还有25%一旦授予,就可以行权。)所以,通常需要3年时间,可以充分解套。之后有7年时间,可以hold直到maturity(过期)。
nonqualified options,大多数公司都在用这种options,因为CEO会支付option给的价格,与行权价格差之间的税。对于公司来说,这种方式省钱。
以前会计是不计入options在报表上的,所以Murphy (2002)谈到,公司都觉得这是一种低成本的奖励机制,因为deferred costs都不在报表内啊!
两种估算方式:
第一,把股票增幅设定在5%-10%
第二,用Black Scholes
Yermack (1997),管理层在好消息发放前,拿到options。在坏消息发放前,行权。(这个有悖于常理哇???!!!)
Lie (2005), Heron and Lie (2007) ,公司发放option的时间都很可疑,都是股价最低的时候。
2.2.3 Long-term incentive plans
IBM几大高管的长期incentive plans也挺多。
2.3 Aggregate measure of compensation
Total annual compensation of the executives
+ Annual change in wealth for the executive based on changes in firm value
= Aggregate measure of compensation for incentive purposes
Annual change in wealth for the executive based on changes in firm value包括这一年里股票,以及option的价值变化。
2.4.1 Total annual compensation
1999年Top 20的CEO工资,离散度也很大。
排名第一,Global Crossing, Ltd. 的Robert赚走了193 million。
排名20, Yahoo的Timothy,赚了44.6 million.
就工资,将近而言,CEO和普通工人的差距,在45倍左右,还没有business week讲的那么夸张。
2.4.2 Holdings of stock and options
mean和median差距很大,因为outliers的存在。
3. What determines incentives (什么决定了incentives,主要从agency的角度)
3.1 Pay-performance sensitivities (PPS)
Murphy (1999)有两种计算办法
第一,regress annual compensation on firm performance (dollar change in firm market value or percentage change)
历史数据有$3.25 (Jensen and Murphy, 1990)
$5.29 (Hall and Liebman, 1998)
for every $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth
Aggarwal and Samwick说,这种办法没有把risk考虑进去。所以用了如下方法。
第二,an executive's holdings of stock as a fraction of the total equity outstanding
管理层在总股本中占有的股票数量
share option另有一种算法(P508),option delta什么的。
平均explicit PPS是3.99%。
股价的增高也会增加PPS,因为option的价值更高了呀!
3.2 How should incentives be set?
谈到了Agency problem, Jensen and Mecking (1976)
Jensen (1986)调查了overinvestment.说在石油不景气的那些年,公司最佳的办法应该是把现金分给股东,而不是继续投资。
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999)发现股价的variance可以解释variation in incentives across CEOs. 两者负相关。
3.3 Executive discretion
Prendergast (2002) 说contracting environment对incentives有影响。
第一,不确定性越大,incentives越大。(但是以往的paper都不支持这种说法)
第二,不确定性越大,分权越多。(Nagar, 2002观察到banking中确实有类似的现象。)
3.4 Firm size
high compensation in dollar values and lower ownership in the firms
3.5 Accounting returns
是不是accounting-based outcome比market-return based outcome更能代表CEO的action呢?因为CEO不可控力之外的东西(比如股灾),不应该让CEO来受到惩罚。(P515)
3.6 Ability
Milbourn (2003)讲到,CEO ability是incentives的一个重要决定因素。
能力高的,不易被炒,股价更Informative,所以PPS也高。
反之,能力低的,容易被炒,股价不informative,所以PPS低。
Frydman (2005)发现,随着时间发展,general skills比specific skills对于CEO在Labor market中更重要。
Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2007) 发现,CAR(top管理层离职当天的return),和在他任期内公司的return负相关。
3.7 Incentives within firms
Oyer(2004) broad-based incentive pay can be optimal if an employee's future outside opportunities are positively correlated with firm performance.
Q: broad-based incentive pay什么意思?
Inderst and Mueller (2006)说broad-based incentive pay可以保护CEO,万一公司调整策略什么的,所以不需要他了。
Oyer and Schaefer (2004)提到了公司给broad-based stock option plan的三个原因,
第一,incentive provision
第二,吸引外头的人才
第三,留住现有的人才
小公司用这招比较多。
Cichello, Fee, Hadlock, and Sonti (2006)研究的是部门级经理。部门绩效好,turnover就少,跟公司整体绩效,或者公司其他部门绩效没什么大关系。turnover只和同行业的其他类似部门绩效,相关。
又有一篇老文章,Lazear and Rosen 1981,讲的是tournament incentives.
4. the general absence of the use of relative performance evaluation when compensating and providing incentives to top managers(评估时,缺了什么?)
5. what managerial actions incentives should or do influence the associated impact on firm value (哪些行为反过来影响股价)
6. alternatives to the agency view (skimming or rent extraction view),skimming在这里什么意思?
